Anattā

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In Buddhism, the term anattā (Template:Langx) or anātman (Template:Langx) is the doctrine of "no-self" – that no unchanging, permanent self or essence can be found in any phenomenon.Template:Refn While often interpreted as a doctrine denying the existence of a self, anatman is more accurately described as a strategy to attain non-attachment by recognizing everything as impermanent, while staying silent on the ultimate existence of an unchanging essence.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn<ref name="Selves"/> In contrast, dominant schools of Hinduism assert the existence of Ātman as pure awareness or witness-consciousness,Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:Refn "reify[ing] consciousness as an eternal self".Template:Sfn

Etymology and nomenclatureEdit

Anattā is a composite Pali word consisting of an (not) and attā (self-existent essence).<ref name="DavidsStede1921p22">Template:Cite book</ref> The term refers to the central Buddhist concept that there is no phenomenon that has a permanent, unchanging "self" or essence.Template:Sfn It is one of the three characteristics of all existence, together with dukkha (suffering, dissatisfaction) and anicca (impermanence).<ref name="DavidsStede1921p22" />

Anattā is synonymous with Anātman (an + ātman) in Sanskrit Buddhist texts.<ref name="Bronkhorst2009p1242">Template:Cite book</ref> In some Pali texts, ātman of Vedic texts is also referred to with the term Attan, with the sense of "soul".<ref name="DavidsStede1921p22" /> An alternate use of Attan or Atta is "self, oneself, essence of a person", driven by the Vedic-era Brahmanical belief that atman is the permanent, unchangeable essence of a living being, or the true self.<ref name="DavidsStede1921p22" /><ref name="Bronkhorst2009p1242" />

In Buddhism-related English literature, Anattā is rendered as "not-Self", but this translation expresses an incomplete meaning, states Peter Harvey; a more complete rendering is "no-Self" because from its earliest days, Anattā doctrine denied that there is anything called a "Self" in any person or anything else, and that a belief in "Self" is a source of Dukkha (suffering, pain, unsatisfactoriness).<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Refn Buddhist scholar Richard Gombrich, however, argues that anattā is often mistranslated as meaning "not having a self or essence", but actually means "is not ātman" instead of "does not have ātman."Template:Sfn It is also incorrect to translate Anattā simply as "ego-less", according to Peter Harvey, because the Indian concept of ātman and attā is different from the Freudian concept of ego.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Refn

In early BuddhismEdit

In early Buddhist textsEdit

The concept of Anattā appears in numerous Sutras of the ancient Buddhist Nikāya texts (Pali canon). It appears, for example, as a noun in Samyutta Nikaya III.141, IV.49, V.345, in Sutta II.37 of Anguttara Nikaya, II.37–45 and II.80 of Patisambhidamagga, III.406 of Dhammapada. It also appears as an adjective, for example, in Samyutta Nikaya III.114, III.133, IV.28 and IV.130–166, in Sutta III.66 and V.86 of Vinaya.<ref name="DavidsStede1921p22" /><ref name="Bronkhorst2009p124">Template:Cite book</ref> It is also found in the Dhammapada.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

The ancient Buddhist texts discuss Attā or Attan (self), sometimes with alternate terms such as Atuman, Tuma, Puggala, Jiva, Satta, Pana and Nama-rupa, thereby providing the context for the Buddhist Anattā doctrine. Examples of such Attā contextual discussions are found in Digha Nikaya I.186–187, Samyutta Nikaya III.179 and IV.54, Vinaya I.14, Majjhima Nikaya I.138, III.19, and III.265–271 and Anguttara Nikaya I.284.<ref name="DavidsStede1921p22" /><ref name="Bronkhorst2009p124" /><ref name=collins71>Template:Cite book</ref> According to Steven Collins,Template:Non sequitur the inquiry of anattā and "denial of self" in the canonical Buddhist texts is "insisted on only in certain theoretical contexts", while they use the terms atta, purisa, puggala quite naturally and freely in various contexts.<ref name=collins71/> The elaboration of the anattā doctrine, along with identification of the words such as "puggala" as "permanent subject or soul" appears in later Buddhist literature.<ref name=collins71/>

