Template:Short description Template:Redirect Template:Pp-semi-indef Template:Use Oxford spelling Template:Use dmy dates Template:Infobox political party Template:Infobox Chinese
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP),<ref>Template:Cite encyclopedia</ref> officially the Communist Party of China (CPC),<ref name=":62">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> is the founding and sole ruling party of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Founded in 1921, the CCP emerged victorious in the Chinese Civil War against the Kuomintang and proclaimed the establishment of the PRC under the leadership of Mao Zedong in October 1949. Since then, the CCP has governed China and has had sole control over the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Template:As of, the CCP has more than 99 million members, making it the second largest political party by membership in the world.
In 1921, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao led the founding of the CCP with the help of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and Far Eastern Bureau of the Communist International. Although the CCP aligned with the Kuomintang (KMT) during its initial years, the rise of the right-wing in the KMT under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek and massacre of tens of thousands of CCP members, resulted in the split and a prolonged civil war between the two. During the next ten years of guerrilla warfare, Mao Zedong rose to become the most influential figure in the CCP, and the party established a strong base among the rural peasantry with its land reform policies. Support for the CCP continued to grow throughout the Second Sino-Japanese War, and after the Japanese surrender in 1945, the CCP emerged triumphant in the communist revolution against the Nationalist government. After the KMT's retreat to Taiwan, the CCP established the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949.
Mao Zedong continued to be the most influential member of the CCP until his death in 1976. Under Mao, the party completed its land reform program, launched a series of five-year plans, and eventually split with the Soviet Union. Although Mao attempted to purge the party of capitalist and reactionary elements during the Cultural Revolution, after his death, these policies were only briefly continued by the Gang of Four before a less radical faction seized control. During the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping directed the CCP away from Maoist orthodoxy and towards a policy of economic liberalization. Since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the CCP has focused on maintaining its relations with the ruling parties of the remaining socialist states. The CCP has also established relations with several non-communist parties, including dominant nationalist parties of many developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well as social democratic parties in Europe.
As a Marxist–Leninist party, the Chinese Communist Party is organized based on democratic centralism, a principle that entails open policy discussion on the condition of unity among party members in upholding the agreed-upon decision. The highest body of the CCP is the National Congress, convened every fifth year. When the National Congress is not in session, the Central Committee is the highest body, but since that body usually only meets once a year, most duties and responsibilities are vested in the Politburo and its Standing Committee. Members of the latter are seen as the top leadership of the party and the state.<ref name=":1">Template:Cite book</ref> Today the party's leader holds the offices of general secretary (responsible for civilian party duties), Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) (responsible for military affairs), and State President (a largely ceremonial position). Because of these posts, the party leader is seen as the country's paramount leader. The current leader is Xi Jinping, who was elected at the 1st Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee held on 15 November 2012 and has been reelected twice, on 25 October 2017 by the 19th Central Committee and on 10 October 2022 by the 20th Central Committee.
HistoryEdit
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Founding and early historyEdit
The October Revolution and Marxist theory inspired the founding of the CCP.<ref name="auto">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao were among the first to publicly support Leninism and world revolution. Both regarded the October Revolution in Russia as groundbreaking, believing it to herald a new era for oppressed countries everywhere.Template:Sfn
Some historical analysis views the May Fourth Movement as the beginning of the revolutionary struggle that led to the founding of the People's Republic of China.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp Following the movement, trends towards social transformation increased.<ref name=":04" />Template:Rp Writing in 1939, Mao Zedong stated that the Movement had shown that the bourgeois revolution against imperialism and China had developed to a new stage, but that the proletariat would lead the revolution's completion.<ref name=":04" />Template:Rp The May Fourth Movement led to the establishment of radical intellectuals who went on to mobilize peasants and workers into the CCP and gain the organizational strength that would solidify the success of the Chinese Communist Revolution.<ref name="zhidong">Template:Cite journal</ref> Chen and Li were among the most influential promoters of Marxism in China during the May Fourth period.<ref name=":04">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp The CCP itself embraces the May Fourth Movement and views itself as part of the movement's legacy.<ref name=":9">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp
Study circles were, according to Cai Hesen, "the rudiments [of our party]".Template:Sfn Several study circles were established during the New Culture Movement, but by 1920 many grew sceptical about their ability to bring about reforms.Template:Sfn China's intellectual movements were fragmented in the early 1920s.<ref name=":12">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp The May Fourth Movement and the New Culture Movement had identified issues of broad concern to Chinese progressives, including anti-imperialism, support for nationalism, support for democracy, promotion of feminism, and rejection of traditional values.<ref name=":12" />Template:Rp Proposed solutions among Chinese progressives differed significantly, however.<ref name=":12" />Template:Rp
The CCP was founded on 1 July 1921 with the help of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and Far Eastern Secretariat of the Communist International, according to the party's official account of its history.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="CI">Template:Cite book</ref> However, party documents suggest that the party's actual founding date was 23 July 1921, the first day of the 1st National Congress of the CCP.<ref>Template:Cite newsTemplate:Cbignore</ref> The founding National Congress of the CCP was held 23–31 July 1921.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>Template:Better source needed With only 50 members in the beginning of 1921, among them Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Mao Zedong,<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> the CCP organization and authorities grew tremendously.<ref name="auto" />Template:Rp While it was originally held in a house in the Shanghai French Concession, French police interrupted the meeting on 30 JulyTemplate:Sfn and the congress was moved to a tourist boat on South Lake in Jiaxing, Zhejiang province.Template:Sfn A dozen delegates attended the congress, with neither Li nor Chen being able to attend,Template:Sfn the latter sending a personal representative in his stead.Template:Sfn The resolutions of the congress called for the establishment of a communist party as a branch of the Communist International (Comintern) and elected Chen as its leader. Chen then served as the first general secretary of the CCPTemplate:Sfn and was referred to as "China's Lenin".Template:Citation needed
