Almanzor

Template:About Template:Otheruses Template:Short description Template:Infobox royalty Abu ʿĀmir Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdullāh ibn Abi ʿĀmir al-Maʿafiri (Template:Langx), nicknamed al-Manṣūr (Template:Langx, "the Victorious"),Template:Sfn which is often Latinized as Almanzor in Spanish, Almansor in Catalan and Almançor in Portuguese (Template:Circa 938 – 8 August 1002),Template:Sfn was a Muslim Arab Andalusi military leader and statesman. As the chancellor of the Umayyad Caliphate of Córdoba and hajib (chamberlain) for Caliph Hisham II, Almanzor was effectively ruler of Islamic Iberia.

Born in Turrush to a family of Yemeni Arab origin with some juridical ancestors, ibn Abi ʿĀmir left for Córdoba when still young to be trained as a faqīh.Template:Sfn After a few humble beginnings, he joined the court administration and soon gained the confidence of Subh, mother of the children of Caliph Al-Hakam II.Template:Sfn Thanks to her patronage and his own efficiency, he quickly expanded his role.Template:Sfn

During the caliphate of Al-Hakam II, he held several important administrative positions, including director of the mint (967), administrator for Subh and her children, administrator for intestate inheritances, and quartermaster for the army of General Ghalib ibn Abd al-Rahman (973).Template:Sfn The death of the caliph in 976 marked the beginning of the domination of the Caliphate by this functionary, which continued beyond his death with the government of two of his sons, Abd al-Malik al-Muzaffar and Abd al-Rahman Sanchuelo, up to 1009.Template:Sfn As chamberlain of the caliphate (from 978), he exercised extraordinary power in the al-Andalus state, throughout the Iberian Peninsula and in part of the Maghreb, while Caliph Hisham II was reduced to near-figurehead status.Template:Sfn

His portentous rise to power has been explained by an insatiable thirst for dominance, but historian Eduardo Manzano Moreno warns that "it must be understood within the framework of the complex internal struggles that developed within the Umayyad administration."Template:Sfn Deeply religious, he received the pragmatic support of Muslim authorities for his control of political power, though not without periodic tensions between them.Template:Sfn The basis of his power was his defense of jihad,Template:Sfn which he proclaimed in the name of the Caliph.Template:Sfn His image as a champion of Islam served to justify his assumption of governmental authority.Template:Sfn

Having monopolized political dominance in the caliphate, he carried out profound reforms in both foreign and domestic politics.Template:Sfn He made numerous victorious campaigns in both the Maghreb and Iberia.Template:Sfn On the peninsula, his bloody and very destructive incursions against the Christian kingdoms temporarily halted their advance southward.Template:Sfn

Origins and youthEdit

Although there are doubts about the exact date of his birth, everything seems to indicate that it occurred around the year 939.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn He was born into an Arab landowning familyTemplate:Sfn of Yemeni origin,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn belonging to the al-Ma'afir tribe.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn They had been established since the conquest of Visigothic Iberia in Torrox, a farm by the mouth of the Guadiaro river,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn belonging to the cora (territorial subdivision) of al-Jazīrah (governed from al-Jazīrah al-Khaḍrāʾ الجزيرة الخضراء, the site of modern Algeciras).Template:Sfn Template:Sfn His family had received lands there from Tariq ibn Ziyad as reward to an ancestor, Abd al-Malik, who had distinguished itself in the taking of Carteia during the Umayyad conquest of Hispania.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Efn

Some of the family had served as Qadis and jurists.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The family's position improved significantly with the appointment of ibn Abi ʿĀmir's paternal grandfather as Qadi of Seville and his marriage to the daughter of a vizier, governor of Badajoz and doctor to Caliph Abd al-Rahman III.Template:Sfn ibn Abi ʿĀmir's father, Abd Allah, was described as a pious, kind and ascetic man,Template:Sfn who died in Tripoli Template:Sfn while returning from his pilgrimage to Mecca.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn His mother, Burayha, also belonged to an Arab family.Template:Sfn Even so, the family was middle class, modestTemplate:Sfn and provincial.Template:Sfn

Ascent in the Caliphal CourtEdit

File:Die Gartenlaube (1875) b 213.jpg

Scrivener, in a nineteenth-century representation. After completing his studies as a faqīh, the young Almanzor had to adopt this profession due to the poor economic situation of his family after the death of his father.

Though still very young, Ibn Abi ʿAmir moved to Córdoba,Template:Sfn where he developed his studies in law and letters under the tutelage of his maternal uncle.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn This training was intended to facilitate entering the state administration,Template:Sfn because the opportunities for advancement in the military were limited to Arabs.Template:Sfn Like many other youth from wealthy families, he received training in interpretation of the Quran, prophetic tradition and application of Sharia, thus completing his education as a faqīh,Template:Sfn with the intention of becoming a judge,Template:Sfn and from this time he retained his taste for literature.Template:Sfn Instructed by renowned masters of Islamic legal tradition and letters, he showed talent in these studies.Template:Sfn

The death of his father and the bad family situation led him to abandon his studies and take the profession of scrivener.Template:Sfn After occupying a modest position as a scribe along the alcázar and mosque of Córdoba – close to the offices of the Administration – to earn his livelihood,Template:Sfn the youth soon stood out for his talent and ambitionTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn and he began his political career as a clerk in the audience chamber of the capital's chief Qadi, Muhammed ibn al-Salim,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn an important advisor to the Caliph Al-Hakam II despite the fact that his positions were exclusively religious and not political.Template:Sfn Ibn Abi ʿĀmir soon caught the attention of Vizier Ja'far al-Mushafi,Template:Sfn head of the civil administration, who would introduce him to caliphal court, probably on the recommendation of Ibn al-Salim.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Already noted for his knowledge and professional competence, he began to accumulate positions in the Administration.Template:Sfn Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, in his thirties,Template:Sfn was one of the young functionaries who took part in a generational turnover of the court at the beginning of Al-Hakam's reign.Template:Sfn

File:Juan Gimenez Martin - In the Harem.jpg

Harem scene. Shortly after joining the caliphal Administration, Ibn Abi ʿĀmir forged a lasting alliance with the mother of the heir to the throne, the favorite Subh, which was only broken in 996 by Ibn Abi ʿĀmir's ambitions, which Subh considered a threat to her son Hisham.

In late February of 967,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn he was given charge of Abd al-Rahman, son and heir of Al-Hakam II by his favorite,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn the Basque Template:Sfn Subh (Aurora),Template:Sfn Template:Sfn a slave with very diverse training, from singing to Islamic jurisprudence to poetry, who owed her power to her ascendancy over the caliph as the mother of his children.Template:Sfn With her, Ibn Abi ʿĀmir established a privileged relationship extremely beneficial for his career.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Although his role was probably secondary,Template:Sfn his responsibility managing the estates of the heir to the throne and those of his mother granted Ibn Abi ʿĀmir close proximity to the reigning family,Template:Sfn and he quickly began to accumulate important positions.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Seven months after his first appointment, and thanks to the intercession of the royal favorite,Template:Sfn he became director of the mint,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn and in December 968,Template:Sfn he was named treasurer of the vacant inheritances.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Efn The following year he was promoted to Qadi of Seville and Niebla,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn one of the most important in the state, and at the death of his charge Abd al-Rahman in 970,Template:Sfn he was placed in the same role for the young heir, Hisham.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn By this time he had married the sister of the head of the caliphal guard, a client of the new heir,Template:Sfn and began to accumulate wealth. A residence was built in al-Rusafa,Template:Sfn near the former palace of Abd al-Rahman I, and he began to make sumptuous gifts to the Caliph's harem.Template:Sfn He was accused of embezzlementTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn and removed from his post as head of the mint in March 972,Template:Sfn but was helped financially to cover the alleged embezzlement.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn He obtained a police commandTemplate:Sfn Template:Efn and he retained his responsibility for the heir and intestate estates.Template:Sfn

In 973, he undertook the logistical, administrative and diplomatic aspects of the caliphal campaign against the Idrisids in the Maghreb,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn with the official position of High Qadi of the Umayyad possessions in North Africa.Template:Sfn The importance of the fleet in the campaign and its dependence on Seville, where Ibn Abi ʿĀmir was Qadi and therefore had responsibility for its facilities, and the confidence of the caliph himself and his chamberlain,Template:Sfn facilitated his acquisition of this appointment.Template:Sfn The commission brought with it authority over civilians and military personnel and, in practice, the supervision of the campaign.Template:Sfn A primary responsibility of his role was to obtain the submission of the notables of the region by giving them formal gifts, the acceptance of which indicated their acceptance of the Caliph's authority and a promise of loyalty.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Along with military victories, this undermined the enemy's position.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn

Achieving victory against the Idrisids, Ibn Abi ʿĀmir returned sick to the Cordoban court in September 974,Template:Sfn intending to recover and resume his duties.Template:Sfn He never returned to North Africa.Template:Sfn His experience as a supervisor of the enlisted troops for the Maghreb campaign gave him an appreciation for their possible political utility if he gained control.Template:Sfn It also allowed him to establish relations with the tribal leaders of the areaTemplate:Sfn and with his future powerful father-in-law, Ghalib ibn Abd al-Rahman,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn who had led the military aspects of the operation.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Ibn Abi ʿĀmir's ability to manage organizational and economic aspects of the campaign was widely recognized,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn and rewarded months before with his reappointment as head of the mint,Template:Sfn and was the beginning of his political success.Template:Sfn In the last months of Al-Hakam's illness, he appointed Ibn Abi ʿĀmir inspector of professional troops,Template:Sfn which included the bulk of the Berbers brought from the Maghreb by the caliph to try to form a force loyal to his person, which guaranteed him access to the throne of the Caliph's young son.Template:Sfn