According to Collins, the Suttas present the doctrine in three forms. First, they apply the "no-self, no-identity" investigation to all phenomena as well as any and all objects, yielding the idea that "all things are not-self" (sabbe dhamma anattā).<ref name=stevecollins95 /> Second, states Collins, the Suttas apply the doctrine to deny self of any person, treating conceit to be evident in any assertion of "this is mine, this I am, this is myself" (etam mamam eso 'ham asmi, eso me atta ti).<ref name=stevecollins96>Template:Cite book</ref> Third, the Theravada texts apply the doctrine as a nominal reference, to identify examples of "self" and "not-self", respectively the Wrong view and the Right view; this third case of nominative usage is properly translated as "self" (as an identity) and is unrelated to "soul", states Collins.<ref name=stevecollins96 /> The first two usages incorporate the idea of soul.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

No denial of selfEdit

Buddhist scholars Richard Gombrich and Alexander Wynne argue that the Buddha's descriptions of no-self in early Buddhist texts do not deny that there is a self.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Wynne and Gombrich both argue that the Buddha's statements on anattā were originally a "not-self" teaching that developed into a "no-self" teaching in later Buddhist thought.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn According to Wynne, early Buddhist texts such as the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta do not deny that there is a self, stating that the five aggregates that are described as not-self are not descriptions of a human being but descriptions of the human experience.Template:Sfn According to Johannes Bronkhorst, it is possible that "original Buddhism did not deny the existence of the soul", even though a firm Buddhist tradition has maintained that the Buddha avoided talking about the soul or even denied its existence.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Tibetologist André Migot states that original Buddhism may not have taught a complete absence of self, pointing to evidence presented by Buddhist and Pali scholars Jean Przyluski and Caroline Rhys Davids that early Buddhism generally believed in a self, making Buddhist schools that admit an existence of a "self" not heretical, but conservative, adhering to ancient beliefs.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> While there may be ambivalence on the existence or non-existence of self in early Buddhist literature, Bronkhorst suggests that these texts clearly indicate that the Buddhist path of liberation consists not in seeking Atman-like self-knowledge, but in turning away from what might erroneously be regarded as the self.<ref name=bronkhorst25 /> This is a reverse position to the Vedic traditions which recognized the knowledge of the self as "the principal means to achieving liberation."<ref name=bronkhorst25>Template:Cite book</ref>

According to Harvey, the contextual use of Attā in the Nikāyas is two-sided. In one, it directly denies that anything can be found called a self or soul in a human being that is a permanent essence of a human being, a theme found in Brahmanical traditions.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> In another, states Peter Harvey, such as at Samyutta Nikaya IV.286, the Sutta considers the materialistic concept in the pre-Buddhist Vedic period of "no afterlife, complete annihilation" at death to be a denial of Self, but still "tied up with belief in a Self".<ref name=harveyp39>Template:Cite book</ref> "Self exists" is a false premise, assert the early Buddhist texts.<ref name=harveyp39 /> However, adds Peter Harvey, these texts do not admit the premise "Self does not exist" either because the wording presumes the concept of "Self" before denying it; instead, the early Buddhist texts use the concept of Anattā as the implicit premise.<ref name=harveyp39 /><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Developing the selfEdit

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According to Peter Harvey, while the Suttas criticize notions of an eternal, unchanging Self as baseless, they see an enlightened being as one whose empirical self is highly developed.<ref name=peterharveytsm54>Template:Cite book</ref> This is paradoxical, states Harvey, in that "the Self-like nibbana state" is a mature self that knows "everything as Selfless".<ref name=peterharveytsm54 /> The "empirical self" is the citta (mind/heart, mindset, emotional nature), and the development of self in the Suttas is the development of this citta.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