The Soviets hoped to foster pro-Soviet forces in East Asia to fight against anti-communist countries, particularly Japan. They attempted to contact the warlord Wu Peifu but failed.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The Soviets then contacted the Kuomintang (KMT), which was leading the Guangzhou government parallel to the Beiyang government. On 6 October 1923, the Comintern sent Mikhail Borodin to Guangzhou, and the Soviets established friendly relations with the KMT. The Central Committee of the CCP,<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Soviet leader Joseph Stalin,<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> and the Comintern<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> all hoped that the CCP would eventually control the KMT and called their opponents "rightists".Template:SfnTemplate:NoteTag KMT leader Sun Yat-sen eased the conflict between the communists and their opponents. CCP membership grew tremendously after the 4th congress in 1925, from 900 to 2,428.<ref name="ksy">Template:Cite book</ref> The CCP still treats Sun Yat-sen as one of the founders of their movement and claim descent from him<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> as he is viewed as a proto-communist<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> and the economic element of Sun's ideology was socialism.Template:Sfn Sun stated, "Our Principle of Livelihood is a form of communism".<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
The communists dominated the left wing of the KMT and struggled for power with the party's right-wing factions.Template:Sfn When Sun Yat-sen died in March 1925, he was succeeded by a rightist, Chiang Kai-shek, who initiated moves to marginalize the position of the communists.Template:Sfn Chiang, Sun's former assistant, was not actively anti-communist at that time,<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> even though he hated the theory of class struggle and the CCP's seizure of power.<ref name="ccc">Template:Cite book</ref> The communists proposed removing Chiang's power.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> When Chiang gradually gained the support of Western countries, the conflict between him and the communists became more and more intense. Chiang asked the Kuomintang to join the Comintern to rule out the secret expansion of communists within the KMT, while Chen Duxiu hoped that the communists would completely withdraw from the KMT.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
In April 1927, both Chiang and the CCP were preparing for conflict.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Fresh from the success of the Northern Expedition to overthrow the warlords, Chiang Kai-shek turned on the communists, who by now numbered in the tens of thousands across China.Template:Sfn Ignoring the orders of the Wuhan-based KMT government, he marched on Shanghai, a city controlled by communist militias. Although the communists welcomed Chiang's arrival, he turned on them, massacring 5,000Template:NoteTag with the aid of the Green Gang.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn Chiang's army then marched on Wuhan but was prevented from taking the city by CCP General Ye Ting and his troops.Template:Sfn Chiang's allies also attacked communists; for example, in Beijing, Li Dazhao and 19 other leading communists were executed by Zhang Zuolin.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Angered by these events, the peasant movement supported by the CCP became more violent. Ye Dehui, a famous scholar, was killed by communists in Changsha, and in revenge, KMT general He Jian and his troops gunned down hundreds of peasant militiamen.Template:Sfn That May, tens of thousands of communists and their sympathizers were killed by KMT troops, with the CCP losing approximately 15,000 of its 25,000 members.Template:Sfn
Chinese Civil War and Second Sino-Japanese WarEdit
The CCP continued supporting the Wuhan KMT government,Template:Sfn but on 15 July 1927 the Wuhan government expelled all communists from the KMT.Template:Sfn The CCP reacted by founding the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of China, better known as the "Red Army", to battle the KMT. A battalion led by General Zhu De was ordered to take the city of Nanchang on 1 August 1927 in what became known as the Nanchang uprising.
Initially successful, Zhu and his troops were forced to retreat after five days, marching south to Shantou, and from there being driven into the wilderness of Fujian.Template:Sfn Mao Zedong was appointed commander-in-chief of the Red Army, and led four regiments against Changsha in the Autumn Harvest Uprising, hoping to spark peasant uprisings across Hunan.Template:Sfn His plan was to attack the KMT-held city from three directions on 9 September, but the Fourth Regiment deserted to the KMT cause, attacking the Third Regiment. Mao's army made it to Changsha but could not take it; by 15 September, he accepted defeat, with 1,000 survivors marching east to the Jinggang Mountains of Jiangxi.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn
The near destruction of the CCP's urban organizational apparatus led to institutional changes within the party.Template:Sfn The party adopted democratic centralism, a way to organize revolutionary parties, and established a politburo to function as the standing committee of the central committee.Template:Sfn The result was increased centralization of power within the party.Template:Sfn At every level of the party this was duplicated, with standing committees now in effective control.Template:Sfn After being expelled from the party, Chen Duxiu went on to lead China's Trotskyist movement. Li Lisan was able to assume de facto control of the party organization by 1929–1930.Template:Sfn
The 1929 Gutian Congress was important in establishing the principle of party control over the military, which continues to be a core principle of the party's ideology.<ref name=":Duan">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp
Li's leadership was a failure, leaving the CCP on the brink of destruction.Template:Sfn The Comintern became involved, and by late 1930, his powers had been taken away.Template:Sfn By 1935, Mao had become a member of Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP and the party's informal military leader, with Zhou Enlai and Zhang Wentian, the formal head of the party, serving as his informal deputies.Template:Sfn The conflict with the KMT led to the reorganization of the Red Army, with power now centralized in the leadership through the creation of CCP political departments charged with supervising the army.Template:Sfn
The Xi'an Incident of December 1936 paused the conflict between the CCP and the KMT.Template:Sfn Under pressure from Marshal Zhang Xueliang and the CCP, Chiang Kai-shek finally agreed to a Second United Front focused on repelling the Japanese invaders.Template:Sfn While the front formally existed until 1945, all collaboration between the two parties had effectively ended by 1940.Template:Sfn Despite their formal alliance, the CCP used the opportunity to expand and carve out independent bases of operations to prepare for the coming war with the KMT.Template:Sfn In 1939, the KMT began to restrict CCP expansion within China.Template:Sfn This led to frequent clashes between CCP and KMT forcesTemplate:Sfn which subsided rapidly on the realization on both sides that civil war amidst a foreign invasion was not an option.Template:Sfn By 1943, the CCP was again actively expanding its territory at the expense of the KMT.Template:Sfn
Mao Zedong became the Chairman of the CCP in 1945. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the war between the CCP and the KMT began again in earnest.Template:Sfn The 1945–1949 period had four stages; the first was from August 1945 (when the Japanese surrendered) to June 1946 (when the peace talks between the CCP and the KMT ended).Template:Sfn By 1945, the KMT had three times more soldiers under its command than the CCP and initially appeared to be prevailing.Template:Sfn With the cooperation of the US and Japan, the KMT was able to retake major parts of the country.Template:Sfn However, KMT rule over the reconquered territories proved unpopular because of its endemic political corruption.Template:Sfn
Notwithstanding its numerical superiority, the KMT failed to reconquer the rural territories which made up the CCP's stronghold.Template:Sfn Around the same time, the CCP launched an invasion of Manchuria, where they were assisted by the Soviet Union.Template:Sfn The second stage, lasting from July 1946 to June 1947, saw the KMT extend its control over major cities such as Yan'an, the CCP headquarters, for much of the war.Template:Sfn The KMT's successes were hollow; the CCP had tactically withdrawn from the cities, and instead undermined KMT rule there by instigating protests among students and intellectuals. The KMT responded to these demonstrations with heavy-handed repression.Template:Sfn In the meantime, the KMT was struggling with factional infighting and Chiang Kai-shek's autocratic control over the party, which weakened its ability to respond to attacks.Template:Sfn
The third stage, lasting from July 1947 to August 1948, saw a limited counteroffensive by the CCP.Template:Sfn The objective was clearing "Central China, strengthening North China, and recovering Northeast China."Template:Sfn This operation, coupled with military desertions from the KMT, resulted in the KMT losing 2 million of its 3 million troops by the spring of 1948, and saw a significant decline in support for KMT rule.Template:Sfn The CCP was consequently able to cut off KMT garrisons in Manchuria and retake several territories.Template:Sfn