Taking powerEdit

Elimination of pretenders and formation of triumvirateEdit

The death of Caliph Al-Hakam II on 1 October 976Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Efn and the proclamation of his son Hisham as his successor inaugurated a new period in the political career of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn and also represented a pivotal event in the history of the Caliphate, which thereafter was marked by his tenureTemplate:Sfn and by the gradual withdrawal of the third Caliph.Template:Sfn Al-Andalus went through a serious succession crisis at this time, because the designated successor, Hisham, born in 965, was too young to rule.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn He had been only eight or nine years old in 974 when his father first introduced him to the process of government,Template:Sfn and was still a minor when his father died.Template:Sfn Template:Efn This was an extraordinary situation because neither the emirate nor caliphate had previously been in the hands of a child.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Some schools of Islamic jurisprudence rejected the possibility of a minor becoming Caliph,Template:Sfn but the Umayyad Al-Andalus tradition had secured the inheritance from parent to child,Template:Sfn while the case of Abd al-Rahman III set a precedent for primogeniture.Template:Sfn Faced with this situation, and despite the efforts of Al-Hakam during the last years of his reign to ensure the succession of his son by associating him with the tasks of government,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn there was division on the succession.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Some favored the appointment of a regent, the chamberlain al-Mushafi, while others preferred to give the caliphal title to one of the brothers of the deceased Caliph, the twenty-seven-year-old al-Mughira,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn who was the favorite younger son of Abd al-Rahman III.Template:Sfn

Two prominent Eastern European slaves (saqaliba) occupying important court positions – one, the uncle of the new CaliphTemplate:Sfn – who were present at Al-Hakam's death decided to take action before this division was more widely known.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn They moved to place al-Mughira on the throne,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn with the condition that he name his nephew Hisham as his heir,Template:Sfn and to remove the chamberlain, al-Mushafi,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn thereby giving them ascendance at court over the faction supporting Hisham.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The two, who would nonetheless occupy prominent places in the ceremony proclaiming Hisham once their plan was thwarted,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn had the support of the thousand saqalibas of the court and control of the palace guard.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The chamberlain, who was the real center of political power after the death of al-HakamTemplate:Sfn and even in the last years of his reign,Template:Sfn had pretended to support the conspirators, only to subvert them thanks to the support of Berber troops.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn He quickly broke up the plot with the help of Subh, and instructed Ibn Abi ʿĀmir,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn then a senior official and member of the court with privileged access to the young Caliph and his mother, to murder the pretender.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The support of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, the right hand of Subh,Template:Sfn for the young caliph was crucial to his rise to power.Template:Sfn

A reluctant but obedientTemplate:Sfn Ibn Abi ʿĀmir surrounded al-Mughira's residence with a detachment of one hundred soldiers,Template:Sfn broke in and notified al-Mughira of the death of al-Hakam and the enthronement of Hisham II.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The young uncle of Hisham expressed his loyalty, and in the face of Almanzor's doubts, demanded compliance with the order for his own assassination.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Al-Mughira was then strangled in front of his familyTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn in the living room of his house, and hung on a beam of the roof of an adjacent structure as if he had committed suicide.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Al-Mushafi and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir thus fulfilled the wishes of their late master to ensure the accession of Hisham.Template:Sfn The young Caliph's supporters relied on the Berber guard, created by al-Hakam for his son,Template:Sfn to face the saqalibas, more than eight hundred of which were expelled from the palace as a result of the crisis.Template:Sfn

Hisham II was invested as caliph on or about Monday, 1 October 976,Template:Sfn Template:Efn with the title of al-Mu'ayyad bi-llah,Template:Sfn ("one who receives the assistance of God").Template:Sfn Ibn Abi ʿĀmir participated in the ceremony, recording in the minutes the oaths of fidelity the attendees made before the cadí.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn A week later, 8 October 976, Hisham named al-Mushafi hajibTemplate:Sfn – chamberlain or prime minister – and made the 36-year-old Ibn Abi ʿĀmir the vizierTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn and delegate of the hajib.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The latter thus maintained a position of singular importance as the link between the new Caliph's mother, in practice representing the government during the minority of Hisham, and the administration headed by al-Mushafi.Template:Sfn The power was effectively in the hands of a triumvirate formed by chamberlain al-Mushafi, the vizier Ibn Abi ʿĀmir and General Ghalib. Subh, who had been associated with them in the past and now ruled in a way on their behalf; this triumvirate reported all important matters to her and consulted her and acted with her permission. They knew very well that without her support they could not win and stay in power in the uncertain and dangerous political spiral of the court, so they tried very hard to please her.Template:Sfn To boost the popularity of the new Caliph among the population, and strengthen their own positions, they abolished the unpopular oil tax.Template:Sfn

Ruin of al-MushafiEdit

File:Weeks Edwin Entering The Mosque 1885.jpg

Soldiers outside the mosque according to a nineteenth-century representation. Almanzor soon gained control of the army of the capital, which settled in his new fortified residence in Template:Ill, built in 979.

While the alliance between Ibn Abi ʿĀmir and al-Mushafi had undermined the traditional power of the court slaves,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn relations between the two soon deteriorated.Template:Sfn The Chamberlain's failure to address the loss of prestige due to the succession intrigue and Christian incursionsTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn that in 976 almost reached the capitalTemplate:Sfn allowed Ibn Abi ʿĀmir to gain control of army troops in the capital of the CaliphateTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn after assuring Subh of his ability to restore that military prestige.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, unlike the chamberlain, was inclined towards the military response to Christian incursions and was willing to command a retaliatory strike.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Al-Mushafi, however, had advocated a defensive strategy,Template:Sfn that, despite Cordoban military power, had conceded the territories north of the Guadiana to the Christian states.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn At the same time, and also thanks to the influence of Subh, Ghalib obtained the government of the Lower March and command of the border armies.Template:Sfn

In February 977,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Ibn Abi ʿĀmir left the capital for his first campaigning season in Salamanca, following the strategy of containment of the Christian states maintained during the previous reign.Template:Sfn His appointment as warden – head of an army – of the capital's troops drew him into alliance with Ghalib – the warden of the border armies – and brought about the end of the triumvirate that the two had formed with al-Mushafi.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn In his first campaign, lasting nearly two months,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn he plundered the outskirts of the baths at Baños de Ledesma.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Efn and brought two thousand captured prisoners to Córdoba, but failed to take any fortresses.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn In autumn, he attacked Salamanca.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn

Ibn Abi ʿĀmir won military prestige by repulsing Christian forces and attacking Cuéllar during a second 977 campaign,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn and Salamanca in the autumn of the same year,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn not for conquest, but to weaken the enemy and gain domestic popularity.Template:Sfn This new prestige allowed him to apply for the post of prefect of Córdoba, a role until then filled by a son of al-Mushafi.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The new military reputation of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, with the support of the harem and of Ghalib, allowed him to obtain the position without the chamberlain's consent.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn This led to open confrontation between Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, hitherto an apparent faithful and efficient servant of the chamberlain, and al-Mushafi.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The latter owed his power to the support of the previous caliph,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn and lacked firm support, being considered an upstart by the leading families in Córdoba's governing administration.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn He tried to counter the alliance between the other two members of the triumvirate by marrying another of his sons to Ghalib's daughter, Asma.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, who had won the favor of the cunning mother of the Caliph, of Ghalib, and of major families of the civil service,Template:Sfn skillfully intervened, using the intercession of Subh and directly addressing Ghalib to encourage him to withdraw his initial approvalTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn and instead allow Ibn Abi ʿĀmir himself to wed Ghalib's daughter.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The magnificent weddingTemplate:Sfn was held in the spring of 978,Template:Sfn eight months after the signing of the marriage contract sealed the alliance between Ghalib and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir and marked the decline of the power of the chamberlain.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn A few days after the wedding, Ghalib and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir left for a new campaign targeting Salamanca.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Military successes increased the power of the two allies and further undermined the chamberlain at court.Template:Sfn The two wardens received new titles as reward for their victories, and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir was named 'double vizier',Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn for Interior and Defense, the two most important vizierships.Template:Sfn Ghalib had been given the title of chamberlain at the end of 977 – an unprecedented situation as there had never been two chamberlains at the same time – depriving al-Mushafi of most of his duties,Template:Sfn and al-Mushafi was subsequently dismissedTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Efn and imprisoned.Template:Sfn His relatives and supporters in positions of the Administration were arrested and his possessions confiscated.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Ibn Abi ʿĀmir succeeded the defeated al-Mushafi as a second chamberlain for the Caliphate.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The most important supporting positions were held by trusted people, in some cases family members.Template:Sfn The elimination of the old chamberlain reduced the visibility of the Caliph, and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir gradually became the intermediary between his lord and the rest of the world.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Aware that his power emanated from Hisham, Mansur was careful, however, to continue to maintain the appearance of the minor's sovereignty.Template:Sfn

