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Veto

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File:President Ronald Reagan signing veto of defense authorization bill.jpg
US President Ronald Reagan signing a veto of a bill.

A veto is a legal power to unilaterally stop an official action. In the most typical case, a president or monarch vetoes a bill to stop it from becoming law. In many countries, veto powers are established in the country's constitution. Veto powers are also found at other levels of government, such as in state, provincial or local government, and in international bodies.

Some vetoes can be overcome, often by a supermajority vote: in the United States, a two-thirds vote of the House and Senate can override a presidential veto.<ref name="us-veto">Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution</ref> Some vetoes, however, are absolute and cannot be overridden. For example, in the United Nations Security Council, the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have an absolute veto over any Security Council resolution.

In many cases, the veto power can only be used to prevent changes to the status quo. But some veto powers also include the ability to make or propose changes. For example, the Indian president can use an amendatory veto to propose amendments to vetoed bills.

The executive power to veto legislation is one of the main tools that the executive has in the legislative process, along with the proposal power.Template:Sfn It is most commonly found in presidential and semi-presidential systems.<ref name="oecd-system"/> In parliamentary systems, the head of state often has either a weak veto power or none at all.Template:Sfn But while some political systems do not contain a formal veto power, all political systems contain veto players, people or groups who can use social and political power to prevent policy change.Template:Sfn

The word "veto" comes from the Latin for "I forbid". The concept of a veto originated with the Roman offices of consul and tribune of the plebs. There were two consuls every year; either consul could block military or civil action by the other. The tribunes had the power to unilaterally block any action by a Roman magistrate or the decrees passed by the Roman Senate.<ref name="Spitzer">Template:Cite book</ref>

HistoryEdit

Roman vetoEdit

File:Tiberius Gracchus.jpg
Tiberius Gracchus, Roman tribune

The institution of the veto, known to the Romans as the intercessio, was adopted by the Roman Republic in the 6th century BC to enable the tribunes to protect the mandamus interests of the plebeians (common citizenry) from the encroachments of the patricians, who dominated the Senate. A tribune's veto did not prevent the senate from passing a bill but meant that it was denied the force of law. The tribunes could also use the veto to prevent a bill from being brought before the plebeian assembly. The consuls also had the power of veto, as decision-making generally required the assent of both consuls. If they disagreed, either could invoke the intercessio to block the action of the other. The veto was an essential component of the Roman conception of power being wielded not only to manage state affairs but to moderate and restrict the power of the state's high officials and institutions.<ref name="Spitzer" />

A notable use of the Roman veto occurred in the Gracchan land reform, which was initially spearheaded by the tribune Tiberius Gracchus in 133 BC. When Gracchus' fellow tribune Marcus Octavius vetoed the reform, the Assembly voted to remove him on the theory that a tribune must represent the interests of the plebeians. Later, senators outraged by the reform murdered Gracchus and several supporters, setting off a period of internal political violence in Rome.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Liberum vetoEdit

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In the constitution of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 17th and 18th centuries, all bills had to pass the Sejm or "Seimas" (parliament) by unanimous consent, and if any legislator invoked the liberum veto, this not only vetoed that bill but also all previous legislation passed during the session, and dissolved the legislative session itself. The concept originated in the idea of "Polish democracy" as any Pole of noble extraction was considered as good as any other, no matter how low or high his material condition might be. The more and more frequent use of this veto power paralyzed the power of the legislature and, combined with a string of weak figurehead kings, led ultimately to the partitioning and the dissolution of the Polish state in the late 18th century.

Emergence of modern vetoesEdit

File:P588 William III. giving his royal assent to the toleration act.jpg
William III of England granting royal assent to the Toleration Act 1688.

