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The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, also called the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, or the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, was the effect of a series of missile tests conducted by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the waters surrounding Taiwan, including the Taiwan Strait, from 21 July 1995 to 23 March 1996. The first set of missiles fired in mid-to-late 1995 was allegedly intended to send a strong signal to the Republic of China government under President Lee Teng-hui, who had been seen as "moving its foreign policy away from the One-China policy", as claimed by PRC.<ref name="CornellNews">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> The second set of missiles was fired in early 1996, allegedly intending to intimidate the Taiwanese electorate in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election.

Lee's 1995 visit to CornellEdit

Template:See also The crisis began when President Lee Teng-hui accepted an invitation from his alma mater, Cornell University, to deliver a speech on "Taiwan's Democratization Experience". Seeking to diplomatically isolate the Republic of China, the PRC opposed such visits by ROC (Taiwanese) leaders. A year earlier, in 1994, when President Lee's plane had stopped in Honolulu to refuel after a trip to South America, the U.S. government under President Bill Clinton refused Lee's request for a visa. Lee had been confined to the military airfield where he landed, forcing him to spend a night on his plane. A U.S. State Department official called the situation "embarrassing" and Lee complained that he was being treated as a second-class leader.

After Lee had decided to visit Cornell, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher assured PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that a visa for Lee would be "inconsistent with [the U.S.'s] unofficial relationship [with Taiwan]." However, the humiliation from Lee's last visit caught the attention of many pro-Taiwan figures in the U.S. and this time, the United States Congress acted on Lee's behalf. The lobbying firm Cassidy & Associates worked to obtain Congressional support for the visit.<ref name=":2" /> In May 1995, a concurrent resolution asking the State Department to allow Lee to visit the U.S. passed the House on 2 May with a vote of 396 to 0 (with 38 not voting), and the Senate on 9 May with a vote of 97 to 1 (with 2 not voting).<ref>Template:USBill. Senator Bennett Johnston Jr. (D-LA) was the lone "nay" voter</ref> The State Department relented on 22 May 1995. Lee spent 9–10 June 1995 in the U.S. at a Cornell alumni reunion.<ref name="CornellNews" />

The United States had not prepared the People's Republic of China for its policy reversal in granting a visa.<ref name=":054">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp While in the United States, Lee stated, "Taiwan is a country with independent sovereignty.<ref name=":12">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp PRC leadership described Lee's moves as an effort to "split the motherland".<ref name="Roy197">Denny Roy. Taiwan: A Political History. Cornell University Press, 2003. p. 197. Template:ISBN</ref>

1995Edit

In July 1995, Xinhua News Agency announced missile tests would be conducted by the People's Liberation Army (PLA); later, it announced when the exercises finished.<ref name=":3">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp The PRC mobilized forces in Fujian. The PRC sent officials to both Washington D.C. and Taipei to convey that the PRC did not intend to invade Taiwan.<ref name=":3" />Template:Rp According to Sankei Shimbun series "Secret Records on Lee Teng-hui" dated 1 April 2019, Tseng Yong-hsien, Lee's National Policy Adviser, received a direct message from China official in early July 1995; "Our ballistic missiles will be launched toward Taiwan a couple of weeks later, but you guys don't have to worry." This was communicated to Lee soon after, to prevent escalation. Tseng, as an envoy of Lee, had met President Yang Shangkun in 1992 and had a secret connection with Ye Xuanning, Head of the Liaison Department of the PLA.<ref>The series was later published as a book: 李登輝秘録 (Ri Touki Hiroku) Template:ISBN.</ref>

From 21 July to 28 July, the Second Artillery Corps (SAC) conducted a round of missile launches in an area 36 miles north of Taiwan.<ref name=":Li">Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp On 21 July, SAC launched two Dongfeng-15 missiles approximately 70 nautical miles from the coast of Taiwan.<ref name=":Li" />Template:Rp On 22 July, SAC fired two missiles at an area 40 miles north of Taiwan.<ref name=":Li" />Template:Rp On 24 July, it fired two more at the same area.<ref name=":Li" />Template:Rp Simultaneously, the PRC concentrated naval and amphibious landing forces in the area of the strait and conducted military exercises.<ref name=":Li" />Template:Rp

The United States responded by sending two aircraft carrier groups to the vicinity of Taiwan.<ref name=":054" />Template:Rp In July 1995, USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3) transited the Taiwan Strait.<ref name=":1">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>

From 15 August to 25 August, the East Sea Fleet deployed 59 naval vessels for exercises, during which the People's Liberation Army Air Force practiced 192 sorties.<ref name=":Li" />Template:Rp Naval exercises continued in September and October.<ref name=":3" />Template:Rp In November, the PLA conducted a major amphibious landing exercise in Nanjing Military Region.<ref name=":3" />Template:Rp

The United States sent the USS O'Brien (DD-975) and USS McClusky FFG-41 through the strait on 11–12 December 1995.<ref name=":1" /> Finally on 19 December 1995, the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) and her battle group passed through the straits.<ref name=":1" />