Dissatisfaction with the royal minority and the regency fueled a new rebellion organized by prominent members of the court at the end of 978.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The conspirators intended to replace Hisham with one of his cousins,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn a grandson of Abd al-Rahman III.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn An improvised attempt to stab the Caliph to death failedTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn and led to the brutal repression of the conspirators at the insistence of Subh and Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, not without overcoming the resistance of major legal advisors.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Efn This ended attempts to replace the Caliph with another member of the Umayyad dynasty,Template:Sfn resulting in the flight of any possible pretender from the capital,Template:Sfn the close surveillance of members of the Umayyad family, and the constructionTemplate:Sfn the following yearTemplate:Sfn of a new fortified residence for Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, Template:Ill Template:Sfn Template:Efn (the "Resplendent City"),Template:Sfn work that went on until 989.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn This new residence, located east of Córdoba,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn housed troops loyal to Ibn Abi ʿĀmir and the governmental administrationTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn and was the center of a sumptuous court.Template:Sfn In addition, to calm the malaise among the faqīh caused by the repression of the conspirators against Hisham's legitimacy, in which some had colluded, he established a commission to expunge Al-Hakam's library.Template:Sfn

As a chamberlain, in the summer he had directed a new campaign that lasted more than two months, this time in the northeast against Pamplona and Barcelona.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn In the fall he made a new incursion into Ledesma lasting just over a month.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn In May the following year, he directed a new campaign in this region.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The next incursion, during the summer, marched to Sepulveda.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn In September 979,Template:Sfn he sent troops from Algeciras to the aid of Ceuta, threatened by the victorious campaign of Buluggin ibn Ziri, supported by the Fatimids, against Umayyad clients in the Western Maghreb.Template:Sfn Later, the city became the center of Algerian Maghreb politics.Template:Sfn

Showdown with Ghalib ibn Abd al-RahmanEdit

Having crushed the opposition at court, the two co-leaders soon clashed.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The old general resented prostrating before Ibn Abi ʿĀmir,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn who had devoted himself to strengthening his power and controlling access to the caliph.Template:Sfn Ghalib believed the maneuvers of his ally, including the construction of his new palatial residence, the reinforcement of the Berber military units, and his increasing control over the Caliph,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn would eventually damage the dynasty.Template:Sfn For his part, Ibn Abi ʿĀmir viewed his father-in-law's continued military prestige as obscuring his own military prowess, despite successive victorious campaigns.Template:Sfn After several joint raids into Christian lands, mainly led by the veteran Ghalib despite the growing military experience of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, a confrontation erupted in the spring of 980,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn over a campaign around Atienza.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Betrayed by Ghalib and wounded, his life only saved through the intercession of the Qadi of Medinaceli,Template:Sfn Ibn Abi ʿĀmir reacted by immediately attacking the fortressTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn where his father-in-law's family was,Template:Sfn and looted it once taken.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Almanzor continued north, but the confrontation with Ghalib, fortified in Atienza, ended the larger campaign, intended to be his second against Castile since 975.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Ghalib was forced into exile in Christian territory.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn In the fall, Mansur led a new offensive against 'Almunia', which is unidentified.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Then in 981, a year of great martial activity for Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, he sent five military campaigns north, the first in February and March.Template:Sfn

After several clashes between the co-leaders that ended favorably for Ibn Abi ʿĀmir,Template:Sfn in April of 981, Ghalib, allied with Castile and Pamplona, defeated him.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn In May, Ibn Abi ʿĀmir counterattacked after having united Berber troops, his own Cordoban men, and some of the border units that his enemy had long commanded.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Ghalib, meanwhile, had the backing of another part of the Caliphate's border forces and his Castilian and Navarese allies.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn On the verge of achieving victory over his son-in-law on in the Battle of Torrevicente on 10 July 981,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Ghalib was found dead in a ravine without signs of violence.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn He may have died of natural causes, being almost eighty years old.Template:Sfn The troops of his rival, disconcerted by the death of their leader,Template:Sfn largely passed to Ibn Abi ʿĀmir's flag.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Ghalib's body was severely mutilated,Template:Sfn first by his own troops at the direction of Ibn Abi ʿĀmir, who wanted to prove his enemy's death,Template:Sfn and then exposed in Córdoba.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Several of his main allies were also killed in the battle,Template:Sfn which gave the winner the nickname, Almanzor,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn ("the Victorious"Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn) by which he is known to history.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The passing of Ghalib made him sole chamberlain and allowed him to eliminate any possible opponents at court,Template:Sfn although his legitimacy came only from his position as regentTemplate:Sfn and the tolerance of the Caliph's mother.Template:Sfn With the elimination of Ghalib, the power of the Caliph became concentrated in his person.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn

That same year, he looted Zamora and its surroundings in September.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn A month later, he attacked Portuguese lands, probably Viseu.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn

Alliance with the queen mother and troubled governmentEdit

For twenty years, until the breakup of his alliance with the caliph's powerful mother in 996,Template:Sfn Ibn Abi ʿĀmir acted in part as her representative, advisor, treasurer, mediator, informant, and her commander of the armies and the police.Template:Sfn It was she who made most of the decisions, in consultation with her son's regents. She was aware of all the political developments of the government and the court and was a dominant force in factional struggles. Subh had a lot of trust and affection for Almanzor, and her support for him was so obvious to everyone that it caused rumors that they were in love. From the reign of Caliph Al-Hakam II to the new Caliph Hisham, it was Subh's patronage, apart from his own ability, that promoted him and removed his opponents from the court.Template:Sfn

Despite years of competition at court for power and administration by others, however, the Caliph, upon reaching his majority, made no move to assume control,Template:Sfn possibly due to some kind of illness or other inability to carry out the responsibilities of his position.Template:Sfn The historian, Al-Dhahabi, attributes Almanzor's locking up the Caliph to the latter being "feeble minded, believing what can't be true".<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> For example, someone brought him a piece of rock, saying it is from Jerusalem's site of the prophet's ascent to heaven. The Caliph rewarded him with a lot of gold. In another instance, someone presented him with a donkey's hoof, claiming it is Uzair's donkey, and he was also rewarded. Yet another person brought him hair, claiming it is the prophet's.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Almanzor not only assumed the caliphal power, but also roles as guardian of the incapacitated Caliph and guarantor of dynastic power.Template:Sfn The fact that he merely controlled the administration and army on behalf of Hisham, however, made him expendable, so he took steps to strengthen his position.Template:Sfn The capital was placed in the hands of a cousin of his, who controlled it tightly,Template:Sfn and he elevated a series of supporters, generally unpopular and considered despotic,Template:Sfn who managed to gain control of various Taifas after the disintegration of the Caliphate.Template:Sfn He also allied himself with important border lords.Template:Sfn

In 988 and 989 he had to face a double threat: a long droughtTemplate:Sfn that caused famine and forced him to apply some social measures to alleviate the shortage (delivery of bread or rescission of taxes, among others) and the emergence of a new rebellion against him in which his eldest Template:Sfn son sought to replace him.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Almanzor managed to disrupt the conspiracy,Template:Sfn which had been joined by the governor of Zaragoza, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muhammad of the Banu Tujib,Template:Sfn and that of Toledo,Template:Sfn an Umayyad descendant of Caliph Al-Hakam I,Template:Sfn 'Abd Allah bin Abd al-'Aziz al-MarwanidTemplate:Sfn also known as Abdullah Piedra Seca,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn but his efforts to get his son to submit proved fruitless.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The latter took refuge with the Castilians after the arrest of his fellow conspirators.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Almanzor launched a successful campaign against Castile and took custody of his wayward son, who was tried and beheaded at dawn on 8 September 990.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Almanzor, still reeling from his eldest son's betrayal, disowned him,Template:Sfn while also ordering those who had killed him at Almanzor's command to themselves be executed.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The governor of Zaragoza would be executed in his presence while he spared the life of Piedra Seca--perhaps because Almanzor did not want to stain his hands with Umayyad blood.Template:Sfn

Almanzor also clashed with some of his enemy's satirical poets, including Abu Yafar al Mushafi (d. 982) and Yûsuf ibn Hârûn al-Ramâdî (d. 1012–3), known as Abû Ceniza. Persecuted and subsequently forgiven, Abû Ceniza went to Barcelona in 986. Ibrahim ibn Idrís al-Hassani also paid for his satire of Almanzor with exile in Africa. Almanzor threw the poet Abu Marwan al-Jaziri in prison, where he died in 1003.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>

Almanzor, leader of al-AndalusEdit

Rupture with Subh and concentration of political powerEdit

File:Salon Rico 4.jpg

Interior of Medina Azahara, the fortified residence built by Almanzor, where he luxuriously locked Caliph Hisham II after the failed attempt at rebellion by the Caliph's mother Subh, after long years of alliance between them.