One with "great self", state the early Buddhist Suttas, has a mind which is neither at the mercy of outside stimuli nor its own moods, neither scattered nor diffused, but imbued with self-control, and self-contained towards the single goal of nibbana and a 'Self-like' state.<ref name=peterharveytsm54 /> This "great self" is not yet an Arahat, because he still does small evil action which leads to karmic fruition, but he has enough virtue that he does not experience this fruition in hell.<ref name=peterharveytsm54 />

An Arahat, states Harvey, has a fully enlightened state of empirical self, one that lacks the "sense of both 'I am' and 'this I am'", which are illusions that the Arahat has transcended.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> The Buddhist thought and salvation theory emphasizes a development of self towards a Selfless state not only with respect to oneself, but recognizing the lack of relational essence and Self in others, wherein states Martijn van Zomeren, "self is an illusion".<ref>Template:Cite book, Quote: Buddhism is an example of a non-theistic religion, which underlies a cultural matrix in which individuals believe that the self is an illusion. Indeed, its anatta doctrine states that the self is not an essence.</ref>

Karma, rebirth and anattāEdit

Template:StagesFettersRebirths The Buddha emphasized both karma and anattā doctrines.<ref name="Selves">Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, "Selves & Not-self: The Buddhist Teaching on Anatta". Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, Template:Webarchive</ref> The Buddha criticized the doctrine that posited an unchanging essence as a subject as the basis of rebirth and karmic moral responsibility, which he called "atthikavāda". He also criticized the materialistic doctrine that denied the existence of both soul and rebirth, and thereby denied karmic moral responsibility, which he calls "natthikavāda".<ref name="Causality 1975, page 44">David Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, page 44.</ref> Instead, the Buddha asserted that there is no essence, but there is rebirth for which karmic moral responsibility is a must. In the Buddha's framework of karma, right view and right actions are necessary for liberation.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism all assert a belief in rebirth, and emphasize moral responsibility in a way different from pre-Buddhist materialistic schools of Indian philosophies.<ref name=danielkeownucchedavada /><ref name="buswelllopezp708">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Harvey2012p46">Template:Cite book</ref> The materialistic schools of Indian philosophies, such as Charvaka, are called annihilationist schools because they posited that death is the end, there is no afterlife, no soul, no rebirth, no karma, and death is that state where a living being is completely annihilated, dissolved.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Buddha criticized the materialistic annihilationism view that denied rebirth and karma, states Damien Keown.<ref name=danielkeownucchedavada /> Such beliefs are inappropriate and dangerous, stated Buddha, because they encourage moral irresponsibility and material hedonism.<ref name="danielkeownucchedavada">Template:Cite book</ref> Anattā does not mean there is no afterlife, no rebirth or no fruition of karma, and Buddhism contrasts itself to annihilationist schools.<ref name=danielkeownucchedavada /> Buddhism also contrasts itself to other Indian religions that champion moral responsibility but posit eternalism with their premise that within each human being there is an essence or eternal soul, and this soul is part of the nature of a living being, existence and metaphysical reality.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

In Theravada BuddhismEdit

Traditional viewsEdit

Theravada Buddhism scholars, states Oliver Leaman, consider the Anattā doctrine as one of the main theses of Buddhism.<ref name="Leaman2002p23" /> The Buddhist denial of an unchanging, permanent self is what distinguishes Buddhism from major religions of the world such as Christianity and Hinduism, giving it uniqueness, asserts the Theravada tradition.<ref name="Leaman2002p23" /> With the doctrine of Anattā, stands or falls the entire Buddhist structure, asserts Nyanatiloka Mahathera.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