1996Edit

Between January and February 1996, the PRC concentrated 100,000 troops along the strait and conducted large scale exercises.<ref name=":Li" />Template:Rp Tensions remained high in early 1996 as Taiwan prepared for its first presidential election and Lee Teng-hui ran on the Kuomintang's ticket.<ref name=":Li" />Template:Rp

On 8 March, the PRC fired more missiles 20 miles off Keelung and 29 miles off Kaohsiung.<ref name=":Li" />Template:Rp Over 70 percent of commercial shipping passed through the targeted ports, which were disrupted by the proximity of the tests.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The PRC also conducted a launch on 11 March.<ref name=":3" />Template:Rp

On 10 March, the United States announced that it was dispatching the USS Independence toward the strait.<ref name=":3" />Template:Rp According to the Washington Post, that same day; the USS Bunker Hill CG-52 (which had detached from the Independence Battlegroup) along with a RC-135 Intelligence aircraft monitored the launch of 3 CSS-6 (DF-15) missiles from the PRC, two of them into shipping lanes near Kaohsiung and one fired directly over Taipei into a shipping lane near Keelung.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>

On the following day, the PRC announced live-fire exercises to be conducted near Penghu from 12 to 20 March. On 11 March, the U.S. dispatched USS Nimitz CVN-68 and her battlegroup, Carrier Group Seven.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref name=":Li" />Template:Rp Nimitz and her battle group, along with Belleau Wood, sailed through the Taiwan Strait, while Independence did not.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> The PRC 12 March to 20 March exercises proceeded<ref name=":3" />Template:Rp and in response to the U.S. moves, the PRC announced further exercises.<ref name=":Li" />Template:Rp

From 18 March to 25 March, the PRC conducted military exercises involving airplanes, guided missile destroyers, submarines, and 150,000 troops at Pingtan Island.<ref name=":Li" />Template:Rp The exercises practiced amphibious landing, mountainous assaults, and included paratrooper exercises.<ref name=":Li" />Template:Rp

AftermathEdit

Shipping and insurance rates for freight to Taiwan radically increased during the crisis and two of the Chinese missile launches twice closed the straits to all sea and airborne commerce.<ref name=":12" />Template:Rp

The crisis boosted Lee by 5% in the polls, earning him a majority as opposed to a plurality.<ref name=":2">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> On March 23, 1996, Lee was elected Taiwan's president.<ref name=":Li" />Template:Rp

The PLA viewed the 1995 military exercises as successful.<ref name=":3" />Template:Rp Zhang Wannian stated, "First, they showed the strong resolve of the PLA in protecting national unity; second, they served as a warning to the outside intervening powers; third, they also provided encouragement for the people on Taiwan who supported peaceful reunification of the island."<ref name=":3" />Template:Rp Fu Quanyou reported to Central Military Commission that the 1995 exercises were "all extremely successful: they attacked the power of the 'Taiwan separatists' represented by Lee Teng-hui, warned the United States as the main outside intervening power, and they were forcefully accompanied by political and diplomatic struggles and were highly praised by the Politburo and the CMC."<ref name=":3" />Template:Rp

The PLA believed that it lacked sufficient leverage in comparison to the United States.<ref name=":3" />Template:Rp Jiang ordered the PLA to begin a ten-year modernization program.<ref name=":054" />Template:Rp Soon the People's Republic ordered Template:Sclasss from Russia, a Cold War-era class designed to counter U.S. Navy carrier battle groups, allegedly in mid-December 1996 during the visit to Moscow by Chinese Premier Li Peng. The PRC subsequently ordered modern attack submarines (Template:Sclass2) and warplanes (76 Su-30MKK and 24 Su-30MK2) to counter the U.S. Navy's carrier groups.Template:Citation needed

The military tests and exercises also strengthened the argument for further U.S. arms sales to the ROC and led to the strengthening of military ties between the U.S. and Japan, increasing the role Japan would play in defending Taiwan.

During the military exercises in March, there were preoccupations in Taiwan that the PRC would occupy some small islands controlled by Taiwan, causing panic among many citizens. Therefore, many flights from Taiwan to the United States and Canada were full.Template:Citation needed The most likely target was Wuqiu (Wuchiu), then garrisoned by 500 soldiers. The outlying islands were placed on high alert.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The then secretary general of the National Security Council of Taiwan, Ting Mao-shih, flew to New York to meet Samuel Berger, Deputy National Security Advisor of the United States.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

In 1999, Major General Liu Liankun, a top Chinese military logistics officer, and his subordinate Senior Colonel Shao Zhengzhong were arrested, court-martialed and executed for disclosing to Taiwan that the missiles had unarmed warheads despite the Chinese government's claims.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>

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U.S. order of battle (March 1996 – May 1996)Edit

U.S. 7th FleetEdit

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See alsoEdit

ReferencesEdit

Template:ReflistTemplate:Chinese Civil War Template:Post-Cold War Asian conflicts

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