With Ghalib eliminated and Hisham unable to perform his duties as Caliph, Almanzor began to weigh preparing for the succession, and even the possibility of officially taking power.Template:Sfn In 989, he tried unsuccessfully to have the faqīhs accept his home, Medina Alzahara, as a major mosque.Template:Sfn From 991 he positioned his son Abd al-Malik in a similar way as Al-Hakam had done with Hisham, appointing him chamberlainTemplate:Sfn and supreme warden of the Caliphate's armies, although Almanzor did not step aside from those roles himself.Template:Sfn At the same time, he discreetly presented to the faqīhs who advised the senior Qadi the possibility that he himself might replace the CaliphTemplate:Sfn because Hisham was incapable and no one else in the state could hold the position.Template:Sfn The regency, formerly founded on Hisham's minority, could no longer be justified by his mere inability to carry out his functions.Template:Sfn The opinion of the faqīhs, however, was negative:Template:Sfn if not Hisham, according to the legal experts, power should devolve to another member of the tribe of Muhammad.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Almanzor reluctantly accepted the decision, and in the following years he gradually assumed even greater powers, corresponding to those of the Caliph: he confirmed the official appointments with his own seal rather than that of the Caliph, in spite of nominally acting on his behalf,Template:Sfn he appointed a new mint official, appropriated new titlesTemplate:Sfn and moved part of the administration to Template:Ill.Template:Sfn He also had his name mentioned after that of the Caliph in Friday prayers and maintained a court parallel to that of the sovereign at al-Zahira.Template:Sfn In 991, under pressure from the chamberlain, the council of faqīhs changed their unfavorable opinion as to the conversion of Medina Alzahira into a major mosque,Template:Sfn although its use continued to be frowned upon by many notable Cordobans.Template:Sfn

His attempts to seize power ended the long alliance between Almanzor and Subh in 996.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn After twenty years as a representative of Subh, Almanzor confronted the Caliph's mother and her supporters. After the collapse of the alliance, Subh tried with all her might to eliminate Almanzor and united with all his opponents and enemies and divided the court into two factions, a group supporting Almanzor and the survival of his power and another group supporting Subh whose goal was to take over the government by her son.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The clash between the two cliques was triggered by Subh withdrawing eighty thousand dinars from the royal treasury to finance an uprising against the chamberlain.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Almanzor discovered this thanks to his agents in the palace,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn and he reacted by successfully petitioning the council of viziers and Faqīhs to transfer the treasury to his residence, Template:Ill, characterizing Subh's theft as a robbery by the harem.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn With Almanzor sick, Subh took over the palace and tried in vain to block the transfer.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Abd al-Malik, Almanzor's son, won the support of the viziers. The Caliph repudiated the rebellion of his mother in late May 996, and Abd al-Malik took custody of both him and the treasure.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Though the rebellion she headed on the peninsula lost steam due to loss of funding and the rapid defeat of its few supporters,Template:Sfn the money she had previously taken allowed Subh to finance a rebellion in the Maghreb.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Although Almanzor had not yet managed to quell this revolt by fall 997, it failed to gain any support on the peninsula.Template:Sfn

To reinforce his image and that of his son and successor, Almanzor organized a paradeTemplate:Sfn with the Caliph and his mother.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The gesture served to dispel any doubts about the support of the Caliph for Almanzor, and thus refuted the allegations of Ziri ibn Atiyya, launched from the Maghreb.Template:Sfn After the procession, Hisham was locked up – with all the comforts but without power – in Template:Ill,Template:Sfn where his mother was probably also imprisoned.Template:Sfn Having lost her confrontation with her former ally, she died shortly thereafter in 999.Template:Sfn Almanzor, who had renewed his oath of allegiance to the Caliph with the proviso that he delegateTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn his powers to his family,Template:Sfn was strengthened. He sent his son to fight the North African rebellion,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn and took charge of all administrative power.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn He counted on the approval of the religious leadership who, fearing possible civil war, supported Almanzor's position as guarantor of stability and of the throne of the impotent Hisham.Template:Sfn State power was divided in two: with Almanzor blocking exercise of the symbolic and legitimate power of the Caliph, while that of the chamberlain and his successors, devoid of legitimacy for being Yemeni Mofarite and not of the Prophet's blood, controlled the Caliphate's policy.Template:Sfn

Reform of army and administrationEdit

The separation between the temporal power, held by Almanzor, and the spiritual, in the hands of Hisham as Caliph, increased the importance of military force, a symbol – along with the new majesty of the chamberlain's court, rival of that of the caliph himself – of the power of Almanzor, and an instrument to guarantee the payment of taxes.Template:Sfn

Almanzor successfully continued the military reforms begun by Al-HakamTemplate:Sfn and his predecessors,Template:Sfn covering many aspects.Template:Sfn On one hand, he increased the professionalization of the regular army,Template:Sfn necessary both to guarantee his military power in the capital and to ensure the availability of forces for his numerous campaigns, one of the sources of his political legitimacy.Template:Sfn This policy de-emphasized levies and other non-professional troops, which he replaced with taxes used to support the professional troops—often saqalibas Template:Sfn or Maghrebis—which freed the natives of al-Andalus from military service.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Recruitment of saqalibas and Berbers was not new, but Almanzor expanded it.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn On the other hand, he created new units, unlike the regular army of the Caliphate, that were faithful primarily to himselfTemplate:Sfn and served to control the capital.Template:Sfn Emir Abd al-Rahman I had already used Berbers and saqalibas for a permanent army of forty thousand to end the conflicts that hitherto had plagued the emirate.Template:Sfn At the time of Emir Muhammad I, the army reached thirty-five to forty thousand combatants, half of them Syrian military contingents.Template:Sfn This massive hiring of mercenaries and slaves meant that, according to Christian chroniclers, "ordinarily the Saracen armies amount to 30, 40, 50, or 60,000 men, even when in serious occasions they reach 100, 160, 300 and even 600,000 fighters." Template:Sfn In fact, it has been argued that, in Almanzor's time, the Cordovan armies could muster six hundred thousand laborers and two hundred thousand horses "drawn from all provinces of the empire."Template:Sfn

File:Mouwahidoune.jpg

Almanzor's troops, as represented in the Cantigas de Santa María. The chamberlain carried out wide-ranging military reforms.

In order to eliminate a possible threat to his power and to improve military efficiency, Almanzor abolished the system of tribal unitsTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn that had been in decline due to lack of Arabs and institution of pseudo-feudalism on the frontiers,Template:Sfn in which the different tribes each had their own commander and that had caused continuous clashes, and replaced it with mixed unitsTemplate:Sfn without clear loyalty under orders from Administration officials.Template:Sfn The nucleus of the new army, however, was formed increasingly by Maghrebi Berber forces.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The ethnic rivalries among Arabs, Berbers and Slavs within the Andalusi army were skillfully used by Almanzor to maintain his own powerTemplate:Sfn--for example, by ordering that every unit of the army consist of diverse ethnic groups so that they would not unite against him;Template:Sfn and thus preventing the emergence of possible rivals.Template:Sfn However, once their centralizing figure disappeared, these units were one of the main causes of the 11th-century civil war called the Fitna of al-Andalus.Template:Sfn Berber forces were also joined by contingents of well-paid Christian mercenaries,Template:Sfn who formed the bulk of Almanzor's personal guard and participated in his campaigns in Christian territories.Template:Sfn Almanzor's completion of this reform, begun by his predecessors, fundamentally divided the population into two unequal groups: a large mass of civilian taxpayers and a small professional military caste, generally from outside the peninsula.Template:Sfn

The increase in military forces and their partial professionalization led to an increase in financial expenses to sustain them.Template:Sfn This represented an additional incentive to carry out campaigns, which produced loot and land with which to pay the troops.Template:Sfn These lands, when handed over to the soldiers as payment, were thereafter subject to tribute and ceased to operate under a system of border colonization.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The Caliphal army was funded by the taxpaying farmers in exchange for military exemptions, and consisted of local recruits as well as foreign mercenaries – Berber militias, Slav and Black slaves, mercenary Christian companies and jihadi volunteers.Template:Sfn At that time al-Andalus was known as Dar Jihad, or "country of jihad", and attracted many volunteers, and though these were relatively few compared to the total army, their zeal in combat more than compensated for this.Template:Sfn

According to modern studies, these mercenary contingents made it possible to increase the total size of the Caliphal army from thirty or fifty thousand troops in the time of Abd al-Rahman III to fifty or ninety thousand.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Others, like Évariste Lévi-Provençal, argue that the Cordoban armies in the field with the Almanzor were between thirty-five thousand and seventy or seventy-five thousand soldiers.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Contemporary figures are contradictory: some accounts claim that their armies numbered two hundred thousand horsemen and six hundred thousand foot soldiers, while others talk about twelve thousand horsemen, three thousand mounted Berbers and two thousand sūdān, African light infantry.Template:Sfn According to the chronicles, in the campaign that swept Astorga and León, Almanzor led twelve thousand African and five thousand Al Andalus horsemen, and forty thousand infantry.Template:Sfn It is also said that, in his last campaigns, he mobilized forty-six thousand horsemen, while another six hundred guarded the train, twenty-six thousand infantry, two hundred scouts or 'police' and one hundred and thirty drummers.Template:Sfn or that the garrison of Cordoba consisted of 10,500 horsemen and many others kept the northern border in dispersed detachments.Template:Sfn However, it is much more likely that the leader's armies, even in their most ambitious campaigns, may not have exceeded twenty thousand men.Template:Sfn It can be argued that until the eleventh century no Muslim army on campaign exceeded thirty thousand troops, while during the eighth century the trans-Pyrenean expeditions totaled ten thousand men and those carried out against Christians in the north of the peninsula were even smaller.Template:Sfn

In the time of Emir Al-Hakam I, a palatine guard of 3000 riders and 2000 infantry was created, all Slavic slaves.Template:Sfn This proportion between the two types of troops was maintained until Almanzor's reforms. The massive incorporation of North African horsemen relegated the infantry to sieges and fortress garrisons.Template:Sfn This reform led to entire tribes, particularly Berber riders, being moved to the peninsula.Template:Sfn