The last stage, lasting from September 1948 to December 1949, saw the communists go on the offensive and the collapse of KMT rule in mainland China as a whole.Template:Sfn Mao's proclamation of the founding of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949 marked the end of the second phase of the Chinese Civil War (or the Chinese Communist Revolution, as it is called by the CCP).Template:Sfn
Proclamation of the PRC and the 1950sEdit
Mao proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) before a massive crowd at Tiananmen Square on 1 October 1949. The CCP headed the Central People's Government.<ref name="auto" />Template:Rp From this time through the 1980s, top leaders of the CCP (such as Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping) were largely the same military leaders prior to the PRC's founding.<ref name=":2">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> As a result, informal personal ties between political and military leaders dominated civil-military relations.<ref name=":2" />
Stalin proposed a one-party constitution when Liu Shaoqi visited the Soviet Union in 1952.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> The constitution of the PRC in 1954 subsequently abolished the previous coalition government and established the CCP's one-party system.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> In 1957, the CCP launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign against political dissidents and prominent figures from minor parties, which resulted in the political persecution of at least 550,000 people. The campaign significantly damaged the limited pluralistic nature in the socialist republic and solidified the country's status as a de facto one-party state.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
The Anti-Rightist Campaign led to the catastrophic results of the Second Five Year Plan from 1958 to 1962, known as the Great Leap Forward. In an effort to transform the country from an agrarian economy into an industrialized one, the CCP collectivized farmland, formed people's communes, and diverted labour to factories. General mismanagement and exaggerations of harvests by CCP officials led to the Great Chinese Famine, which resulted in an estimated 15 to 45 million deaths,<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> making it the largest famine in recorded history.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
Sino-Soviet split and Cultural RevolutionEdit
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During the 1960s and 1970s, the CCP experienced a significant ideological separation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which was going through a period of "de-Stalinization" under Nikita Khrushchev.Template:Sfn By that time, Mao had begun saying that the "continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" stipulated that class enemies continued to exist even though the socialist revolution seemed to be complete, leading to the Cultural Revolution in which millions were persecuted and killed.Template:Sfn During the Cultural Revolution, party leaders such as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai, and He Long were purged or exiled, and the Gang of Four, led by Mao's wife Jiang Qing, emerged to fill in the power vacuum left behind.
Reforms under Deng XiaopingEdit
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Following Mao's death in 1976, a power struggle between CCP chairman Hua Guofeng and vice-chairman Deng Xiaoping erupted.Template:Sfn Deng won the struggle, and became China's paramount leader in 1978.Template:Sfn Deng, alongside Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, spearheaded the "reform and opening-up" policies, and introduced the ideological concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics, opening China to the world's markets.Template:Sfn In reversing some of Mao's "leftist" policies, Deng argued that a socialist state could use the market economy without itself being capitalist.<ref name="marketvsplanning" /> While asserting the political power of the CCP, the change in policy generated significant economic growth.Template:Citation needed This was justified on the basis that "Practice is the Sole Criterion for the Truth", a principle reinforced through a 1978 article that aimed to combat dogmatism and criticized the "Two Whatevers" policy.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>Template:Better source needed The new ideology, however, was contested on both sides of the spectrum, by Maoists to the left of the CCP's leadership, as well as by those supporting political liberalization. In 1981, the Party adopted a historical resolution, which assessed the historical legacy of the Mao Zedong era and the future priorities of the CCP.<ref name=":22">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp With other social factors, the conflicts culminated in the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre.Template:Sfn The protests having been crushed and the reformist party general secretary Zhao Ziyang under house arrest, Deng's economic policies resumed and by the early 1990s the concept of a socialist market economy had been introduced.Template:Sfn In 1997, Deng's beliefs (officially called "Deng Xiaoping Theory") were embedded into the CCP's constitution.Template:Sfn
Further reforms under Jiang Zemin and Hu JintaoEdit
CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin succeeded Deng as paramount leader in the 1990s and continued most of his policies.Template:Sfn In the 1990s, the CCP transformed from a veteran revolutionary leadership that was both leading militarily and politically, to a political elite increasingly renewed according to institutionalized norms in the civil bureaucracy.<ref name=":2" /> Leadership was largely selected based on rules and norms on promotion and retirement, educational background, and managerial and technical expertise.<ref name=":2" /> There is a largely separate group of professionalized military officers, serving under top CCP leadership largely through formal relationships within institutional channels.<ref name=":2" />
The CCP ratified Jiang's Three Represents concept for the 2003 revision of the party's constitution, as a "guiding ideology" to encourage the party to represent "advanced productive forces, the progressive course of China's culture, and the fundamental interests of the people."Template:Sfn The theory legitimized the entry of private business owners and bourgeois elements into the party.Template:Sfn Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin's successor as general secretary, took office in 2002.Template:Sfn Unlike Mao, Deng and Jiang Zemin, Hu laid emphasis on collective leadership and opposed one-man dominance of the political system.Template:Sfn The insistence on focusing on economic growth led to a wide range of serious social problems. To address these, Hu introduced two main ideological concepts: the "Scientific Outlook on Development" and "Harmonious Society".Template:Sfn Hu resigned from his post as CCP general secretary and Chairman of the CMC at the 18th National Congress held in 2012, and was succeeded in both posts by Xi Jinping.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Leadership of Xi JinpingEdit
Since taking power, Xi has initiated a wide-reaching anti-corruption campaign, while centralizing powers in the office of CCP general secretary at the expense of the collective leadership of prior decades.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Commentators have described the campaign as a defining part of Xi's leadership as well as "the principal reason why he has been able to consolidate his power so quickly and effectively."<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> Xi's leadership has also overseen an increase in the Party's role in China.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Xi has added his ideology, named after himself, into the CCP constitution in 2017.<ref name=":0">Template:Cite news</ref> Xi's term as general secretary was renewed in 2022.<ref name=":2" /><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Since 2014, the CCP has led efforts in Xinjiang that involve the detention of more than 1 million Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in internment camps, as well as other repressive measures. This has been described as a genocide by some academics and some governments.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> On the other hand, a greater number of countries signed a letter penned to the Human Rights Council supporting the policies as an effort to combat terrorism in the region.<ref name=":5">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Celebrations of the 100th anniversary of the CCP's founding, one of the Two Centenaries, took place on 1 July 2021.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In the sixth plenary session of the 19th Central Committee in November 2021, CCP adopted a resolution on the Party's history, which for the first time credited Xi as being the "main innovator" of Xi Jinping Thought while also declaring Xi's leadership as being "the key to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In comparison with the other historical resolutions, Xi's one did not herald a major change in how the CCP evaluated its history.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
