Template:Short description Template:Use dmy dates {{#invoke:Infobox military conflict|main}} Template:Campaignbox Iran-Iraq War Operation Earnest Will (24 July 1987 – 26 September 1988) was an American military protection of Kuwaiti-owned tankers from Iranian attacks in 1987 and 1988, three years into the Tanker War phase of the Iran–Iraq War.<ref name=kelley-0706 /> It was the largest naval convoy operation since World War II, and flowed from Resolution 598 which had been adopted three days earlier.

The U.S. Navy warships that escorted the tankers, part of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, were the operations' most visible part. U.S. Air Force AWACS radar planes provided surveillance and U.S. Army special-operations helicopters hunted for possible attackers.

Other U.S. Navy vessels participated in Operation Earnest Will. They were then under the command of the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet which had primary responsibility for combat operations in the Persian Gulf. The numerous ships used in Operation Earnest Will mostly consisted of Carrier Battle Groups, Surface Action Groups and ships from the Pacific's Third and Seventh Fleets and the Mediterranean-based Sixth Fleet. They generally operated in and near the Persian Gulf for parts of their normal six-month deployments.

It was the first tactical operation of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) that involved Navy SEALs, Special Boat Units, and 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) ("Nightstalkers") aviators all working together.

The French Navy also supported Resolution 598,<ref name="upi1">Template:Cite news</ref> as did the British Navy.<ref name="usni1">Template:Cite journal</ref>

BackgroundEdit

Template:See also The so-called "Tanker War" phase of the Iran–Iraq War started when Iraq attacked the oil terminal and oil tankers at Iran's Kharg Island in early 1984.<ref name=efraimkarsh>Template:Cite book</ref> Iraq had expanded its air force with new, Exocet-equipped French and Soviet aircraft.<ref name=efraimkarsh/> Saddam's aim in attacking Iranian shipping was, among other things, to provoke the Iranians to retaliate with extreme measures, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz to all maritime traffic, thereby bringing American intervention.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Iran limited the retaliatory attacks to Iraqi shipping, leaving the strait open.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

Becoming landlocked after the Battle of al-Faw, and due to the blockade of Iraqi oil pipelines to the Mediterranean Sea by Iran's ally Syria, Iraq had to rely on its ally, Kuwait and other Gulf Arab allies to a lesser extent to transport its oil. After increasing attacks on Iran's main oil export facility at Kharg Island by Iraq, Iran started to attack Kuwaiti tankers carrying Iraqi oil from 13 May 1984, and later attacking tankers from any Gulf state supporting Iraq. Attacks on ships of non-combatant nations in the Persian Gulf sharply increased thereafter, with both nations attacking oil tankers and merchant ships of neutral nations in an effort to deprive their opponent of trade.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

Besides concerns about the intensified Tanker War, the superpowers feared that the possible fall of Basra, which was now under threat, might lead to a pro-Iranian Islamic republic in largely Shia-populated southern Iraq. During the first four months of 1987, Kuwait turned to the superpowers, partly to protect oil exports but largely to seek an end to the war through superpower intervention.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> In December 1986, Kuwait's government asked the Reagan administration to send the U.S. Navy to protect Kuwaiti tankers against Iranian attacks.<ref>"Kuwaiti Call for Help Led to U.S. Role in Gulf". Los Angeles Times. 4 July 1988.</ref> Although members of both the U.S. House and Senate opposed the reflagging policy,<ref name=Pelletiere>Template:Cite book</ref> the executive debated this idea and finally agreed to it on 7 March 1987.<ref name="phillips24">Template:Cite news</ref>

U.S. law forbade the use of navy ships to escort civilian vessels under a foreign flag,Template:Cn so the Kuwaiti ships were re-registered under the U.S. flag. Before Earnest Will formally began, it became clear how dangerous Persian Gulf operations would be. On 17 May 1987, an Iraqi F-1 Mirage fired two Exocet missiles at the guided missile frigate Template:USS, killing 37 sailors and injuring 21. Iraqi officials said that the targeting of the U.S. warship was accidental.<ref name=kelley-0706 /><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref>Desert Storm at sea: what the Navy really did by Marvin Pokrant, P 43.</ref><ref name="DoD_report">Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Attack of the USS Stark in 1987 Template:Webarchive</ref>