The main weapon of the peninsular campaigns, which required speed and surprise, was the light cavalry.Template:Sfn To try to counteract them, the Castilians created the role of "villain knights" – ennobling those free men who were willing to keep a horse to increase the mounted units – through the Fuero de Castrojeriz of 974.Template:Sfn For similar reasons, the Barcelonan count Borrell II created the figure of the homes of paratge- who obtained privileged military status by fighting against the Cordobans armed on horseback – after losing their capital in the fall of 985.Template:Sfn In contrast to the prominent role the navy had played in previous decades under Abd al-Rahman III,Template:Sfn under Almanzor it served only as a means of transporting ground troops,Template:Sfn such as between the Maghreb and the Iberian Peninsula, or Alcácer do Sal's ships in the campaign against Santiago de Compostela in 997.Template:Sfn

During this time, military industry flourished in factories around Córdoba.Template:Sfn It was said to be able to produce a thousand bows and twenty thousand arrows monthly,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn and 1300 shieldsTemplate:Sfn and three thousand campaign stores annually.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn

As for the fleet, its network of ports was reinforced with a new base in the Atlantic, in Alcácer do Sal, which protected the area of Coimbra, recovered in the 980s, and served as the origin of the units that participated in the campaign against Santiago.Template:Sfn On the Mediterranean shore, the naval defense was centered at the base of al-Mariya, now Almería.Template:Sfn The dockyards of the fleet had been built in Tortosa in 944.Template:Sfn

Initially the maritime defense of the Caliphate was led by Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Rumahis, a veteran admiral who had served Al-Hakam II and was Qadi of Elvira Template:Sfn and Pechina.Template:Sfn He repulsed raids by al-Magus (idolaters) or al-Urdumaniyun ('men of the north', vikings),<ref>Crespi, Gabriele (1982). "L'Europe Musulmane". Les Formes de la nuit. No. 2. Saint Léger-Vauban: Zodiaque, pp. 55. En francés. {{#if:0763-7608|Template:Catalog lookup link{{#if:Template:Trim|{{#ifeq:Template:Yesno-no|yes|Template:Main other|{{#invoke:check isxn|check_issn|Template:Trim|error=Template:Error-small Template:Main other}}}}{{#if:Template:Trim|{{#ifeq:Template:Yesno-no|yes|Template:Main other|{{#invoke:check isxn|check_issn|Template:Trim|error=Template:Error-small Template:Main other}}}}{{#if:Template:Trim|{{#ifeq:Template:Yesno-no|yes|Template:Main other|{{#invoke:check isxn|check_issn|Template:Trim|error=Template:Error-small Template:Main other}}}}{{#if:Template:Trim|{{#ifeq:Template:Yesno-no|yes|Template:Main other|{{#invoke:check isxn|check_issn|Template:Trim|error=Template:Error-small Template:Main other}}}}{{#if:Template:Trim|{{#ifeq:Template:Yesno-no|yes|Template:Main other|{{#invoke:check isxn|check_issn|Template:Trim|error=Template:Error-small Template:Main other}}}}{{#if:Template:Trim|{{#ifeq:Template:Yesno-no|yes|Template:Main other|{{#invoke:check isxn|check_issn|Template:Trim|error=Template:Error-small Template:Main other}}}}{{#if:Template:Trim|{{#ifeq:Template:Yesno-no|yes|Template:Main other|{{#invoke:check isxn|check_issn|Template:Trim|error=Template:Error-small Template:Main other}}}}{{#if:Template:Trim|{{#ifeq:Template:Yesno-no|yes|Template:Main other|{{#invoke:check isxn|check_issn|Template:Trim|error=Template:Error-small Template:Main other}}}}{{#if:Template:Trim|{{#ifeq:Template:Yesno-no|yes|Template:Main other|{{#invoke:check isxn|check_issn|Template:Trim|error=Template:Error-small Template:Main other}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}|Template:Error-small}}.</ref> in the west of al-Andalus in mid-971;Template:Sfn at the end of that year, when they tried to invade Al Andalus,Template:Sfn the admiral left Almería and defeated them off the coast of Algarve.Template:Sfn In April 973, he transported the army of Ghalib from AlgecirasTemplate:Sfn to subdue the rebellious tribes of the Maghreb and end Fatimid ambitions in that area.Template:Sfn As in 997, when the Al Andalus fleet hit the Galician coast, in 985 it had ravaged the Catalans.Template:Sfn During the Catalan campaign, Gausfred I, Count of Empurias and Roussillon, tried to gather an army to help the locals but then several flotillas of Berber pirates threatened their coasts, forcing them to stay to defend their lands.Template:Sfn

To ensure control of the military, Almanzor eliminated the main figures who could have opposed his reforms:Template:Sfn in addition to the death of Ghalib, the participation of the governor of Zaragoza in the plot of his eldest son served as a justification to replace himTemplate:Sfn with another, more amenable, member of the same clan, the Banu Tujib.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The admiral of the fleet,Template:Sfn who maintained a significant budget, was poisonedTemplate:Sfn in January 980Template:Sfn and replaced by a man faithful to Almanzor.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn

As in the Army he encouraged the recruitment of Berbers faithful to him, so in the Administration he favored the saqalibas to the detriment of native officials, again with the aim of surrounding himself with personnel loyal only to him.Template:Sfn

Land transport routes were dotted with strongholds,Template:Sfn since ancient Al Andalus dignitaries sought to control communications.Template:Sfn Messengers were bought in Sudan and specially trained to handle Almanzor's messages and to transmit the official reports that his foreign ministries wrote about the annual campaigns.Template:Sfn

The Caliphate ruled by Almanzor was a rich and powerful state. According to Colmeiro, it is estimated that in a pre-industrial society, for every million inhabitants, ten thousand soldiers could be mustered. Even assuming the chronicles exaggerated tenfold the real numbers – these speak of eight hundred thousand soldiers – the caliphate could have had eight million inhabitants.Template:Sfn Those who use more bullish criteria estimate between sevenTemplate:Sfn and tenTemplate:Sfn million, but the population was probably much fewer.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Traditionally speaking, around the year 1000, the caliphate occupied four hundred thousand square kilometers and was populated by three million souls.Template:Sfn By comparison, the Iberian Christian states comprised one hundred and sixty thousand square kilometers and half a million people.Template:Sfn By the 10th century, 75% of the population under the Umayyads had converted to Islam, a number reaching 80% two centuries later.Template:Sfn By comparison, at the time of the Muslim invasion, Spain had about four million inhabitants, although there is no shortage of historians who would raise that estimate to seven or eight million.Template:Sfn

His realm also had large cities like Córdoba, which surpassed one hundred thousand inhabitants; Toledo, Almería and Granada, which were around thirty thousand; and Zaragoza, Valencia and Málaga, all above fifteen thousand.Template:Sfn This contrasted sharply with the Christian north of the peninsula, which lacked large urban centers.Template:Sfn

Defense of religious orthodoxy and legitimation of powerEdit

One of the instruments Almazor used to strengthen his power was his court,Template:Sfn at which writers and poets celebrated his virtues—praise that was used as propaganda among the people.Template:Sfn

File:Prayer in the Mosque.jpg

Praying in the mosque. Among the gestures that Almanzor made in service of his image as Defender of the Faith was the expansion of Córdoba's mosque.

The stability and prosperity of the regime and its rigorous defense of Islam, which Almanzor showed through various pious gestures, gave him popular support.Template:Sfn Also numbered among these gestures were copying a Koran that he took with him during his campaigns,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn and the expansion of the mosque of Cordoba (987–990).Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The political ambitions of the chamberlain had important repercussions on culture and religion, which he was forced to support.Template:Sfn His image as Islam's leader led to the censorship of some sciences considered non-Islamic, and to the purging from Al-Hakam's important library of works considered heretical.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn His political interests required him to ingratiate himself with the lawyers when his power was still unsteady, and led him to censure logic, philosophy and astrology, despite his appreciation for culture.Template:Sfn His meddling in religious matters led to the appointment of his own uncle, himself a veteran qadi, as the principal qadi after the death of the hostile Ibn Zarb, who had opposed some of his proposals.Template:Sfn The main expression of his defense of religion, however, was his military campaigns against the Christian states, a method of legitimization that the caliphs had used before but which Almanzor took to extremes.Template:Sfn Successive victories, despite their transient benefits to the realm, had a great propaganda effect,Template:Sfn both in the Caliphate and in the enemy states of the north.Template:Sfn To each crisis of his political career, he responded with large and/or multiple military campaigns.Template:Sfn

The campaigns also had a beneficial economic effect because of the loot – especially abundant slaves – obtained by them and because of the security they granted to the borders.Template:Sfn

The Maghreb campaignsEdit

The meager Cordoban cereal production forced the Umayyads to obtain stocks from the Maghreb, and, thus, to oppose Fatimid expansion in the region, which jeopardized their supply.Template:Sfn At stake was commercial control of the western Mediterranean.Template:Sfn Unlike his campaigns on the Iberian Peninsula and with the exception of the one carried out jointly with Ghalib at the beginning of his career, Almanzor did not take a personal role in the fighting in the Maghreb, but simply a supervisory one.Template:Sfn The effective direction of the fight was in the hands of subordinates, whom he would ceremonially accompany to Algeciras to see off the troops as they crossed the strait.Template:Sfn

Abd al-Rahman III had conquered Ceuta and Tangier and fortified them in 951, but he had not been able to prevent the Fatimids from taking control of the Maghreb in 958–959, after burning the Umayyad fleet in Almería in 955.Template:Sfn In 971, Umayyad clients suffered another heavy defeat.Template:Sfn The Fatimid march to Egypt around 972 benefitted the Umayyads, who were left facing a Fatimid client, the Sanhaja Berber Buluggin ibn Ziri.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn

File:ZiríesComoClientesFatimíes.svg

The situation in the Maghreb at the end of the 970s.

