Use–mention distinction
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In analytic philosophy,<ref>Wheeler (2005) p. 568.</ref> a fundamental distinction is made between the use of a term and the mere mention of it.<ref name="Devitt99">Devitt and Sterelny (1999) pp. 40–1.</ref><ref name="Suine40p24">W. V. O. Quine (1940) p. 24.</ref> Many philosophical works have been "vitiated by a failure to distinguish use and mention."<ref name="Devitt99"/> The distinction can sometimes be pedantic, especially in simple cases where it is obvious.<ref name="Devitt99" /><ref name="Derrida77p79"/>
The distinction between use and mention can be illustrated with the word "cheese":<ref name="Devitt99"/><ref name="Suine40p24"/>
- Cheese is derived from milk.
- "Cheese" is derived from the Old English word {{#invoke:Lang|lang}}.
The first sentence is a statement about the substance called "cheese": it Template:Em the word "cheese" to refer to that substance. The second is a statement about the word "cheese" as a signifier: it Template:Em the word without using it to refer to anything other than itself.
OverviewEdit
In written language, Template:Em words or phrases often appear between single or double quotation marks or in italics. In philosophy, single quotation marks are typically used, while in other fields (such as linguistics) italics are more common.<ref>For example, Butcher's Copy-Editing: The Cambridge Handbook for Editors, Copy-editors and Proofreaders, 4th edition, by Judith Butcher, Caroline Drake, and Maureen Leach. Cambridge University Press, 2006. Butcher's recommends against the practice, but The Chicago Manual of Style, section 7.58 (15th edition, 2003), indicates that philosophers use single quotes for a similar distinction, though it is not explained in these terms.</ref> Some style authorities, such as Strunk and White, emphasize that mentioned words or phrases should be visually distinct. On the other hand, Template:Em words or phrases do not carry typographic markings.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
The phenomenon of a term having different references in various contexts was referred to as suppositio (substitution) by medieval logicians.<ref>See Read, Stephen (2006). Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.</ref> A substitution describes how a term is substituted in a sentence based on its referent. For nouns, a term can be used in different ways:
- With a Template:Em:Template:Efn "That is my pig." (personal supposition)
- With a Template:Em: "Santa Claus's pig is very big." (personal supposition)
- With a Template:Em: "Any pig breathes air." (simple supposition)
- Metaphorically: "Your grandfather is a pig." (improper supposition)
- As a Template:Em: "Pig has only three letters." (material supposition)
The use–mention distinction is particularly significant in analytic philosophy.<ref>Template:Cite encyclopedia</ref> Confusing use with mention can lead to misleading or incorrect statements, such as category errors.
Self-referential statements also engage the use–mention distinction and are often central to logical paradoxes, such as Quine's paradox. In mathematics, this concept appears in Gödel's incompleteness theorem, where the diagonal lemma plays a crucial role.
CommentaryEdit
Stanisław Leśniewski extensively employed this distinction, noting the fallacies that can result from confusing it in Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
Donald Davidson argued that quotation cannot always be treated as mere mention, giving examples where quotations carry both use and mention functions.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
Douglas Hofstadter explains the distinction between use and mention as follows:<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
<templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" />
When a word is used to Template:Em to something, it is being Template:Em. When a word is Template:Em, the focus is on its surface aspects, such as typography or phonetics, and it is being Template:Em.{{#if:|{{#if:|}}
— {{#if:|, in }}Template:Comma separated entries}}
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Issues arise when a mention itself is mentioned. Notating this with italics or repeated quotation marks can lead to ambiguity.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
Some analytic philosophers have said the distinction "may seem rather pedantic".<ref name="Devitt99" />
In a 1977 response to analytic philosopher John Searle, Jacques Derrida mentioned the distinction as "rather laborious and problematical".<ref name="Derrida77p79">Template:Cite book</ref>
See alsoEdit
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NotesEdit
ReferencesEdit
SourcesEdit
- Derrida, Jacques (1977) Limited Inc abc ... in Limited Inc
- Michael Devitt, Kim Sterelny (1999) Language and reality: an introduction to the philosophy of language
- W. V. O. Quine (1940) Mathematical Logic, §4 Use versus mention, pp. 23–5
- Wheeler, Samuel (2005) Davidson as Derridean: Analytic Philosophy as Deconstruction in Cardozo Law Review Vol. 27–2 November 2005 Symposium: Derrida/America, The Present State of America's Europe
Further readingEdit
- A. W. Moore (1986) How Significant Is the Use/Mention Distinction? in Analysis Vol. 46, No. 4 (Oct. 1986), pp. 173–179
External linksEdit
- "Robert And The Use-Mention Distinction", by William A. Wisdom, c. 2002
- "On the use of Quotation Marks", by Ralph E. Kenyon Jr. PhD, 29 December 1992, Revised 21 October 1993, Published in ETC: A Review of General Semantics, Vol. 51 No 1, Spring 1994. (accessed: 26 August 2006).
- "The evolution of Confusion", talk by Daniel Dennett AAI 2009, 4 October 2009