According to Collins, "insight into the teaching of anattā is held to have two major loci in the intellectual and spiritual education of an individual" as s/he progresses along the Path.<ref name=stevecollins94/> The first part of this insight is to avoid sakkayaditthi (Personality Belief), that is converting the "sense of I which is gained from introspection and the fact of physical individuality" into a theoretical belief in a self.<ref name=stevecollins94/> "A belief in a (really) existing body" is considered a false belief and a part of the Ten Fetters that must be gradually lost. The second loci is the psychological realization of anattā, or loss of "pride or conceit". This, states Collins, is explained as the conceit of asmimana or "I am"; (...) what this "conceit" refers to is the fact that for the unenlightened, all experience and action must necessarily appear phenomenologically as happening to or originating from an "I".<ref name=stevecollins94/> When a Buddhist gets more enlightened, this happening to or originating in an "I" or sakkdyaditthi is less. The final attainment of enlightenment is the disappearance of this automatic but illusory "I".<ref name=stevecollins94>Template:Cite book</ref>

The Theravada tradition has long considered the understanding and application of the Anattā doctrine to be a complex teaching, whose "personal, introjected application has always been thought to be possible only for the specialist, the practising monk". The tradition, states Collins, has "insisted fiercely on anattā as a doctrinal position", while in practice it may not play much of a role in the daily religious life of most Buddhists.<ref name=stevecollins95>Template:Cite book</ref> The Theravada doctrine of Anattā, or not-self not-soul, inspire meditative practices for monks, states Donald Swearer, but for the lay Theravada Buddhists in Southeast Asia, the doctrines of kamma, rebirth and punna (merit) inspire a wide range of ritual practices and ethical behavior.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

The Anattā doctrine is key to the concept of Nibbana in the Theravada tradition. The liberated nirvana state, states Collins, is the state of Anattā, a state that is neither universally applicable nor can be explained, but can be realized.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Refn

Current disputesEdit

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The dispute about "self" and "not-self" doctrines has continued throughout the history of Buddhism.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> In Thai Buddhism, for example, states Paul Williams, some modern era Buddhist scholars have claimed that "Nirvana is indeed the true self", while other Thai Buddhists disagree.Template:Sfn For instance, the Dhammakaya tradition in Thailand teaches that it is erroneous to subsume nirvana under the rubric of anattā (no-self); instead, nirvana is taught to be the "true self" or dhammakaya.Template:Sfn The Dhammakaya tradition teaching that nirvana is atta, or true self, was criticized as heretical in Buddhism in 1994 by Ven. Payutto, a well-known scholar monk, who stated that 'Buddha taught Nibbana as being no-self".Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The abbot of one major temple in the Dhammakaya tradition, Luang Por Sermchai of Wat Luang Por Sodh Dhammakayaram, argues that it tends to be scholars who hold the view of absolute no-self, rather than Buddhist meditation practitioners. He points to the experiences of prominent forest hermit monks such as Luang Pu Sodh and Ajahn Mun to support the notion of a "true self".Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Similar interpretations on the "true self" were put forth earlier by the 12th Supreme Patriarch of Thailand in 1939. According to Williams, the Supreme Patriarch's interpretation echoes the tathāgatagarbha sutras.Template:Sfn

Several notable teachers of the Thai Forest Tradition have also described ideas in contrast to absolute no-self. Ajahn Maha Bua, a well known meditation master, described the citta (mind) as being an indestructible reality that does not fall under anattā.<ref>pp. 101–103 Maha Boowa, Arahattamagga, Arahattaphala: the Path to Arahantship – A Compilation of Venerable Acariya Maha Boowa's Dhamma Talks about His Path of Practice, translated by Bhikkhu Silaratano, 2005, http://www.forestdhammabooks.com/book/3/Arahattamagga.pdf Template:Webarchive (consulted 16 March 2009)</ref> He has stated that not-self is merely a perception that is used to pry one away from infatuation with the concept of a self, and that once this infatuation is gone the idea of not-self must be dropped as well.<ref>Archived at Ghostarchive Template:Cbignore and the Wayback Machine Template:Cbignore: Template:Citation Template:Cbignore</ref> American monk Thanissaro Bhikkhu of the Thai Forest Tradition describes the Buddha's statements on non-self as a path to awakening rather than a universal truth.<ref name="Selves" /> Bhikkhu Bodhi authored a rejoinder to Thanissaro, agreeing that anattā is a strategy for awakening but stating that "The reason the teaching of anattā can serve as a strategy of liberation is precisely because it serves to rectify a misconception about the nature of being, hence an ontological error."<ref>Template:Citation</ref> Thanissaro Bhikkhu states that the Buddha intentionally set aside the question of whether or not there is a self as a useless question, and goes on to call the phrase "there is no self" the "granddaddy of fake Buddhist quotes". He adds that clinging to the idea that there is no self at all would actually prevent enlightenment.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Thanissaro Bhikkhu points to the Ananda Sutta (SN 44.10), where the Buddha stays silent when asked whether there is a 'self' or not,<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> as a major cause of the dispute.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>