On 6 July 2021, Xi chaired the Communist Party of China and World Political Parties Summit, which involved representatives from 500 political parties across 160 countries.<ref name=":7">Template:Cite news</ref> Xi urged the participants to oppose "technology blockades," and "developmental decoupling" in order to work towards "building a community with a shared future for mankind."<ref name=":7" />
IdeologyEdit
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Formal ideologyEdit
The core ideology of the party has evolved with each distinct generation of Chinese leadership. As both the CCP and the People's Liberation Army promote their members according to seniority, it is possible to discern distinct generations of Chinese leadership.<ref name="auto1">Template:Cite book</ref>
Marxism–Leninism was the first official ideology of the CCP.<ref name="MLT" /> According to the CCP, "Marxism–Leninism reveals the universal laws governing the development of history of human society."<ref name="MLT" /> To the CCP, Marxism–Leninism provides a "vision of the contradictions in capitalist society and of the inevitability of a future socialist and communist societies".<ref name="MLT" /> According to the People's Daily, Mao Zedong Thought "is Marxism–Leninism applied and developed in China".<ref name="MLT">Template:Cite news</ref> Mao Zedong Thought was conceived not only by Mao Zedong, but by leading party officials, according to Xinhua News Agency.<ref name="MaoZedongThought">Template:Cite news</ref>
Deng Xiaoping Theory was added to the party constitution at the 14th National Congress in 1992.Template:Sfn The concepts of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and "the primary stage of socialism" were credited to the theory.Template:Sfn Deng Xiaoping Theory can be defined as a belief that state socialism and state planning is not by definition communist, and that market mechanisms are class neutral.Template:Sfn In addition, the party needs to react to the changing situation dynamically; to know if a certain policy is obsolete or not, the party had to "seek truth from facts" and follow the slogan "practice is the sole criterion for the truth".Template:Sfn At the 14th National Congress, Jiang reiterated Deng's mantra that it was unnecessary to ask if something was socialist or capitalist, since the important factor was whether it worked.Template:Sfn The CCP's ideology today is often summarized as socialism with Chinese characteristics.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
The "Three Represents", Jiang Zemin's contribution to the party's ideology, was adopted by the party at the 16th National Congress. The Three Represents defines the role of the CCP, and stresses that the Party must always represent the requirements for developing China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people."<ref>Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 2013, Vol. III, p. 519.</ref>Template:Sfn Certain segments within the CCP criticized the Three Represents as being un-Marxist and a betrayal of basic Marxist values. Supporters viewed it as a further development of socialism with Chinese characteristics.Template:Sfn Jiang disagreed, and had concluded that attaining the communist mode of production, as formulated by earlier communists, was more complex than had been realized, and that it was useless to try to force a change in the mode of production, as it had to develop naturally, by following the "economic laws of history."Template:Sfn The theory is most notable for allowing capitalists, officially referred to as the "new social strata", to join the party on the grounds that they engaged in "honest labor and work" and through their labour contributed "to build[ing] socialism with Chinese characteristics."Template:Sfn
In 2003, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee conceived and formulated the ideology of the Scientific Outlook on Development (SOD).Template:Sfn It is considered to be Hu Jintao's contribution to the official ideological discourse.Template:Sfn The SOD incorporates scientific socialism, sustainable development, social welfare, a humanistic society, increased democracy, and, ultimately, the creation of a Socialist Harmonious Society. According to official statements by the CCP, the concept integrates "Marxism with the reality of contemporary China and with the underlying features of our times, and it fully embodies the Marxist worldview on and methodology for development."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, commonly known as Xi Jinping Thought, was added to the party constitution in the 19th National Congress in 2017.<ref name=":0" /> The theory's main elements are summarized in the ten affirmations, the fourteen commitments, and the thirteen areas of achievements.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
The party combines elements of both socialist patriotismTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn and Chinese nationalism.Template:Sfn
EconomicsEdit
Deng did not believe that the fundamental difference between the capitalist mode of production and the socialist mode of production was central planning versus free markets. He said, "A planned economy is not the definition of socialism, because there is planning under capitalism; the market economy happens under socialism, too. Planning and market forces are both ways of controlling economic activity".<ref name="marketvsplanning">Template:Cite news</ref> Jiang Zemin supported Deng's thinking, and stated in a party gathering that it did not matter if a certain mechanism was capitalist or socialist, because the only thing that mattered was whether it worked.Template:Sfn It was at this gathering that Jiang Zemin introduced the term socialist market economy, which replaced Chen Yun's "planned socialist market economy".Template:Sfn In his report to the 14th National Congress Jiang Zemin told the delegates that the socialist state would "let market forces play a basic role in resource allocation."<ref name="basicdecisive">Template:Cite news</ref> At the 15th National Congress, the party line was changed to "make market forces further play their role in resource allocation"; this line continued until the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee,<ref name="basicdecisive" /> when it was amended to "let market forces play a decisive role in resource allocation."<ref name="basicdecisive" /> Despite this, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee upheld the creed "Maintain the dominance of the public sector and strengthen the economic vitality of the state-owned economy."<ref name="basicdecisive" />
The CCP views the world as organized into two opposing camps; socialist and capitalist.Template:Sfn They insist that socialism, on the basis of historical materialism, will eventually triumph over capitalism.Template:Sfn In recent years, when the party has been asked to explain the capitalist globalization occurring, the party has returned to the writings of Karl Marx.Template:Sfn Despite admitting that globalization developed through the capitalist system, the party's leaders and theorists argue that globalization is not intrinsically capitalist.Template:Sfn The reason being that if globalization was purely capitalist, it would exclude an alternative socialist form of modernity.Template:Sfn Globalization, as with the market economy, therefore does not have one specific class character (neither socialist nor capitalist) according to the party.Template:Sfn The insistence that globalization is not fixed in nature comes from Deng's insistence that China can pursue socialist modernization by incorporating elements of capitalism.Template:Sfn Because of this there is considerable optimism within the CCP that despite the current capitalist dominance of globalization, globalization can be turned into a vehicle supporting socialism.Template:Sfn
Analysis and criticismEdit