The modern executive veto derives from the European institution of royal assent, in which the monarch's consent was required for bills to become law. This in turn had evolved from earlier royal systems in which laws were simply issued by the monarch, as was the case for example in England until the reign of Edward III in the 14th century.Template:Sfn In England itself, the power of the monarch to deny royal assent was not used after 1708, but it was used extensively in the British colonies. The heavy use of this power was mentioned in the U.S. Declaration of Independence in 1776.Template:Sfn

Following the French Revolution in 1789, the royal veto was hotly debated, and hundreds of proposals were put forward for different versions of the royal veto, as either absolute, suspensive, or nonexistent.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> With the adoption of the French Constitution of 1791, King Louis XVI lost his absolute veto and acquired the power to issue a suspensive veto that could be overridden by a majority vote in two successive sessions of the Legislative Assembly, which would take four to six years.<ref name="longman-2014">Template:Cite book</ref> With the abolition of the monarchy in 1792, the question of the French royal veto became moot.<ref name="longman-2014"/>

The presidential veto was conceived in by republicans in the 18th and 19th centuries as a counter-majoritarian tool, limiting the power of a legislative majority.Template:Sfn Some republican thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson, however, argued for eliminating the veto power entirely as a relic of monarchy.Template:Sfn To avoid giving the president too much power, most early presidential vetoes, such as the veto power in the United States, were qualified vetoes that the legislature could override.Template:Sfn But this was not always the case: the Chilean constitution of 1833, for example, gave that country's president an absolute veto.Template:Sfn

TypesEdit

Most modern vetoes are intended as a check on the power of the government, or a branch of government, most commonly the legislative branch. Thus, in governments with a separation of powers, vetoes may be classified by the branch of government that enacts them: an executive veto, legislative veto, or judicial veto.

However, other types of veto power have safeguarded other interests. The denial of royal assent by governors in the British colonies, which continued well after the practice had ended in Britain itself, served as a check by one level of government against another.Template:Sfn Vetoes may also be used to safeguard the interests of particular groups within a country. The veto power of the ancient Roman tribunes protected the interests of one social class (the plebeians) against another (the patricians).Template:Sfn In the transition from apartheid, a "white veto" to protect the interests of white South Africans was proposed but not adopted.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> More recently, indigenous vetoes over industrial projects on indigenous land have been proposed following the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which requires the "free, prior and informed consent" of indigenous communities to development or resource extraction projects on their land. However, many governments have been reluctant to allow such a veto.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

Vetoes may be classified by whether the vetoed body can override them, and if so, how. An absolute veto cannot be overridden at all. A qualified veto can be overridden by a supermajority, such as two-thirds or three-fifths. A suspensory veto, also called a suspensive veto, can be overridden by a simple majority, and thus only delays the law from coming into force.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Types of executive vetoesEdit

File:President William J. Clinton Signing Line Item Veto Letters - NARA - 77861673.jpg
US President Bill Clinton signing cancellation letters related to his line-Item vetoes for the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.

A package veto, also called a "block veto" or "full veto", vetoes a legislative act as a whole. Conversely, a partial veto, also called a line item veto, allows the executive to object only to some specific part of the law while allowing the rest to stand. An executive with a partial veto has a stronger negotiating position than an executive with only a package veto power.<ref name="oecd-system"/> Template:Anchor An amendatory veto or amendatory observation returns legislation to the legislature with proposed amendments, which the legislature may either adopt or override. The effect of legislative inaction may vary: in some systems, if the legislature does nothing, the vetoed bill fails, while in others, the vetoed bill becomes law. Because the amendatory veto gives the executive a stronger role in the legislative process, it is often seen as a marker of a particularly strong veto power.

Some veto powers are limited to budgetary matters (as with line-item vetoes in some US states, or the financial veto in New Zealand).Template:Sfn Other veto powers (such as in Finland) apply only to non-budgetary matters; some (such as in South Africa) apply only to constitutional matters. A veto power that is not limited in this way is known as a "policy veto".<ref name="oecd-system"/>

One type of budgetary veto, the reduction veto, which is found in several US states, gives the executive the authority to reduce budgetary appropriations that the legislature has made.Template:Sfn When an executive is given multiple different veto powers, the procedures for overriding them may differ. For example, in the US state of Illinois, if the legislature takes no action on a reduction veto, the reduction simply becomes law, while if the legislature takes no action on an amendatory veto, the bill dies.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>

A pocket veto is a veto that takes effect simply by the executive or head of state taking no action. In the United States, the pocket veto can only be exercised near the end of a legislative session; if the deadline for presidential action passes during the legislative session, the bill will simply become law.Template:Sfn The legislature cannot override a pocket veto.Template:Sfn

Some veto powers are limited in their subject matter. A constitutional veto only allows the executive to veto bills that are unconstitutional; in contrast, a "policy veto" can be used wherever the executive disagrees with the bill on policy grounds.<ref name="oecd-system">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> Presidents with constitutional vetoes include those of Benin and South Africa.