Anātman in Mahayana BuddhismEdit

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Anātman is one of the main bedrock doctrines of Buddhism, and its discussion is found in the later texts of all Buddhist traditions.<ref name="Leaman2002p23">Template:Cite book</ref>

There are many different views of anātman (Template:Zh; Japanese: 無我 muga; Korean: 무아 mu-a) within various Mahayana schools.<ref>King, R., Early Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism: The Mahayana Context of the Gaudapadiya-Karika (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), p. 97 Template:Webarchive.</ref>

The early Mahayana Buddhist texts link their discussion of "emptiness" (śūnyatā) to anātman and nirvana. They do so, states Mun-Keat Choong, in three ways: first, in the common sense of a monk's meditative state of emptiness; second, with the main sense of anātman or 'everything in the world is empty of self'; third, with the ultimate sense of Nirvana or realization of emptiness and thus an end to rebirth cycles of suffering.<ref name="Choong1999p85">Template:Cite book</ref> The anātman doctrine is another aspect of śūnyatā, its realization is the nature of the nirvana state and to an end to rebirths.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

NāgārjunaEdit

The Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (~200 CE), the founder of Madhyamaka (middle way) school of Mahayana Buddhism, analyzed dharma first as factors of experience.<ref name=kalupahana56 /> David Kalupahana states that Nāgārjuna analyzed how these experiences relate to "bondage and freedom, action and consequence", and thereafter analyzed the notion of personal self (ātman).<ref name=kalupahana56>Template:Cite book</ref>

Nāgārjuna extensively wrote about rejecting the metaphysical entity called ātman (self, soul), asserting in chapter 18 of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā that there is no such substantial entity and that "Buddha taught the doctrine of no-self".<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Nāgārjuna asserted that the notion of a self is associated with the notion of one's own identity and corollary ideas of pride, selfishness and a sense of psychophysical personality.<ref name=kalupahana57 /> This is all false, and leads to bondage in his Madhyamaka thought. There can be no pride nor possessiveness, in someone who accepts anātman and denies "self" which is the sense of personal identity of oneself, others or anything, states Nāgārjuna.<ref name=kalupahana56 /><ref name=davidloyp105>Template:Cite book, Quote: Nāgārjuna, the second century Indian Buddhist philosopher, used śūnyatā not to characterize the true nature of reality but to deny that anything has any self-existence or reality of its own.</ref> Further, all obsessions are avoided when a person accepts emptiness (śūnyatā).<ref name=kalupahana56 /><ref name="Loy2009p37">Template:Cite book</ref> Nāgārjuna denied there is anything called a self-nature as well as other-nature, emphasizing true knowledge to be comprehending emptiness.<ref name=kalupahana57 /><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Anyone who has not dissociated from their belief in personality in themselves or others, through the concept of self, is in a state of avidya (ignorance) and caught in the cycle of rebirths and redeaths.<ref name=kalupahana57>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

YogācāraEdit

The texts attributed to the 5th-century Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu of the Yogācāra school similarly discuss anātman as a fundamental premise of the Buddha.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> The Vasubandhu interpretations of no-self thesis were challenged by the 7th-century Buddhist scholar Candrakīrti, who then offered his own theories on its importance.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Tathāgatagarbha Sutras: Buddha is True SelfEdit