While foreign analysts generally agree that the CCP has rejected orthodox Marxism–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (or at least basic thoughts within orthodox thinking), the CCP itself disagrees.Template:Sfn Critics of the CCP argue that Jiang Zemin ended the party's formal commitment to Marxism–Leninism with the introduction of the ideological theory, the Three Represents.Template:Sfn However, party theorist Leng Rong disagrees, claiming that "President Jiang rid the Party of the ideological obstacles to different kinds of ownershipTemplate:Nbsp... He did not give up Marxism or socialism. He strengthened the Party by providing a modern understanding of Marxism and socialism—which is why we talk about a 'socialist market economy' with Chinese characteristics."Template:Sfn The attainment of true "communism" is still described as the CCP's and China's "ultimate goal".Template:Sfn While the CCP claims that China is in the primary stage of socialism, party theorists argue that the current development stage "looks a lot like capitalism".Template:Sfn Alternatively, certain party theorists argue that "capitalism is the early or first stage of communism."Template:Sfn Some have dismissed the concept of a primary stage of socialism as intellectual cynicism.Template:Sfn For example, Robert Lawrence Kuhn, a former foreign adviser to the Chinese government, stated: "When I first heard this rationale, I thought it more comic than clever—a wry caricature of hack propagandists leaked by intellectual cynics. But the 100-year horizon comes from serious political theorists."Template:Sfn
American political scientist and sinologist David Shambaugh argues that before the "Practice Is the Sole Criterion for the Truth" campaign, the relationship between ideology and decision making was a deductive one, meaning that policy-making was derived from ideological knowledge.Template:Sfn However, under Deng's leadership this relationship was turned upside down, with decision making justifying ideology.Template:Sfn Chinese policy-makers have described the Soviet Union's state ideology as "rigid, unimaginative, ossified, and disconnected from reality", believing that this was one of the reasons for the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Therefore, Shambaugh argues, Chinese policy-makers believe that their party ideology must be dynamic to safeguard the party's rule.Template:Sfn
British sinologist Kerry Brown argues that the CCP does not have an ideology, and that the party organization is pragmatic and interested only in what works.Template:Sfn The party itself argues against this assertion. Hu Jintao stated in 2012 that the Western world is "threatening to divide us" and that "the international culture of the West is strong while we are weak ... Ideological and cultural fields are our main targets".Template:Sfn As such, the CCP puts a great deal of effort into the party schools and into crafting its ideological message.Template:Sfn
GovernanceEdit
Collective leadershipEdit
Template:Further Collective leadership, the idea that decisions will be taken through consensus, has been the ideal in the CCP.Template:Sfn The concept has its origins back to Lenin and the Russian Bolshevik Party.Template:Sfn At the level of the central party leadership this means that, for instance, all members of the Politburo Standing Committee are of equal standing (each member having only one vote).Template:Sfn A member of the Politburo Standing Committee often represents a sector; during Mao's reign, he controlled the People's Liberation Army, Kang Sheng, the security apparatus, and Zhou Enlai, the State Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Template:Sfn This counts as informal power.Template:Sfn Despite this, in a paradoxical relation, members of a body are ranked hierarchically (despite the fact that members are in theory equal to one another).Template:Sfn Informally, the collective leadership is headed by a "leadership core"; that is, the paramount leader, the person who holds the offices of CCP general secretary, CMC chairman and PRC president.Template:Sfn Before Jiang Zemin's tenure as paramount leader, the party core and collective leadership were indistinguishable.Template:Sfn In practice, the core was not responsible to the collective leadership.Template:Sfn However, by the time of Jiang, the party had begun propagating a responsibility system, referring to it in official pronouncements as the "core of the collective leadership".Template:Sfn Academics have noted a decline in collective leadership under Xi Jinping.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref><ref>Template:Citation</ref>
Democratic centralismEdit
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The CCP's organizational principle is democratic centralism, a principle that entails open discussion of policy on the condition of unity among party members in upholding the agreed-upon decision.<ref>Template:Citation</ref> It is based on two principles: democracy (synonymous in official discourse with "socialist democracy" and "inner-party democracy") and centralism.<ref name="DemocraticcentralismQiushi" /> This has been the guiding organizational principle of the party since the 5th National Congress, held in 1927.<ref name="DemocraticcentralismQiushi" /> In the words of the party constitution, "The Party is an integral body organized under its program and constitution and on the basis of democratic centralism".<ref name="DemocraticcentralismQiushi" /> Mao once quipped that democratic centralism was "at once democratic and centralized, with the two seeming opposites of democracy and centralization united in a definite form." Mao claimed that the superiority of democratic centralism lay in its internal contradictions, between democracy and centralism, and freedom and discipline.<ref name="DemocraticcentralismQiushi" /> Currently, the CCP is claiming that "democracy is the lifeline of the Party, the lifeline of socialism".<ref name="DemocraticcentralismQiushi" /> But for democracy to be implemented, and functioning properly, there needs to be centralization.<ref name="DemocraticcentralismQiushi" /> Democracy in any form, the CCP claims, needs centralism, since without centralism there will be no order.<ref name="DemocraticcentralismQiushi" />
SupervisionEdit
Shuanggui was an intra-party disciplinary process conducted by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). The process, which literally translates to "double regulation", aims to extract confessions from members accused of violating party rules. According to the Dui Hua Foundation, tactics such as cigarette burns, beatings and simulated drowning are among those used to extract confessions. Other reported techniques include the use of induced hallucinations, with one subject of this method reporting that "In the end I was so exhausted, I agreed to all the accusations against me even though they were false."<ref>Template:Cite newsTemplate:Cbignore</ref>
In 2018, the shuanggui process was superseded by liuzhi or "retention in custody," which expands beyond CCP members to the entire public sector, academics, and business leaders.<ref name=":05">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
United frontEdit
The CCP employs a political strategy that it terms "united front work" that involves groups and key individuals that are influenced or controlled by the CCP and used to advance its interests.<ref name=":02">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> United front work is managed primarily but not exclusively by the United Front Work Department (UFWD).<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> The united front has historically been a popular front that has included eight legally permitted political parties alongside other people's organizations which have nominal representation in the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> However, the CPPCC is a body without real power.Template:Sfn While consultation does take place, it is supervised and directed by the CCP.Template:Sfn Under Xi Jinping, the united front and its targets of influence have expanded in size and scope.<ref>Template:Citation</ref><ref name=":32">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
OrganizationEdit
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Central organizationEdit
The National Congress is the party's highest body, and, since the 9th National Congress in 1969, has been convened every five years (prior to the 9th Congress they were convened on an irregular basis). According to the party's constitution, a congress may not be postponed except "under extraordinary circumstances."Template:Sfn The party constitution gives the National Congress six responsibilities:Template:Sfn
- Electing the Central Committee;
- Electing the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI);
- Examining the report of the outgoing Central Committee;
- Examining the report of the outgoing CCDI;
- Discussing and enacting party policies; and,
- Revising the party's constitution.
