Negative responsiveness

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A 4-candidate Yee diagram under IRV. The diagram shows who would win an IRV election if the electorate is centered at a particular point. Moving the electorate to the left can cause a right-wing candidate to win, and vice versa. Black lines show the optimal solution (achieved by Condorcet or score voting).

In social choice, the negative response,<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref><ref name=":4222">Template:Cite book</ref> perversity,<ref name="jstor.org">Template:Cite journal</ref> or additional support paradox<ref name=":0">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> is a pathological behavior of some voting rules where a candidate loses as a result of having too much support (or wins because of increased opposition). In other words, increasing (decreasing) a candidate's ranking or rating causes that candidate to lose (win), respectively.<ref name=":0" /> Electoral systems that do not exhibit perversity are sometimes said to satisfy the monotonicity criterion.<ref name="Woodall-Monotonicity222">D R Woodall, "Monotonicity and Single-Seat Election Rules", Voting matters, Issue 6, 1996</ref>

Perversity is often described by social choice theorists as an exceptionally severe kind of electoral pathology,<ref name="Felsenthal-severe">Template:Cite journal</ref> as such rules can have "backwards" responses to voters' opinions, where popularity causes defeat while unpopularity leads to a win.<ref name=":1">Template:Cite book</ref> Similar rules treat the well-being of some voters as "less than worthless".<ref name="Arrow">Template:Cite book</ref> These issues have led to constitutional prohibitions on such systems as violating the right to equal and direct suffrage.<ref name=":42322">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name=":0322">Template:Cite news</ref> Negative response is often cited as an example of a perverse incentive, as rules with negative response can incentivize politicians to take extreme or unpopular positions in an attempt to shed excess votes.<ref name=":4" />

Most ranked methods (including Borda and all common round-robin rules) satisfy positive response,<ref name="Woodall-Monotonicity222" /> as do all common rated voting methods (including approval, highest medians, and score).Template:NoteTag

Negative responsiveness occurs in instant-runoff voting (IRV),<ref name="Ornstein">Template:Cite journal</ref> the single transferable vote,<ref name="jstor.org"/> and the two-round system.<ref name=":4" /> Some quota-based apportionment methods also violate the rule,<ref name=":5" /> as can the randomized Condorcet method in cases of cyclic ties.

The participation criterion is closely-related, but different. While positive responsiveness deals with a voter changing their opinion (or vote), participation deals with situations where a voter choosing to cast a ballot at all has a backwards effect on the election.<ref name=":5">Template:Cite journal</ref>

DefinitionEdit

Miller defined two main classes of monotonicity failure in 2012, which have been repeated in later papers:<ref name="Miller2012">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="Felsenthal-severe"/> Template:Bq In simpler terms, an upward failure occurs when a winner loses from more support, and a downward failure occurs when a loser wins with less support.

ViewsEdit

Social choice theorists generally agree that negative responsiveness is an especially severe issue for a voting rule.<ref name="Felsenthal-severe"/> Some have argued the mere possibility should be enough to disqualify runoff-based electoral methods, while others argue this is only true if it occurs in "easy" or "common" cases, generally meaning those without a Condorcet cycle.<ref name="Gallagher"/>

Gallagher notes some political scientists are less concerned about negative response, arguing voters will not notice or understand it, making it appear random from their perspective and preventing exploitation by strategic voters.<ref name="Gallagher"/> By contrast, other researchers have argued voters will predict negative response and respond by strategically down-ranking their preferred candidates, keeping it from affecting the results.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

By methodEdit

Runoff votingEdit

Template:See also Runoff-based voting systems such as ranked choice voting (RCV) are typically vulnerable to perverse response. A notable example is the 2009 Burlington mayoral election, the United States' second instant-runoff election in the modern era, where Bob Kiss won the election as a result of 750 ballots ranking him in last place.<ref name=":522">Template:Cite journal</ref> Another example is given by the 2022 Alaska at-large special election.

An example with three parties (Top, Center, Bottom) is shown below. In this scenario, the Bottom party initially loses. However, they are elected after running an unsuccessful campaign and adopting an unpopular platform, which pushes their supporters away from the party and into the Top party.