Legislative vetoEdit

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A legislative veto is a veto power exercised by a legislative body. It may be a veto exercised by the legislature against an action of the executive branch, as in the case of the legislative veto in the United States, which is found in 28 US states.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> It may also be a veto power exercised by one chamber of a bicameral legislature against another, such as was formerly held by members of the Senate of Fiji appointed by the Great Council of Chiefs.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

Veto over candidatesEdit

In certain political systems, a particular body is able to exercise a veto over candidates for an elected office. This type of veto may also be referred to by the broader term "vetting".

Historically, certain European Catholic monarchs were able to veto candidates for the papacy, a power known as the jus exclusivae. This power was used for the last time in 1903 by Franz Joseph I of Austria.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

In Iran, the Guardian Council has the power to approve or disapprove candidates, in addition to its veto power over legislation.

In China, following a pro-democracy landslide in the 2019 Hong Kong local elections, in 2021 the National People's Congress approved a law that gave the Candidate Eligibility Review Committee, appointed by the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, the power to veto candidates for the Hong Kong Legislative Council.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

Balance of powersEdit

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In presidential and semi-presidential systems, the veto is a legislative power of the presidency, because it involves the president in the process of making law. In contrast to proactive powers such as the ability to introduce legislation, the veto is a reactive power, because the president cannot veto a bill until the legislature has passed it.Template:Sfn

Executive veto powers are often ranked as comparatively "strong" or "weak". A veto power may be considered stronger or weaker depending on its scope, the time limits for exercising it and requirements for the vetoed body to override it. In general, the greater the majority required for an override, the stronger the veto.<ref name="oecd-system"/>

Partial vetoes are less vulnerable to override than package vetoes,<ref name="metcalf-2000">Template:Cite journal</ref> and political scientists who have studied the matter have generally considered partial vetoes to give the executive greater power than package vetoes.Template:Sfn However, empirical studies of the line-item veto in US state government have not found any consistent effect on the executive's ability to advance its agenda.Template:Sfn Amendatory vetoes give greater power to the executive than deletional vetoes, because they give the executive the power to move policy closer to its own preferred state than would otherwise be possible.Template:Sfn But even a suspensory package veto that can be overridden by a simple majority can be effective in stopping or modifying legislation. For example, in Estonia in 1993, president Lennart Meri was able to successfully obtain amendments to the proposed Law on Aliens after issuing a suspensory veto of the bill and proposing amendments based on expert opinions on European law.<ref name="metcalf-2000"/>

WorldwideEdit

File:UN-Sicherheitsrat - UN Security Council - New York City - 2014 01 06.jpg
United Nations Security Council meeting room.

Globally, the executive veto over legislation is characteristic of presidential and semi-presidential systems, with stronger veto powers generally being associated with stronger presidential powers overall.<ref name="oecd-system"/> In parliamentary systems, the veto power of the head of state is typically weak or nonexistent.Template:Sfn In particular, in Westminster systems and most constitutional monarchies, the power to veto legislation by withholding royal assent is a rarely used reserve power of the monarch. In practice, the Crown follows the convention of exercising its prerogative on the advice of parliament.

International bodiesEdit

|CitationClass=web }}</ref> Every permanent member has used this power at some point.<ref name="un-voting">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> A permanent member that wants to disagree with a resolution, but not to veto it, can abstain.<ref name="un-voting"/> The first country to use the latter power was the USSR in 1946, after its amendments to a resolution regarding the withdrawal of British troops from Lebanon and Syria were rejected.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>Template:Further