In practice, the delegates rarely discuss issues at length at the National Congresses.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Page number Most substantive discussion takes place before the congress, in the preparation period, among a group of top party leaders.Template:Sfn In between National Congresses, the Central Committee is the highest decision-making institution.Template:Sfn The CCDI is responsible for supervising party's internal anti-corruption and ethics system.Template:Sfn In between congresses the CCDI is under the authority of the Central Committee.Template:Sfn
The Central Committee, as the party's highest decision-making institution between national congresses, elects several bodies to carry out its work.Template:Sfn The first plenary session of a newly elected central committee elects the general secretary of the Central Committee, the party's leader; the Central Military Commission (CMC); the Politburo; the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). The first plenum also endorses the composition of the Secretariat and the leadership of the CCDI.Template:Sfn According to the party constitution, the general secretary must be a member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), and is responsible for convening meetings of the PSC and the Politburo, while also presiding over the work of the Secretariat.<ref name="CRI">Template:Cite news</ref> The Politburo "exercises the functions and powers of the Central Committee when a plenum is not in session".Template:Sfn The PSC is the party's highest decision-making institution when the Politburo, the Central Committee and the National Congress are not in session.Template:Sfn It convenes at least once a week.Template:Sfn It was established at the 8th National Congress, in 1958, to take over the policy-making role formerly assumed by the Secretariat.Template:Sfn The Secretariat is the top implementation body of the Central Committee, and can make decisions within the policy framework established by the Politburo; it is also responsible for supervising the work of organizations that report directly into the Central Committee, for example departments, commissions, publications, and so on.Template:Sfn The CMC is the highest decision-making institution on military affairs within the party, and controls the operations of the People's Liberation Army.Template:Sfn The general secretary has, since Jiang Zemin, also served as Chairman of the CMC.Template:Sfn Unlike the collective leadership ideal of other party organs, the CMC chairman acts as commander-in-chief with full authority to appoint or dismiss top military officers at will.Template:Sfn
A first plenum of the Central Committee also elects heads of departments, bureaus, central leading groups and other institutions to pursue its work during a term (a "term" being the period elapsing between national congresses, usually five years).Template:Sfn The General Office is the party's "nerve centre", in charge of day-to-day administrative work, including communications, protocol, and setting agendas for meetings.Template:Sfn The CCP currently has six main central departments: the Organization Department, responsible for overseeing provincial appointments and vetting cadres for future appointments,<ref name="COD">Template:Cite news</ref> the Publicity Department (formerly "Propaganda Department"), which oversees the media and formulates the party line to the media,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn the United Front Work Department, which oversees the country's eight minor parties, people's organizations, and influence groups inside and outside of the country,Template:Sfn the International Department, functioning as the party's "foreign affairs ministry" with other parties, the Society Work Department, which handles work related to civic groups, chambers of commerce and industry groups and mixed-ownership and non-public enterprises,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> and the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, which oversees the country's legal enforcement authorities.Template:Sfn The CC also has direct control over the Central Policy Research Office, which is responsible for researching issues of significant interest to the party leadership,Template:Sfn the Central Party School, which provides political training and ideological indoctrination in communist thought for high-ranking and rising cadres,Template:Sfn the Institute of Party History and Literature, which sets priorities for scholarly research in state-run universities and the Central Party School and studies and translates the classical works of Marxism.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn The party's newspaper, the People's Daily, is under the direct control of the Central CommitteeTemplate:Sfn and is published with the objectives "to tell good stories about China and the (Party)" and to promote its party leader.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The theoretical magazines Qiushi and Study Times are published by the Central Party School.Template:Sfn The China Media Group, which oversees China Central Television (CCTV), China National Radio (CNR) and China Radio International (CRI), is under the direct control of the Publicity Department.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> The various offices of the "Central Leading Groups", such as the Hong Kong and Macau Work Office, the Taiwan Affairs Office, and the Central Finance Office, also report to the central committee during a plenary session.Template:Sfn Additionally, CCP has sole control over the People's Liberation Army (PLA) through its Central Military Commission.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
Lower-level organizationsEdit
After seizing political power, the CCP extended the dual party-state command system to all government institutions, social organizations, and economic entities.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> The State Council and the Supreme Court each has a party group, established since November 1949. Party committees permeate in every state administrative organ as well as the People's Consultation Conferences and mass organizations at all levels.<ref name=":10">Template:Cite book</ref> According to scholar Rush Doshi, "[t]he Party sits above the state, runs parallel to the state, and is enmeshed in every level of the state."<ref name=":10" /> Modelled after the Soviet Nomenklatura system, the party committee's organization department at each level has the power to recruit, train, monitor, appoint, and relocate these officials.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
Party committees exist at the level of provinces, cities, counties, and neighbourhoods.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> These committees play a key role in directing local policy by selecting local leaders and assigning critical tasks.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":3">Template:Cite journal</ref> The Party secretary at each level is more senior than that of the leader of the government, with the CCP standing committee being the main source of power.<ref name=":3" /> Party committee members in each level are selected by the leadership in the level above, with provincial leaders selected by the central Organizational Department, and not removable by the local party secretary.<ref name=":3" /> Neighborhood committees are generally composed of older volunteers.<ref name=":024">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp
CCP committees exist inside of companies, both private and state-owned.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> A business that has more than three party members is legally required to establish a committee or branch.<ref name=":11" />Template:Sfn Template:As of, more than half of China's private firms have such organizations.Template:Sfn These branches provide places for new member socialization and host morale boosting events for existing members.Template:Sfn They also provide mechanisms that help private firm interface with government bodies and learn about policies which relate to their fields.Template:Sfn On average, the profitability of private firms with a CCP branch is 12.6 per cent higher than the profitability of private firms.Template:Sfn
Within state-owned enterprises, these branches are governing bodies that make important decisions and inculcate CCP ideology in employees.Template:Sfn Party committees or branches within companies also provide various benefits to employees.Template:Sfn These may include bonuses, interest-free loans, mentorship programs, and free medical and other services for those in need.Template:Sfn Enterprises that have party branches generally provide more expansive benefits for employees in the areas of retirement, medical care, unemployment, injury, and birth and fertility.Template:Sfn Increasingly, the CCP is requiring private companies to revise their charters to include the role of the party.<ref name=":11">Template:Cite news</ref>
FundingEdit
The funding of all CCP organizations mainly comes from state fiscal revenue. Data for the proportion of total CCP organizations' expenditures in total China fiscal revenue is unavailable.Template:Citation needed
MembersEdit
The CCP reached 99.19 million members at the end of 2023, a net increase of 1.1 million over the previous year.<ref name="2023PartyCensus">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref name=":8">Template:Cite news</ref> It is the second largest political party in the world after India's Bharatiya Janata Party.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