Some 1st-millennium CE Buddhist texts suggest concepts that have been controversial because they imply a "self-like" concept.<ref name=":0">Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> In particular are the tathāgatagarbha sūtras, where the title itself means a garbha (womb, matrix, seed) containing Tathāgata (Buddha). These Sutras suggest, states Paul Williams, that "all sentient beings contain a Tathagata" as their "essence, core or essential inner nature".<ref name=paulwilliamsp104>Template:Cite book</ref> The tathāgatagarbha doctrine, at its earliest probably appeared about the later part of the 3rd century CE, and is verifiable in Chinese translations of 1st millennium CE.<ref name=paulwilliamsp104 /> Most scholars consider the tathāgatagarbha doctrine of an "essential nature" in every living being is equivalent to "self",Template:Citation needed Template:Refn and it contradicts the anātman doctrines in a vast majority of Buddhist texts, leading scholars to posit that the tathāgatagarbha sutras were written to promote Buddhism to non-Buddhists.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book, Quote: "Some texts of the tathāgatagarbha literature, such as the Mahaparinirvana Sutra actually refer to an atman, though other texts are careful to avoid the term. This would be in direct opposition to the general teachings of Buddhism on anātman. Indeed, the distinctions between the general Indian concept of atman and the popular Buddhist concept of Buddha-nature are often blurred to the point that writers consider them to be synonymous."</ref>

The Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra explicitly asserts that the Buddha used the term "self" in order to win over non-Buddhist ascetics.<ref>Template:Cite book Quote: "... it refers to the Buddha using the term "self" in order to win over non-Buddhist ascetics."</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> The Ratnagotravibhāga (also known as Uttaratantra), another text composed in the first half of 1st millennium CE and translated into Chinese in 511 CE, points out that the teaching of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine is intended to win sentient beings over to abandoning "self-love" (atma-sneha) – considered to be one of the defects by Buddhism.<ref name=paulwilliamsp111>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> The 6th-century Chinese tathāgatagarbha translation states that "Buddha has shiwo (true self) which is beyond being and nonbeing".<ref name=paulwilliams112 /> However, the Ratnagotravibhāga asserts that the "self" implied in tathāgatagarbha doctrine is actually "not-self".<ref name=paulwilliams112>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

According to some scholars, the Buddha-nature discussed in these sutras does not represent a substantial self; rather, it is a positive language and expression of śūnyatā "emptiness" and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices.<ref name=paulwilliamsp111 /> Other scholars do in fact detect leanings towards monism in these tathagatagarbha references.<ref>Jamie Hubbard, Absolute Delusion, Perfect Buddhahood, University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, 2001, pp. 99–100</ref> Michael Zimmermann sees the notion of an unperishing and eternal self in the Tathagatagarbha Sutra.<ref>Zimmermann, Michael (2002), A Buddha Within: The Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, Biblotheca Philologica et Philosophica Buddhica VI, The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Soka University, p. 64</ref> Zimmermann also avers that "the existence of an eternal, imperishable self, that is, buddhahood, is definitely the basic point of the Tathāgatagarbha Sutra".<ref>Michael Zimmermann, A Buddha Within, p. 64</ref> He further indicates that there is no evident interest found in this sutra in the idea of Emptiness (sunyata).<ref>Zimmermann, A Buddha Within, p. 81</ref> Williams states that the "self" in tathāgatagarbha sutras is actually "non-self", and neither identical nor comparable to the Hindu concepts of brahman and self.<ref name=paulwilliamsp111 />

VajrayānaEdit

File:Guimet Havajra y Nairatmya 01.JPG

Tibetan and Nepalese Buddhist deities Nairatmya and Hevajra in an embrace. Nairatmya is the goddess of emptiness, and of anātman realization.<ref name=mirandashaw387 /><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

The anātman doctrine is extensively discussed in and partly inspires the ritual practices of the Vajrayāna tradition. The Tibetan terms such as bdag med refer to "without a self, insubstantial, anātman".<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> These discussions, states Jeffrey Hopkins, assert the "non-existence of a permanent, unitary and independent self", and attribute these ideas to the Buddha.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