  • Template:Flag: The members of the EU Council have veto power in certain areas, such as foreign policy and the accession of a new member state, due to the requirement of unanimity in these areas. For example, Bulgaria has used this power to block accession talks for North Macedonia,<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation

|CitationClass=web }}</ref> and in the 1980s, the United Kingdom (then a member of the EU's precursor, the EEC) secured the UK rebate by threatening to use its veto power to stall legislation.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> In addition, when the Parliament and Council delegate legislative authority to the Commission, they can provide for a legislative veto over regulations that the Commission issues under that delegated authority.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref name="schuetze-2011">Template:Cite journal</ref> This power was first introduced in 2006 as "regulatory procedure with scrutiny", and since 2009 as "delegated acts" under the Lisbon Treaty.<ref name="dearth">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> This legislative veto power has been used sparingly: from 2006 to 2016, the Parliament issued 14 vetoes and the Council issued 15.<ref name="dearth"/>Template:Further

AfricaEdit

File:Africa just countries.svg
Africa
  • Template:Flag: The president can return legislation to the National Assembly for reconsideration within 15 days (or 5 days if the legislation is declared urgent).Template:Sfn The National Assembly can override the veto by passing the legislation once again by an absolute majority.Template:Sfn<ref name="benin-57">Template:Cite constitution</ref> If the president then vetoes the legislation a second time, the National Assembly can ask the Constitutional Court to rule on its constitutionality. If the Court rules that the legislation is constitutional, it becomes law.Template:Sfn<ref name="benin-57"/> If the president neither approves nor returns legislation within the prescribed 15- or 5-day period, this operates as a veto, and the National Assembly can petition the Court to declare the law constitutional and effective.<ref name="benin-57"/> This occurred for example in 2008, when President Yayi did not take action on a bill that would set an end date to the "exceptional measures" by which he had kept the National Assembly in session. After pocket-vetoing the bill in this way, the president petitioned the Court for constitutional review.<ref name="dcc08-171"/> The Court ruled that once the deadline for presidential action had passed, only the National Assembly could petition for review, which it did (and prevailed).<ref name="dcc08-171">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation

|CitationClass=web }}</ref>Template:Further

|CitationClass=web }}</ref> The president can return a bill to the National Assembly if the president has reservations about the bill's constitutionality.<ref name="south-africa-79">Template:Cite constitution</ref> If the National Assembly passes the bill a second time, the president must either sign it or refer it to the Constitutional Court of South Africa for a final decision on whether the bill is constitutional.<ref name="south-africa-79"/> If there are no constitutional concerns, the president's assent to legislation is mandatory.Template:Further

  • Template:Flag: The president has package veto and item veto powers.<ref name="uganda-91">Template:Cite constitution</ref> This power must be exercised within 30 days of receiving the legislation.<ref name="uganda-91"/> The first time the president returns a bill to the Parliament, the Parliament can pass it again by a simple majority vote. If the president returns it a second time, the Parliament can override the veto with a two-thirds vote.<ref name="uganda-91"/> This occurred for example in the passage of the Income Tax Amendment Act 2016, which exempted legislators' allowances from taxation.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Further
  • Template:Flag: Under the 1996 constitution, the president had an absolute pocket veto: if he neither assented to legislation nor returned it to parliament for a potential override, it was permanently dead.Template:Sfn This unusual power was eliminated in a general reorganization of the Constitution's legislative provisions in 2016.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation

|CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref>Template:Cite constitution</ref>Template:Further

AmericasEdit

File:Amerika.PNG
The Americas

|CitationClass=web }}</ref> Many state governors also have additional kinds of vetoes, such as amendatory, line-item, and reduction vetoes.<ref name="ncsl-executive"/> Gubernatorial veto powers vary in strength. The president and some state governors have a "pocket veto", in that they can delay signing a bill until after the legislature has adjourned, which effectively kills the bill without a formal veto and without the possibility of an override.Template:Sfn<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Further