To join the CCP, an applicant must go through an approval process.Template:Sfn Adults can file applications for membership with their local party branch.Template:Sfn A prescreening process, akin to a background check, follows.Template:Sfn Next, established party members at the local branch vet applicants' behaviour and political attitudes and may make a formal inquiry to a party branch near the applicants' parents residence to vet family loyalty to communism and the party.Template:Sfn In 2014, only 2 million applications were accepted out of some 22 million applicants.<ref name=":4">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> Admitted members then spend a year as a probationary member.Template:Sfn Probationary members are typically accepted into the party.Template:Sfn Members must pay dues regardless of location and, in 2019, the CCP Central Committee issued a rule requiring members abroad to contact CCP cells at home at least once every six months.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
In contrast to the past, when emphasis was placed on the applicants' ideological criteria, the current CCP stresses technical and educational qualifications.Template:Sfn To become a probationary member, the applicant must take an admission oath before the party flag.Template:Sfn The relevant CCP organization is responsible for observing and educating probationary members.Template:Sfn Probationary members have duties similar to those of full members, with the exception that they may not vote in party elections nor stand for election.Template:Sfn Many join the CCP through the Communist Youth League.Template:Sfn Under Jiang Zemin, private entrepreneurs were allowed to become party members.Template:Sfn
Membership demographicsEdit
Template:As of, individuals who identify as farmers, herdsmen and fishermen make up 26 million members; members identifying as workers totalled 6.6 million.<ref name=":4" /><ref name="2023PartyCensus" /> Another group, the "Managing, professional and technical staff in enterprises and public institutions", made up 16.2 million, 11.5 million identified as working in administrative staff and 7.6 million described themselves as party cadres.<ref name="CCPmembersoccupation">Template:Cite news</ref> The CCP systematically recruits white-collar workers over other social groups.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> By 2023, CCP membership had become more educated, younger, and less blue-collar than previously, with 56.2% of party members having a college degree or above.<ref name=":8" /> Template:As of, around 30 to 35 per cent of Chinese entrepreneurs are or have been a party member.Template:Sfn At the end of 2023, the CCP stated that it has approximately 7.59 million ethnic minority members or 7.7% of the party.<ref name="2023PartyCensus" />
Status of womenEdit
Template:As of, 30.19 million women are CCP members, representing 30.4% of the party.<ref name="2023PartyCensus" /> Women in China have low participation rates as political leaders. Women's disadvantage is most evident in their severe underrepresentation in the more powerful political positions.<ref name="Bauer">Template:Cite journal</ref> At the top level of decision making, no woman has ever been among the members of the Politburo Standing Committee, while the broader Politburo currently does not have any female members. Just 3 of 27 government ministers are women, and importantly, since 1997, China has fallen to 53rd place from 16th in the world in terms of female representation in the National People's Congress, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union.<ref>Template:Cite newsTemplate:Cbignore</ref> CCP leaders such as Zhao Ziyang have vigorously opposed the participation of women in the political process.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Within the party women face a glass ceiling.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Benefits of membershipEdit
A 2019 Binghamton University study found that CCP members gain a 20% wage premium in the market over non-members.<ref name=":03">Template:Cite news</ref> A subsequent academic study found that the economic benefit of CCP membership is strongest on those in lower wealth brackets.<ref name=":03"/> CCP households also tend to accumulate wealth faster than non-CCP households.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
Certain CCP cadres have access to a special supply system for foodstuffs called tegong.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> CCP leadership cadres have access to a dedicated healthcare system managed by the CCP General Office.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
Communist Youth LeagueEdit
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The Communist Youth League (CYL) is the CCP's youth wing, and the largest mass organization for youth in China.Template:Sfn To join, an applicant has to be between the ages of 14 and 28.Template:Sfn It controls and supervises Young Pioneers, a youth organization for children below the age of 14.Template:Sfn The organizational structure of CYL is an exact copy of the CCP's; the highest body is the National Congress, followed by the Central Committee, Politburo, and the Politburo Standing Committee.Template:Sfn However, the Central Committee (and all central organs) of the CYL work under the guidance of the CCP central leadership.<ref name="CPCactualconstitution">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> By the end of 2024, the CYLC had 75 million members and 4.4 million organizations throughout China.<ref name=":23">Template:Cite news</ref>
SymbolsEdit
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At the beginning of its history, the CCP did not have a single official standard for the flag, but instead allowed individual party committees to copy the flag of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.<ref name="CPCemblemflag">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> The Central Politburo decreed the establishment of a sole official flag on 28 April 1942: "The flag of the CPC has the length-to-width proportion of 3:2 with a hammer and sickle in the upper-left corner, and with no five-pointed star. The Political Bureau authorizes the General Office to custom-make a number of standard flags and distribute them to all major organs".<ref name="CPCemblemflag" />
According to the People's Daily, "The red color symbolizes revolution; the hammer-and-sickle are tools of workers and peasants, meaning that the Communist Party of China represents the interests of the masses and the people; the yellow color signifies brightness."<ref name="CPCemblemflag" />
Party-to-party relationsEdit
The International Department of the Chinese Communist Party is responsible for dialogue with global political parties.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
Communist partiesEdit
The CCP continues to have relations with non-ruling communist and workers' parties and attends international communist conferences, most notably the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>Template:Better source needed While the CCP retains contact with major parties such as the Communist Party of Portugal,<ref name="PCP">Template:Cite news</ref> the Communist Party of France,<ref name="FCP">Template:Cite news</ref> the Communist Party of the Russian Federation,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> the Communist Party of Brazil,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> the Communist Party of Greece,<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> the Communist Party of Nepal (UML)<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> and the Communist Party of Spain,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> the party also retains relations with minor communist and workers' parties, such as the Communist Party of Australia,<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> the Workers Party of Bangladesh, the Bangladesher Samyabadi Dal (ML), the Communist Party of Sri Lanka, the Workers' Party of Belgium, the Hungarian Workers' Party, the Dominican Workers' Party, the Nepal Workers Peasants Party, and the Party for the Transformation of Honduras, for instance.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> It has pricklyTemplate:Vague relations with the Japanese Communist Party.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> In recent years, noting the self-reform of the European social democratic movement in the 1980s and 1990s, the CCP "has noted the increased marginalization of West European communist parties."Template:Sfn
Ruling parties of socialist statesEdit
The CCP has retained close relations with the ruling parties of socialist states still espousing communism: Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam.Template:Sfn It spends a fair amount of time analysing the situation in the remaining socialist states, trying to reach conclusions as to why these states survived when so many did not, following the collapse of the Eastern European socialist states in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.Template:Sfn In general, the analyses of the remaining socialist states and their chances of survival have been positive, and the CCP believes that the socialist movement will be revitalized sometime in the future.Template:Sfn