OperationsEdit

After the passage of UNSCR 598 on 20 July 1987,<ref name=cfr1>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref name="farrokh03">Template:Cite book</ref> the U.S. Navy began Operation Earnest Will at 2:00 a.m. (EDT) on 23 July 1987.<ref name=Gibson>Template:Cite book</ref> Template:USS, Template:USS, Template:USS, Template:USS, and Template:USS<ref name="pool_report_25July1987">Template:Cite news</ref> were the first U.S. Navy ships assigned to escort the Kuwaiti oil tankers,<ref name=ct1>Template:Cite news</ref> under the command of Rear Admiral Harold Bernsen.<ref name=phillips24/>

Bridgeton incidentEdit

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File:Earnest Will map.png
BridgetonTemplate:'s convoy route and the place it was hit

On the very first escort mission, on 24 July 1987, the Kuwaiti oil tanker al-Rekkah, re-flagged as the U.S. tanker MV Bridgeton and accompanied by US navy warships, struck an Iranian underwater mine planted some Template:Convert west of Farsi Island the night earlier by a Pasdaran special unit, damaging the ship, but causing no injuries. Bridgeton proceeded under her own power to Kuwait, with the U.S. Navy escorts following behind to avoid mines.<ref name=kelley-0706 /><ref name=Crist>Template:Cite book</ref>

The operation was widely publicized, and American reporters aboard another ship in the convoy immediately issued reports about the incident, claiming it had "played into Iran's plan". Iran's Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi called it an "irreparable blow to America's political and military prestige",<ref name=Gibson /> and said that it was the "invisible hands [of God]" that hit the US-flagged ship, and expressed hope that the U.S. Congress would put an immediate end to the Administration's plan. The Congress was critical of the re-flagging policy, but still didn't have a united position on the issue.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

It was an unforeseen development. The commander of the task force admitted that in spite of intelligence warnings, no one had thought it necessary to check the route for naval mines,<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> and it was soon brought out that not only did the U.S. not have any minesweepers in the Persian Gulf, it did not have any easily accessible minesweepers at all, so the escort operation was placed on hold until minesweepers would be available.<ref name=Pelletiere /> The Pentagon deployed Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 14 (HM-14) with eight minesweeping SeaStallion helicopters, five oceangoing minesweepers, and six small coastal minesweepers—dramatically increasing U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf, and increasing the probability of an Iran–U.S. confrontation. U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger indirectly provoked Iran to retaliate.<ref name=Gibson />

Subsequent operationsEdit

In the following 14 months, many U.S. warships took up escort duties. At one point, more than 30 warships were in the region to support the operation.<ref name="Pyle 1987">Template:Cite news</ref>

Operation Prime ChanceEdit

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Earnest Will overlapped with Operation Prime Chance, a largely secret effort to stop Iranian forces from attacking Persian Gulf shipping. Despite the protection offered by U.S. Navy vessels, Iran used mines and small boats to harass the convoys steaming to and from Kuwait, at the time a principal ally of Iraq. In late July 1987, Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, commander of the Middle East Force, requested Naval Special Warfare assets. Special Boat Teams deployed with six Mark III Patrol Boats and two Navy SEAL platoons in August.<ref name="socom.mil">United States Special Operations Command</ref> The Middle East Force decided to convert two oil service barges, Hercules and Wimbrown VII, into mobile sea bases. These were moored in the northern Persian Gulf, allowing special operations forces to thwart clandestine Iranian mining and small boat attacks.

On 21 September, Night Stalkers flying MH-6 and AH-6 "Little Birds" took off from the frigates Template:USS and USS Klakring to track an Iranian ship, Template:Ship. The Nightstalkers watched Iran Ajr turn off its lights and begin laying mines. After receiving permission to attack, the helicopters fired guns and rockets, stopping the ship. Iran AjrTemplate:'s crew continued to push mines over the side, and the aircraft resumed firing until the crew abandoned ship.