The ritual practices in Vajrayāna Buddhism employs the concept of deities, to end self-grasping, and to manifest as a purified, enlightened deity as part of the Vajrayāna path to liberation from rebirths.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> One such deity is goddess Nairatmya (literally, non-soul, non-self).<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> She symbolizes, states Miranda Shaw, that "self is an illusion" and "all beings and phenomenal appearances lack an abiding self or essence" in Vajrayāna Buddhism.<ref name=mirandashaw387>Template:Cite book</ref>

Difference between Buddhism and HinduismEdit

Atman in HinduismEdit

The Buddhist concept of anattā or anātman is one of the fundamental differences between mainstream Buddhism and mainstream Hinduism, with the latter asserting that ātman ("self") exists.Template:Refn

In Hinduism, Atman refers to the essence of human beings, the observing pure awareness or witness-consciousness.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>[a] Template:Cite book;
[b] Template:Cite book;
[c] Template:Cite book</ref> It is unaffected by ego,<ref>James Hart (2009), Who One Is: Book 2: Existenz and Transcendental Phenomenology, Springer, Template:ISBN, pages 2–3, 46–47</ref><ref>Richard White (2012), The Heart of Wisdom: A Philosophy of Spiritual Life, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Template:ISBN, pages 125–131</ref> distinct from the individual being (jivanatman) embedded in material reality, and characterized by Ahamkara ('I-making'), mind (citta, manas), and all the defiling kleshas (impurities). Embodied personality changes over time, while Atman doesn't.Template:Sfn

According to Jayatilleke, the Upanishadic inquiry fails to find an empirical correlate of the assumed Atman, but nevertheless assumes its existence,Template:Sfn and Advaitins "reify consciousness as an eternal self."Template:Sfn In contrast, the Buddhist inquiry "is satisfied with the empirical investigation which shows that no such Atman exists because there is no evidence" states Jayatilleke.Template:Sfn According to Harvey, in Buddhism the negation of temporal existents is applied even more rigorously than in the Upanishads: Template:Quote

Both Buddhism and Hinduism distinguish ego-related "I am, this is mine", from their respective abstract doctrines of "Anattā" and "Atman".Template:Sfn This, states Peter Harvey, may have been an influence of Buddhism on Hinduism.<ref>Template:Cite book, Quote: "The post-Buddhist Matri Upanishad holds that only defiled individual self, rather than the universal one, thinks 'this is I' or 'this is mine'. This is very reminiscent of Buddhism, and may well have been influenced by it to divorce the universal Self from such egocentric associations".</ref>

Anatman and NiratmanEdit

The term niratman appears in the Maitrayaniya Upanishad of Hinduism, such as in verses 6.20, 6.21 and 7.4. Niratman literally means "selfless".<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Wood1992p67">Template:Cite book</ref> The niratman concept has been interpreted to be analogous to anatman of Buddhism.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> The ontological teachings, however, are different. In the Upanishad, states Thomas Wood, numerous positive and negative descriptions of various states – such as niratman and sarvasyatman (the self of all) – are used in Maitrayaniya Upanishad to explain the nondual concept of the "highest Self".<ref name="Wood1992p67"/> According to Ramatirtha, states Paul Deussen, the niratman state discussion is referring to stopping the recognition of oneself as an individual soul, and reaching the awareness of universal soul or the metaphysical Brahman.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Correspondence in PyrrhonismEdit

{{#invoke:Labelled list hatnote|labelledList|Main article|Main articles|Main page|Main pages}} The Greek philosopher Pyrrho traveled to India as part of Alexander the Great's entourage where he was influenced by the Indian gymnosophists,<ref name=":1">Template:Cite journal</ref> which inspired him to create the philosophy of Pyrrhonism. Philologist Christopher Beckwith argues that Pyrrho based his philosophy on his translation of the three marks of existence into Greek, and that adiaphora (not logically differentiable, not clearly definable, negating Aristotle's use of "diaphora") reflects Pyrrho's understanding of the Buddhist concept of anattā.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>