The ruling party which the CCP is most interested in is the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).Template:Sfn In general the CPV is considered a model example of socialist development in the post-Soviet era.Template:Sfn Chinese analysts on Vietnam believe that the introduction of the Đổi Mới reform policy at the 6th CPV National Congress is the key reason for Vietnam's current success.Template:Sfn
While the CCP is probably the organization with most access to North Korea, writing about North Korea is tightly circumscribed.Template:Sfn The few reports accessible to the general public are those about North Korean economic reforms.Template:Sfn While Chinese analysts of North Korea tend to speak positively of North Korea in public, in official discussions Template:Circa they show much disdain for North Korea's economic system, the cult of personality which pervades society, the Kim family, the idea of hereditary succession in a socialist state, the security state, the use of scarce resources on the Korean People's Army and the general impoverishment of the North Korean people.Template:Sfn Circa 2008, there are those analysts who compare the current situation of North Korea with that of China during the Cultural Revolution.Template:SfnTemplate:Update inline Over the years, the CCP has tried to persuade the Workers' Party of Korea (or WPK, North Korea's ruling party) to introduce economic reforms by showing them key economic infrastructure in China.Template:Sfn For instance, in 2006 the CCP invited then-WPK general secretary Kim Jong Il to Guangdong to showcase the success economic reforms had brought China.Template:Sfn In general, the CCP considers the WPK and North Korea to be negative examples of a ruling communist party and socialist state.Template:Sfn
There is a considerable degree of interest in Cuba within the CCP.Template:Sfn Fidel Castro, the former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), is greatly admired, and books have been written focusing on the successes of the Cuban Revolution.Template:Sfn Communication between the CCP and the PCC has increased since the 1990s.Template:Sfn At the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee, which discussed the possibility of the CCP learning from other ruling parties, praise was heaped on the PCC.Template:Sfn When Wu Guanzheng, a Central Politburo member, met with Fidel Castro in 2007, he gave him a personal letter written by Hu Jintao: "Facts have shown that China and Cuba are trustworthy good friends, good comrades, and good brothers who treat each other with sincerity. The two countries' friendship has withstood the test of a changeable international situation, and the friendship has been further strengthened and consolidated."Template:Sfn
Non-communist partiesEdit
Since the decline and fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the CCP has begun establishing party-to-party relations with non-communist parties.Template:Sfn These relations are sought so that the CCP can learn from them.Template:Sfn For instance, the CCP has been eager to understand how the People's Action Party of Singapore (PAP) maintains its total domination over Singaporean politics through its "low-key presence, but total control."Template:Sfn According to the CCP's own analysis of Singapore, the PAP's dominance can be explained by its "well-developed social network, which controls constituencies effectively by extending its tentacles deeply into society through branches of government and party-controlled groups."Template:Sfn While the CCP accepts that Singapore is a liberal democracy, they view it as a guided democracy led by the PAP.Template:Sfn Other differences are, according to the CCP, "that it is not a political party based on the working class—instead it is a political party of the elite.Template:Nbsp... It is also a political party of the parliamentary system, not a revolutionary party."Template:Sfn Other parties which the CCP studies and maintains strong party-to-party relations with are the United Malays National Organization, which has ruled Malaysia (1957–2018, 2020–2022), and the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, which dominated Japanese politics since 1955.Template:Sfn
Since Jiang Zemin's time, the CCP has made friendly overtures to its erstwhile foe, the Kuomintang. The CCP emphasizes strong party-to-party relations with the KMT so as to strengthen the probability of the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China.Template:Sfn However, several studies have been written on the KMT's loss of power in 2000 after having ruled Taiwan since 1949 (the KMT officially ruled mainland China from 1928 to 1949).Template:Sfn In general, one-party states or dominant-party states are of special interest to the party and party-to-party relations are formed so that the CCP can study them.Template:Sfn The longevity of the Syrian Regional Branch of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party is attributed to the personalization of power in the al-Assad family, the strong presidential system, the inheritance of power, which passed from Hafez al-Assad to his son Bashar al-Assad, and the role given to the Syrian military in politics.Template:Sfn
Circa 2008, the CCP has been especially interested in Latin America,Template:Sfn as shown by the increasing number of delegates sent to and received from these countries.Template:Sfn Of special fascination for the CCP is the 71-year-long rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico.Template:Sfn While the CCP attributed the PRI's long reign in power to the strong presidential system, tapping into the machismo culture of the country, its nationalist posture, its close identification with the rural populace and the implementation of nationalization alongside the marketization of the economy,Template:Sfn the CCP concluded that the PRI failed because of the lack of inner-party democracy, its pursuit of social democracy, its rigid party structures that could not be reformed, its political corruption, the pressure of globalization, and American interference in Mexican politics.Template:Sfn While the CCP was slow to recognize the pink tide in Latin America, it has strengthened party-to-party relations with several socialist and anti-American political parties over the years.Template:Sfn The CCP has occasionally expressed some irritation over Hugo Chávez's anti-capitalist and anti-American rhetoric.Template:Sfn Despite this, the CCP reached an agreement in 2013 with the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), which was founded by Chávez, for the CCP to educate PSUV cadres in political and social fields.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> By 2008, the CCP claimed to have established relations with 99 political parties in 29 Latin American countries.Template:Sfn
Social democratic movements in Europe have been of great interest to the CCP since the early 1980s.Template:Sfn With the exception of a short period in which the CCP forged party-to-party relations with far-right parties during the 1970s in an effort to halt "Soviet expansionism", the CCP's relations with European social democratic parties were its first serious efforts to establish cordial party-to-party relations with non-communist parties.Template:Sfn The CCP credits the European social democrats with creating a "capitalism with a human face".Template:Sfn Before the 1980s, the CCP had a highly negative and dismissive view of social democracy, a view dating back to the Second International and the Marxist–Leninist view on the social democratic movement.Template:Sfn By the 1980s, that view had changed and the CCP concluded that it could actually learn something from the social democratic movement.Template:Sfn CCP delegates were sent all over Europe to observe.Template:Sfn By the 1980s, most European social democratic parties were facing electoral decline and in a period of self-reform.Template:Sfn The CCP followed this with great interest, laying most weight on reform efforts within the British Labour Party and the Social Democratic Party of Germany.Template:Sfn The CCP concluded that both parties were re-elected because they modernized, replacing traditional state socialist tenets with new ones supporting privatization, shedding the belief in big government, conceiving a new view of the welfare state, changing their negative views of the market and moving from their traditional support base of trade unions to entrepreneurs, the young and students.Template:Sfn
Electoral historyEdit
National People's Congress electionsEdit
See alsoEdit
NotesEdit
ReferencesEdit
CitationsEdit
SourcesEdit
BooksEdit
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- Dittmer, Lowell, et al. (eds.) Informal politics in East Asia, (2000), Informal politics in East Asia
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- Pye, Lucian, The Dynamics of Chinese politics (1987) The Dynamics of Chinese politics
- Saich, Tony. From Rebel to Ruler: One Hundred Years of the Chinese Communist Party (2021)
- Saich, Tony. Finding Allies and Making Revolution The Early Years of the Chinese Communist Party (2020)
- Saich, Tony. Governance and Politics of China (2015)
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- Snow, Edgar, Red Star Over China 1937 Red Star Over China - The Rise Of The Red Army
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- Whitson, William W., The Chinese high command : a history of Communist military politics, 1927–71, (1973)
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Journal articlesEdit
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External linksEdit
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