At first light, a SEAL team, assisted by Special Boat Teams, boarded the vessel and discovered nine mines on the vessel's deck, as well as a logbook revealing areas where previous mines had been laid. Template:USS towed the mine layer (a converted tank landing craft) to the Iran-Iraq war zone. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technicians from EOD Mobile Unit 5 scuttled the vessel the following day.Template:Citation needed The logbook implicated Iran in mining international waters.<ref name="socom.mil" />

Within a few days, the special operations forces had determined the Iranian pattern of activity: hide during the day near oil and gas platforms in Iranian waters and at night, head toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a navigation aid for tankers. With this knowledge, the special operations forces launched three Little Bird aircraft and two patrol craft to the buoy. The aircraft arrived first and were fired upon by three Iranian boats anchored near the buoy. In a short but intense firefight, the aircraft sank all three boats. The captured and wounded Iranians were later taken aboard the USS Guadalcanal for treatment. The injured Iranian detainees were returned through cooperation between the U.S. Red Cross and the Red Crescent.

Lessons from Earnest Will later led USSOCOM to acquire the patrol coastal ships and the Mark V Special Operations Craft.<ref name="socom.mil" />

Operation Nimble ArcherEdit

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File:Operation Nimble Archer DN-SC-88-01042.jpg
Rostam, one of two Iranian oil platforms set ablaze after shelling by American destroyers.

On 15 October, the reflagged U.S. tanker Template:MV was struck by an Iranian Silkworm missile while at anchor near the oil terminal outside Kuwait City. Seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the attack.<ref name=kelley-0706>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref name="socom.mil" /> On 18 October, the U.S. Navy responded with Operation Nimble Archer. Four destroyers shelled two Revolutionary Guard bases in the Rostam oil field, located on oil platforms, that had been used to stage attacks on shipping. After the shelling, the Template:USS landed a SEAL platoon and a demolition unit that planted explosives on one of the platforms to destroy it. The SEALs then boarded and searched a third platform Template:Convert. Documents and radios were taken for intelligence.

Operation Praying MantisEdit

{{#invoke:Labelled list hatnote|labelledList|Main article|Main articles|Main page|Main pages}} On 14 April 1988, Template:Convert east of Bahrain, the frigate Template:USS hit a mine, blowing an immense hole in its hull.<ref name=NHH /> 10 sailors were injured. The U.S. retaliated fiercely. On 18 April, U.S. forces launched Operation Praying Mantis, attacking the Iranian fast-attack craft Joshan, the frigates Template:Ship and Template:Ship and Revolutionary Guard bases in the Sirri and Sassan oil fields.<ref name=kelley-0706 /><ref name=NHH>Template:Cite book</ref> After U.S. warships bombarded the Sirri base, located on an oil platform, and set it ablaze, a UH-60 helicopter with a SEAL platoon flew toward the platform but was unable to get close enough because of the roaring fire. Secondary explosions soon wrecked the platform.<ref name="socom.mil" />

EndgameEdit

Template:Further Thereafter, Iranian attacks on neutral ships dropped drastically. On 3 July 1988, Template:USS, mistook Iran Air Flight 655 for an Iranian F-14 and shot it down over the Strait of Hormuz. All 290 passengers and aircrew aboard the Airbus A300B2 died, including 65 children or infants.<ref>Islamic Republic of Iran. Memorial of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 3Template:NbspJuly 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) Template:Webarchive. p. 15. 24 July 1990.</ref>

The two effects of Earnest Will – Praying Mantis and the airliner's downing – helped convince Iran to agree to a ceasefire on 18 July 1988 and a permanent end to hostilities on 20 August 1988, ending its eight-year war with Iraq.<ref>Template:Citation</ref>

On 26 September 1988, Template:USS escorted the operation's last tanker to Kuwait. The remaining SEALs, patrol boats, and helicopters then returned to the U.S.<ref name="socom.mil" />

See alsoEdit

ReferencesEdit

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Further readingEdit

External linksEdit

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