Popular Bottom				Unpopular Bottom
	Round 1	Round 2			Round 1	Round 2
Top	~~25%~~ Template:Xmark		+6%	Top	31%	46%
Center	30%	55% Template:Tick	↗	Center	~~30% Template:Xmark~~
Bottom	45%	45%	-6%	Bottom	39%	54% Template:Tick

This election is an example of a center-squeeze, a class of elections where instant-runoff and plurality have difficulties electing the majority-preferred candidate. Here, the loss of support for Bottom policies makes the Top party more popular, allowing it to defeat the Center party in the first round.

Proportional rulesEdit

Some proportional representation systems can exhibit negative responsiveness. These include the single transferable vote and some implementations of mixed-member proportional representation, generally as a result of poorly-designed overhang rules. An example can be found in the 2005 German federal election.

Frequency of violationsEdit

The frequency of negative response will depend on the electoral method, the candidates, and the distribution of outcomes.

Empirical analysisEdit

In the US, a 2021 analysis of instant-runoff elections in California between 2008 and 2016, as well as the 2009 Burlington, Vermont mayoral election, found an upward monotonicity anomaly rate of 0.74% (1/135) in all elections, 2.71% (1/37) when limited to elections going to a second round of counting and 7.7% (1/13) of elections with three competitive candidates.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref><ref name="McCune"/> A more comprehensive 2023 survey of 182 American IRV elections where no candidate was ranked first by a majority of voters found seven total examples of non-monotonicity (3.8%), broken down into 2.2% (4/182) examples of upward monotonicity, 1.6% (3/182) of downward montonicity and 0.5% (1/182) of no-show or truncation (one example was both an upward and downward monotonicity failure).<ref name=":522" /><ref name="McCune">Template:Cite journal</ref> Two of those elections are also noted as specific examples below.

Semi-empiricalEdit

Some empirical research do not have access to full ballot preference data, and thus make probabilistic estimates of transfer patterns. A 2013 survey of Irish elections using IRV and PR-STV found plausible non-monotonicity in 20 out of 1326 elections between 1922 and 2011.<ref name="Gallagher">Template:Cite conference</ref>

Data from the five UK general elections between 1992 and 2010 showed 2642 three candidate elections in English constituencies. With second preferences imputed from survey data, 1.7% of all elections appeared vulnerable to monotonicity anomalies (1.4% upward, 0.3% downward), significantly lower than simulated datasets from the same paper. However, when limited to the 4.2% of elections considered three-way competitive, 40.2% appeared vulnerable (33% upward, 7.1% downward), and further increasing with closer competition, a result closer to the simulations.<ref name=":3">Template:Cite journal</ref>

A 2022 analysis out of the 10 French presidential elections (conducted under the two-round system) 2 had results where monotonicity violations were not mathematically possible, another 6 where violations were unlikely given the evidence, leaving 2 elections (2002 and 2007) where an upward monotonicity violation was probable and likely respectively.<ref name=":4">Template:Cite journal</ref>

Theoretical modelsEdit

Results using the impartial culture model estimate about 15% of elections with 3 candidates;<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref name="Miller2012"/> however, the true probability may be much higher, especially when restricting observation to close elections.<ref name=":2">Template:Cite journal</ref>

A 2013 study using a two-dimensional spatial model of voting estimated at least 15% of IRV elections would be nonmonotonic in the best-case scenario (with only three equally-competitive candidates). The researchers concluded that "three-way competitive races will exhibit unacceptably frequent monotonicity failures" and "In light of these results, those seeking to implement a fairer multi-candidate election system should be wary of adopting IRV."<ref name="Ornstein" />

Specific examplesEdit

2022 in AlaskaEdit

Alaska's first-ever instant-runoff election resulted in a victory for Democrat Mary Peltola, but had many voters for Republican Sarah Palin instead ranked Peltola first, Peltola would have lost.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

Burlington, VermontEdit

In Burlington's second IRV election, incumbent Bob Kiss was re-elected, despite losing in a head-to-head matchup with Democrat Andy Montroll (the Condorcet winner). However, if Kiss had gained more support from Wright voters, Kiss would have lost.<ref name=":522" />

2005 German election in DresdenEdit

In the 2005 German federal election, CDU supporters in Dresden were instructed to vote for the FDP, a strategy that allowed the CDU to win an additional seat.<ref name=":4222" /> This led the Federal Constitutional Court to rule that negative responsiveness violates the German constitution's guarantee of equal and direct suffrage.<ref name=":0322"/>

NotesEdit

ReferencesEdit

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