The Caliphate's strategy began by the fortification of Ceuta, manned by a large garrison.Template:Sfn In May of 978,Template:Sfn the Zenata tribes seized the city of Sijilmasa, at the northern end of the trans-Saharan gold, salt and textile trading routes, and where they founded a pro-Córdoba principality ruled by Jazrun ibn Fulful,Template:Sfn the city's conqueror.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The success of the Umayyad political machine, continued by Almanzor,Template:Sfn allowed him to concentrate the offensive power of the Berber tribes on the expansion of the regions that recognized his legitimacy and limited clashes among those accepting Córdoba's protection.Template:Sfn This conquest, which gave great prestige to Hisham and Almanzor—and affronted the Fatimids because it was the city where its founder had appeared before the Berber Kutama tribeTemplate:Sfn--allowed them to counteract the influence of the Fatimids who, after moving to Egypt, had left these regions under the control of the Zirid dynasty.Template:Sfn Ibn Ziri launched a victorious campaign that temporarily disrupted the Zenata and allowed him to recover much of the Western Maghreb before besieging Ceuta.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The refugees there asked for help from Almanzor, who sent a large army that he accompanied as far as Algeciras, to repulse Ibn Ziri, who decided to retireTemplate:Sfn although he continued harassing Umayyad supporters until his death in 984.Template:Sfn The effects of Ibn Ziri's inroads, however, were transient: at his death most of the tribes of the region once again accepted Cordoban religious authority.Template:Sfn

In 985, before the Idrisid Al-Hasan ibn Kannun, who had proclaimed himself Caliph, returned from his refuge in the Fatimid court in Egypt, Almanzor saw off a new army that crossed the Maghreb to confront him under command of his cousin.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Reinforcements were later dispatched, commanded by the eldest son of Almanzor, and his father-in-law, the governor of Zaragoza.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Overwhelmed, the Idrisid negotiated his surrender and proceeded to the Cordoban court,Template:Sfn but Almanzor had him assassinated on his way to the city, and later executedTemplate:Sfn his cousin who had granted safe conduct to the rebel.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn

The disagreements among the various tribal leaders loyal to the Umayyads did produce one crisis: the favor shown by Almanzor to Ziri ibn Atiyya of the Maghrawa Berbers upset other chiefs, who ended up rising in arms. They defeated the Cordoban governor of Fez, who died in combat, and Ibn Atiyya in April 991.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn After this defeat, Almanzor understood the need to grant control of the region to local Berber leaders instead of trying to govern through Iberian delegates.Template:Sfn This strategy aimed to attract the support of local tribes to the Umayyads.Template:Sfn Fundamentally, the fate of the campaigns depended on the changing loyalties of the various tribal leaders, although, in general, the Zenata supported the Umayyads while the Sanhaja supported the Fatimids.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Almanzor unsuccessfully attempted to divide the territory between Ibn Attiya and another tribal chief who had abandoned the Fatimids—the uncle of al-Mansur ibn Buluggin, son and successor of Buluggin ibn Ziri.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn So, Almanzor gave all lands controlled by the Caliphate to Ibn Atiyya,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn who managed to defeat the rebels and supporters of the Fatimids in 994,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn and founded a small principality centered on Oujda.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn

The crisis between Almanzor and the royal family in 996–998 caused a confrontation between him and Ibn Atiyya,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn who considered Almanzor's attitude towards the Caliph to be disrespectful.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Seeing in Ibn Atiyya a threat to his power, Almanzor dismissed himTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn and sent forces to combat him.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The Banu Maghrawa, the Banu Ifran and Banu Miknasa joined the Al Andalus forces landing at Tangier,Template:Sfn soon receiving reinforcements commanded by the Almanzor's son,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn already chamberlain.Template:Sfn At the beginning of August 998, Almanzor himself went to Algeciras with the numerous reinforcements destined to participate in the campaign.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn In October 998, Abd al-Malik managed to defeat Ibn Atiyya and put him to flight,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn although Almanzor still sought local support for the Umayyad administration.Template:Sfn Until his death, however, the territorial government remained in the hands of successive Iberian officials.Template:Sfn

The campaigns in the Maghreb also had an important consequence for Iberian politics: Almanzor brought Berber troops and warlords to the peninsula,Template:Sfn both to form his personal troops and as contingents in the campaigns against Christian territories.Template:Sfn Some of these leaders were even named viziers, which did not prevent their occasional fall from grace.Template:Sfn

Campaigns against ChristiansEdit

RaidsEdit

File:Map Almanzor campaigns-es.svg

Military campaigns of Almanzor. In dark green, territories conquered by the Arab military, while arrows depict the main campaigns of Almanzor and the dates on which they were carried out.

General characteristicsEdit

Since the death of Ramiro II of León in 950, his kingdom along with the kingdom of Pamplona and the county of Barcelona had been forced to recognize Cordoba's sovereignty through an annual tribute, with default resulting in reprisal campaigns.Template:Sfn Almanzor began carrying these out in 977 and he continued to do so until his death in 1002,Template:Sfn although most were concentrated in his later years when he was most powerful.Template:Sfn In parallel with the Maghreb campaigns, Almanzor was devoted to the war against the Christian kingdoms of Iberia. Although the various sources are in conflict on the precise details, it is estimated that he made about fifty-six campaigns,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn twenty of these being in the first period from 977 to 985.Template:Sfn In these offensives, Almanzor balanced attacks on centers of political and economic power with those against sites of religious importance.Template:Sfn The famous raids, cavalry strikes and aceiphas, literally "summer campaigns" and called by the Christians cunei, had as their tactical and economic objective the taking of captives and cattle from the enemy; strategically they sought to generate a state of permanent insecurity that prevented Christians from developing an organized life outside of castles, fortified cities or their immediate vicinity.Template:Sfn Their main feature was the short duration of the campaigns and the remoteness of the points reached by them.Template:Sfn In spite of the military success of the many incursions, they failed to prevent in the long term ruin of the state.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Although they halted the advance of Christian repopulation and dismantled important fortresses and cities, they failed to significantly alter the boundariesTemplate:Sfn because Almanzor rarely occupied the territories he plundered.Template:Sfn Template:Efn

The region most affected and vulnerable to the campaigns was the Douro valley.<ref>Maíllo Salgado, Felipe (1993). "Sobre la presencia de los muslimes en Castilla la Vieja en las Edades Medias". Seminario, repoblación y reconquista: actas del III Curso de Cultura Medieval. Aguilar de Campoo: Centro de Estudios del Románico, septiembre de 1991. Coordinación por José Luis Hernando Garrido & Miguel Ángel García Guinea, pp. 17–22, Template:ISBN.</ref> This was the destination for Christian settlers who were driven to repopulate it due to demographic pressure in Asturias,Template:Sfn the heartland of the kingdom. This area was protected by the Cantabrian Mountains, a narrow strip of landTemplate:Sfn that nonetheless could defend itself—unlike Leon or Galicia, which were more vulnerable to Moorish cavalry raids.Template:Sfn In fact, Almanzor's campaigns reached all of Christian Spain with the exception of the Cantabrian coast, and contributed to León and Galicia coming more solidly under the sovereignty of the Asturian Crown,Template:Sfn but still with great autonomy, due to the weakness of the kingdom's expansion.Template:Sfn

First campaigns with GhalibEdit

The first eight campaigns were carried out with the support of his father-in-law Ghalib.Template:Sfn Among them were three in the Salamanca lands (two in 977 and one in 978), another against Cuéllar (the same year), one against Pamplona and Barcelona (the long summer campaign of 978), one against Zamora (or maybe Ledesma, according to other authors, in the spring of 979) and one against Sepúlveda (in the summer of 979, which he could not take, although he razed its surroundings).Template:Sfn The eighth was one in which he accompanied to Algeciras the forces destined to Maghreb, between September 979 and early 980.Template:Sfn

The ninth campaign, in the spring of 980, was that during which the rupture between Almanzor and Ghalib took place and is known as "the one of betrayal" for Ghalib's surprise assault on Almanzor's son-in-law at Atienza.Template:Sfn The confrontation followed a short raid through Castilla.Template:Sfn The next four offensives (one in the fall of 980, two in the springTemplate:Sfn of the following year and one in the summerTemplate:Sfn) took place during the conflict between the two rivals.Template:Sfn During the last campaign – that of Almanzor's victory over Ghalib, he regained control of the fortresses of Atienza and Calatayud, held by partisans of his rival.Template:Sfn

Weakening of León and harassment of the Castilian borderEdit

File:Weeks Edwin Lord Interior of the Mosque at Cordova.jpg

Call to jihad in the mosque of Córdoba, from a nineteenth-century painting. Almanzor presented himself as champion of Islam in his numerous campaigns against the peninsular Christian states and used this image to justify his political power.

As a result of the defeat of Ghalib in the summer of 981, Almanzor's forces continued their advance, looting and destroying the lands around ZamoraTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn at the end of the summer.Template:Sfn Later, they defeated Pamplona, León and Castile at the Battle of Rueda Template:Sfn Template:Sfn (or Roa Template:Sfn) and recovered Simancas,Template:Sfn which was razed.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The loss of Simancas disrupted the Christian defensive line along the Duero, which later campaigns eventually dismantled.Template:Sfn These losses, along with Almanzor's support for rivals to the Leonine crown, first Bermudo Template:Sfn Template:Sfn against the weakened Ramiro III Template:Sfn and later rival counts, one of which briefly took the throne, plunged León into a political crisis that it submitted to Almanzor for arbitration.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn In general, Almanzor supported the noble families opposed to the monarch of the moment to take advantage of intra-Leonese squabbles.Template:Sfn From 977, he launched attacks into León's territories almost annually.Template:Sfn

The Galician and Portuguese counts, hostile to Ramiro III as they had been to his father, sought to appease Almanzor after the Trancoso and Viseu campaignTemplate:Sfn of the beginning of the winter of 981Template:Sfn and for this they sought to impose a new king, Bermudo II,Template:Sfn crowned in October 982Template:Sfn in Santiago while Almanzor pillagedTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn the outskirts of León.Template:Sfn Castile and León, continually exposed to Cordoban assaults, on the other hand, supported Ramiro.Template:Sfn In 983, Almanzor plundered the area surrounding Salamanca in the fall, after failing to take it,Template:Sfn and Sacramenia at the beginning of winter,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn slaughtering the men and taking the rest of the population captive.Template:Sfn In his attempt to halt the Christian advance south of the Duero, he continued assailing the Leonese and Castilian positions in this area and the most important points of repopulation, such as Zamora (984)Template:Sfn Template:Sfn or Sepúlveda the same year,Template:Sfn razed before he fell on Barcelona.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The destruction of Sepúlveda forced Ramiro to submit to Córdoba in 985, the year of his deathTemplate:Sfn due to natural causes, as Bermudo had done before.Template:Sfn Bermudo's submission had been accompanied by that of other Portuguese and Galician counts.Template:Sfn This imposed the presence of Cordoban forces on the Leonese kingdom, as a protectorate, which it remained until 987.Template:Sfn

The expulsion of the Cordoban troops from LeónTemplate:Sfn by Bermudo triggered the 988 campaign against CoimbraTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn and the torching of the Monastery of San Pedro de Eslonza in the first retaliatory campaign in 986,Template:Efn in which he also took León,Template:Sfn Zamora,Template:Sfn Salamanca and Alba de Tormes Template:Sfn before attacking Condeixa.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn

Campaigns of Almanzor

977

1. Baños de Ledesma

2. Cuéllar

3. Salamanca

978

4. Pla de Barcelona and Tarragona

5. Ledesma

979

6. Zamora

7. Sepúlveda

8. Maghreb

980

9. Medinaceli

10. Almunia

981

11. Canales de la Sierra

12. Rota de los Maafiríes

13. Calatayud

14. Zamora

15. Trancoso

982

16. 'The three nations'

17. Toro and León

983

18. Simancas

19. Salamanca

20. Sacramenia

984

21. Zamora

22. Sepúlveda

985

23. Barcelona

24. Algeciras

986

25. Zamora, Salamanca and León

26. Condeixa and Coimbra

987

27. Coimbra

28. Coimbra

988

29. Portillo

30. Zamora and Toro

31. Astorga

989

32. Osma

990

33. Toro

34. Osma and Alcubilla del Marqués

35. Montemor-o-Velho

992

36. Castile

37. Kingdom of Pamplona

993

38. Al Marakib

39. San Esteban de Gormaz

40. al-Agar

994

41. San Esteban de Gormaz, Pamplona and Clunia

42. Astorga and León

995

43. Castile

44. Batrisa

45. Monastery of San Román de Entrepeñas

46. Aguiar

996

47. Astorga

997

48. Santiago de Compostela

998

49. Maghreb

999

50. Pamplona

51. Pallars

1000

52. Cervera

1001

53. Montemor-o-Velho

54. Pamplona

55. Baños de Rioja

1002

56. Canales de la Sierra and San Millán de la Cogolla

Según Echevarría Arsuaga pp. 243–245, Molina pp. 238–263 y Martínez Díez.

Attacks on Pamplona and the Catalan countiesEdit

In 982, he launched the "campaign of the three nations' possibly against Castile, Pamplona and the Girona Franks,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn that forced the king of Pamplona, Sancho II to give to Almanzor a daughter,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn who would take the name Abda.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn This union would produce the last of Almanzor's political dynasty, Abd al-Rahman Sanchuelo.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn In 985, exploiting the subjugation of León and Castile, he attacked Barcelona,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn which he managed to take in early July, treating it harshly.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Almanzor had previously attacked the region in the summer of 978,Template:Sfn when for several months he ravaged the plains of Barcelona and parts of Tarragona, conquered by the Barcelona counts some decades earlier.Template:Sfn In an almost three-month-long campaign,Template:Sfn he captured the city with the help of the fleet, imprisoned Viscount Udalard I and Archdeacon Arnulf and sacked the monasteries of Sant Cugat del Vallés and Sant Pere de les Puelles.Template:Sfn

New campaigns against León and CastileEdit

In 987, he made two campaigns against Coimbra, conquering it during the second on 28 June.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Unlike previous offensives, focused on looting and destruction, this time he repopulated the area with Muslims, who held the area until 1064.Template:Sfn In 988 and 989, he again ravaged the Leonese Duero valley.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn He assaulted Zamora, Toro, LeónTemplate:Sfn and Astorga, which controlled access to Galicia,Template:Sfn and forced Bermudo to take refuge among the Galician counts.Template:Sfn

After concentrating most of his attacks on León, he went on to launch his forces against Castile from 990, previously the object of only four of thirty-one campaigns.Template:Sfn The west of León would, however, suffer one last attack in December 990, in which Montemor-o-Velho and Viseu, on the defensive line of the Mondego River, were surrendered, probably as punishment for the asylum that Bermudo had granted to the Umayyad "Piedra Seca".Template:Sfn The failed collusion of his son Abd Allah and the governors of Toledo and Zaragoza triggered a change of objective.Template:Sfn Fearing his father's anger over his participation in the plot along with the arrested governor of Zaragoza, Abd Allah had fled to take refuge with count García Fernández of Castile.Template:Sfn As punishment and to force the surrender of his son, the chamberlain took and armed OsmaTemplate:Sfn in August.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The broad raid achieved its goal and on 8 September, the Castilian count returned to Abdullah to his fatherTemplate:Sfn in return for a two-year truce.Template:Sfn Moving on from Castile, the following year he attacked the kingdom of Pamplona.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Sancho II tried to appease the Cordoban leader with a visit to the capital of the CaliphateTemplate:Sfn at the end of 992,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn but this failed to prevent his lands from being subject to a new foray in 994.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The last half of the decade saw general submission of Pamplona to the Caliphate along with its repeated attempts to avoid any punitive Cordoban campaigns.Template:Sfn

In 993 Almanzor attacked Castile again, for unknown reasons, but failed to take San Esteban de Gormaz,Template:Sfn simply looting its surroundings.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn He succeeded in taking it the following year, along with Clunia.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The loss of San Esteban dismantled Castilian defenses along the Douro, while the taking of Clunia endangered lands south of the Arlanza.Template:Sfn

At the end of 994, on the occasion of the wedding between Bermudo II and a daughter of the Castilian count,Template:Sfn Almanzor took LeónTemplate:Sfn and Astorga,Template:Sfn the Leonese capital since 988, and devastated the territory, perhaps also intending to facilitate a future campaign against Santiago de Compostela.Template:Sfn In May 995,Template:Sfn the Castilian Count Garcia Fernandez was wounded and taken prisonerTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn in a skirmish near the Duero and, despite the care of his captors, he died in Medinaceli.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn He was succeeded by his prudent son Sancho,Template:Sfn who had fought with Córdoba against his fatherTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn and managed to maintain an informal truceTemplate:Sfn with the Caliphate between 995 and 1000.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The ties between Castile and the chamberlain were sealed with delivery of one of the new count's sisters to Almanzor as a wife or concubine.Template:Sfn Urraca Sanchez, nicknamed "the Basque", adopted the Arabic name Abda after being given to Almanzor by her father Sancho II of Pamplona. Urraca and Almanzor had a single son, named Abd al-Rahman Sanchuelo that became chief minister of Hisham II, Caliph of Córdoba. As retribution for the support of the former count by the Banu Gómez, counts of Saldaña and former allies of Córdoba, their seat of Carrión was attacked in a raid that reached the monastery of San Román de Entrepeñas.Template:Sfn At the end of 995, a new incursion against Aguiar,Template:Sfn southeast of Porto, forced Bermudo II to return the former Umayyad conspirator "Piedra Seca."Template:Sfn Template:Sfn

Santiago de Compostela and his later campaignsEdit

In 996, he again launched a raid on León and destroyed AstorgaTemplate:Sfn to force them to resume the tribute payments.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn In the summer of 997, he devastated Santiago de Compostela,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn after the Bishop, Pedro de Mezonzo, evacuated the city.Template:Sfn In a combined operation involving his own land troops, those of Christian alliesTemplate:Sfn and the fleet,Template:Sfn Almanzor's forces reached the city in mid-August.Template:Sfn They burned the pre-Romanesque temple dedicated to the apostle James the Great,Template:Sfn and said to contain his tomb.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The prior removal of the saint's relics allowed the continuity of the Camino de Santiago, a pilgrimage route that had begun to attract pilgrims in the previous century.Template:Sfn The campaign was a great triumph for the chamberlain at a delicate political moment, as it coincided with the breakdown of his long alliance with Subh.Template:Sfn The Leonese setback was so great that it allowed Almanzor to settle a Muslim population in Zamora on his return from Santiago,Template:Sfn while the bulk of the troops in Leonese territory remained in Toro.Template:Sfn He then imposed peace terms on the Christian magnates that allowed him to forego campaigning in the north in 998, the first year this happened since 977.Template:Sfn

In 999, he made his last foray to the eastern borderlands, where, after passing through Pamplona,Template:Sfn he sacked Manresa and the plains of Bages.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn In April he attacked the County of Pallars,Template:Sfn governed by the kin of the mother of count Sancho García of Castile.Template:Sfn It is suggested that the attacks could have been triggered by the Pamplonan king and Catalan counts ceasing to pay tribute to Córdoba, taking advantage of Almanzor's distraction in crushing Ziri ibn Atiyya.Template:Sfn

Also in 999, the death of Bermudo II in September produced a new minority in León through the ascent to the throne of Alfonso V,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn but this did not prevent the formation of a broad anti-Córdoba alliance that united not just the people of Pamplona and Castile,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn but also the ancient Christian clients of Almanzor.Template:Sfn Sancho of Castile, until then a faithful ally who had managed to avoid the incursions of Córdoba into his territory, joined the allianceTemplate:Sfn and provoked Almanzor into launching an attack.Template:Sfn To his great surprise, the Castilian Count assembled a large force bringing together his own troops and those of his allies,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn who intercepted the Córdoban units north of CluniaTemplate:Sfn in a strong defensive position.Template:Sfn In the hard-fought battle of Cervera Template:Sfn (29 July 1000),Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Almanzor's side gained the victory,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn after the rout of much of his armyTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn through the intervention of eight hundred cavalry.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn

After the victory, at the end of the year Almanzor made another strike at the western border, where he took Montemor-o-Velho on December 2, 1000,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn after overcoming fierce resistance.Template:Sfn For its part, the kingdom of Pamplona suffered several attacks after the defeat of Cervera,Template:Sfn in 1000 and again in 1001 and 1002.Template:Sfn After Cervera, Almanzor accelerated the number of strikes, despite being sickTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn and needing to be carried on a litter at times.Template:Sfn

His last campaign, also victorious, was made in 1002,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn when he was mortally ill, having suffered from gouty arthritis for twenty years.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn He aimed to avenge the quasi-rout of Cervera and punish the Castilian count Sancho, architect of the alliance that almost defeated him.Template:Sfn San Millán de la Cogolla, dedicated to the patron saint of Castile and in the territory of Pamplona, allied with Sancho, was sacked and burned; in Pamplona, Almanzor ordered a retreat due to his worsening health,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn and he died en route to Córdoba before reaching the capital.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn

The victorious campaigns of Almanzor were due to his skills as a military tactician and the army he commanded, which was a highly professionalized force of a size that dwarfed any counterattack that the Christian kings and counts could mount to meet him: "rarely above 1000 knights or 2000 or 3000 men in total." They had few weeks in spring or summer to gather what was often no more than a few hundred knights and men.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> "The most frequent average seems to have been a knight for every two or three auxiliary riders (squires and others) and one of these for every two or three peons."Template:Sfn In those days an army of ten or fifteen thousand men – a third knights and the rest peons – was the maximum concentration of forces that a medieval ruler could muster when presenting battle.Template:Sfn For example, Muslim campaigns had formations of only one thousand to ten thousand men.Template:Sfn "An army of ten or fifteen thousand men is considered in every way exceptional and few historians would be willing to admit that on some occasion that number was actually reached by a host during a battle."Template:Sfn

In his campaigns Almanzor emphasized cavalry operations, so much so that he had reserved the islands of the Guadalquivir for horse breeding.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn These marshes around Seville, Huelva and Cádiz had suitable pastures for raising horses.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Mules were imported from the Balearic Islands and camels from Africa, the latter raised in the semi-desert area between Murcia and Lorca.Template:Sfn According to Vallvé, "Normally participating in his campaigns were twelve thousand horsemen, enrolled in the military hierarchy and provided, in addition to that customarily due the usual soldier, with a horse with their harnesses, weapons, accommodation, payments and bonuses for various expenses, and fodder for their horses, based on their role."Template:Sfn

Loot and slavesEdit

Almanzor's campaigns were a continuation of a policy from emirate times: the capture of numerous contingents of Christian slaves, the famous esclavos or francos, in Arabic Saqtïliba or Saqáliba (plural of Siqlabi, "slave").Template:Sfn These were the most lucrative part of the loot, and constituted an excellent method of paying the troops, so much so that many campaigns were little more than slave raids.Template:Sfn From these came many eunuchs who were essential elements for handling harems; others were purchased already castrated in Verdun and disembarked in Pechina or Almería according to Liutprand of Cremona.Template:Sfn However, the most valuable take was the beautiful girls, selected according to "the predilection they had for the blonde and redhead Galicians, Basques and Franks,"<ref>Holgado Cristeto, Belén (2010). "Tras las huellas de las mujeres cristianas de al-Ándalus". En Actas del Congreso Conocer Al-Ándalus: perspectivas desde el siglo XXI. Edición de María Mercedes Delgado Pérez & Gracia López Anguita. Sevilla: Alfar, pp. 110. Template:ISBN. ". . . la predilección que tenían por las rubias y pelirrojas gallegas, vasconas y francas."</ref> usually also described as having blue eyes, large breasts, wide hips, thick legs and perfect teeth<ref>Bellido Bello, Juan Félix (2006). "El cuerpo de la mujer en la literatura andalusí". En Sin carne: representaciones y simulacros del cuerpo femenino: tecnología, comunicación y poder. Barcelona: ArCiBel, pp. 342. Edición de Mercedes Arriaga Flórez, Rodrigo Browne Sartori, José Manuel Estévez Saá y Víctor Silva Echeto. Template:ISBN.</ref> that "the gynaecea of the royal families and the aristocracy supplied as concubines and legitimate wives."Template:Sfn As in the case of the eunuchs, some slaves were bought from pirates attacking the Mediterranean coast, others came from Slavic or Germanic populations passing through several hands from Vikings, and there were also blacks imported from Sudan.Template:Sfn Most of these slaves, however, were children who would be Islamized and assigned to work at court, including the work of eunuchs.Template:Sfn Jews and, to a lesser extent, Muslims were involved in this lucrative trade, thanks to their ability as interpreters and ambassadors.Template:Sfn

During the rule of Almanzor's Amirí regime, the already-rich Al-Andalus slave market reached unprecedented proportions. For example, the Moorish chronicles mention that after destroying Barcelona in July 985, Almanzor brought seventy thousand chained Christians to the great market of CórdobaTemplate:Sfn and, after destroying Simancas in July 983, he captured seventeen thousand womenTemplate:Sfn and imprisoned ten thousand nobles.Template:Sfn Obviously, these figures must be carefully evaluated, but likewise given the enormity this type of trade reached during his tenure, Almanzor is described as "the slave importer".Template:Sfn The commoners of Córdoba even asked his successor to stop the trade since, to get a good husband for their daughters they had to raise the dowries to exorbitant levels because the young Christian slaves were so numerous and cheap that many men preferred to buy them instead of marrying Muslims.Template:Sfn

Death and successionEdit

File:Algeciras Almanzor.jpg

Statue of Almanzor, Algeciras

Almanzor died on August 9, 1002Template:Sfn of illness at the age of about sixty-fiveTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn in Medinaceli.Template:Sfn During his last days, the dying chamberlain commended the government of the caliphate to his son, who hurried to Córdoba after his death to take his father's position and avoid any fickle opposition from the supporters of the family of the Caliph.Template:Sfn The Historia silense says:Template:Sfn

Template:Quote

His body was covered with the linen shroud that his daughters had woven with their own hands from raw material derived from the income of the estate inherited from their ancestors in Torrox, seat of their lineage.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn His remains were interred in the courtyard of the palace, covered by the dustTemplate:Sfn Template:Sfn his servants had shaken from their clothes after each battle against the Christians.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn According to the Arab historian Ibn 'Idhari, the following verses were carved in marble as an epitaph:Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn

Template:Quote

The dynasty Almanzor founded continued with his son Abd al-Malik al-Muzaffar,Template:Sfn and then his other son, Abd al-Rahman Sanchuelo,Template:Sfn who was unable to preserve the inherited power, and was murdered in 1009.Template:Sfn The fall of the Amiris set off the Fitna of al-Andalus, a civil war that resulted in the disintegration of the centralized Caliphate into regional taifa kingdoms.Template:Sfn

Later, the legend of a defeat immediately prior to his death in a Battle of Calatañazor appeared first in the Estoria de España and was later adorned in other documents.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Tradition holds that "in Calatañazor Almanzor lost the drum" (en Calatañazor Almanzor perdió el tambor) a term indicating that he there lost his joy because of the defeat that was inflicted.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn

NotesEdit

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ReferencesEdit

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BibliographyEdit

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