AsiaEdit

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Asia

|CitationClass=web }}</ref>Template:Further

  • Template:Flag: The president can return a bill to the parliament with proposed amendments within two weeks of receiving the bill.<ref name="georgia-46">Template:Cite constitution</ref> Parliament must first vote on the proposed amendments, which can be adopted by the same majority as for the original legislation (for ordinary legislation, a simple majority vote).<ref name="georgia-46"/> If Parliament does not adopt the amendments, it can override the veto by passing the original bill by an absolute majority.<ref name="georgia-46"/> Before the constitutional reforms of the 2010s, the president had both a package veto and an amendatory veto, which could be overridden only with a 3/5 majority.Template:Sfn Template:Further
  • Template:Flag: The president has three veto powers: absolute, suspension, and pocket. The president can send the bill back to parliament for changes, which constitutes a limited veto that can be overridden by a simple majority. But the bill reconsidered by the parliament becomes a law with or without the president's assent after 14 days. The president can also take no action indefinitely on a bill, sometimes referred to as a pocket veto. The president can refuse to assent, which constitutes an absolute veto. But the absolute veto can be exercised by the President only once in respect of a bill. If the President refuses to provide his assent to a bill and sends it back to Parliament, suggesting his recommendations or amendments to the bill and the Parliament passes the bill again with or without such amendments, the president is obligated to assent to the bill.<ref>Article 111 of the Constitution of India</ref><ref name="intro india">Template:Cite book</ref><ref name="india times">Template:Cite news</ref>Template:Further
  • Template:Flag: Express presidential veto powers were removed from the Constitution in the 2002 democratization reforms.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> The president can however enact a "regulation in lieu of law" (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang or perppu), which temporarily blocks a law from taking effect.<ref name="setiawan-2022"/> The People's Representative Council (DPR) can revoke such a regulation in its next session.<ref name="indonesia-22">Template:Cite constitution</ref> In addition, the Constitution requires that legislation be jointly approved by the president and the DPR. The president thus can effectively block a bill by withholding approval.<ref name="setiawan-2022">Template:Cite book</ref> Whether these presidential powers constitute a "veto" has been disputed, including by former Constitutional Court justice Patrialis Akbar.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation

|CitationClass=web }}</ref>Template:Further

|CitationClass=web }}</ref> This veto power can be based on the legislation being contrary to the constitution or contrary to Islamic law. A constitutional veto requires a majority of the Guardian Council's members, while a veto based on Islamic law requires a majority of its fuqaha members.<ref>Template:Cite constitution</ref> The Guardian Council also has veto power over candidates for various elected offices.<ref name="iran-portal"/>Template:Further

|CitationClass=web }}</ref> The local assembly can override this veto by a 2/3 vote.<ref name="shimizutani-2010">Template:Cite journal</ref>Template:Further

EuropeEdit

File:Europe ISO 3166-1.svg
Europe

European countries in which the executive or head of state does not have a veto power include Slovenia and Luxembourg, where the power to withhold royal assent was abolished in 2008.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> Countries that have some form of veto power include the following:

|CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>Template:Further

|CitationClass=web }}</ref> Two of these vetoes resulted in referendums.<ref name="grimsson"/>Template:Further

|CitationClass=web }}</ref>Template:Further

OceaniaEdit

File:Oceania without Asian country codes.jpg
Oceania

|CitationClass=web }}</ref> This power has never been used. The Australian governor-general himself or herself has, in theory, the power to veto, or more technically, withhold assent to, a bill passed by both houses of the Australian Parliament, and contrary to the advice of the prime minister.<ref name="hamer">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> However, in matters of assent to legislation, the governor-general is advised by parliament, not by the government. Consequently, when a minority parliament passes a bill against the wishes of the government, the government could resign, but cannot advise a veto.<ref name="hamer" /><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> Since 1986, the individual states of Australia are fully independent entities. Thus, the Crown may not veto (nor the UK Parliament overturn) any act of a state governor or state legislature. State constitutions determine what role the state's governor plays. In general, the governor exercises the powers the sovereign would have; in all states and territories, the governor's (or, for territories, administrator's) assent is required for a bill to become law, except the Australian Capital Territory, which has no administrator.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>Template:Further

|CitationClass=web }}</ref> Bills can be subjected to a financial veto only on third reading, when they have been finalized, but before they have been passed.<ref name="mcgee">Template:Cite book</ref> The financial veto system was introduced in 1996.<ref name="mcgee"/>Template:Further

Veto theoriesEdit

In political science, the broader power of people and groups to prevent change is sometimes analyzed through the frameworks of veto points and veto players. Veto players are actors who can potentially exercise some sort of veto over a change in government policy.Template:Sfn Veto points are the institutional opportunities that give these actors the ability to veto.Template:Sfn The theory of veto points was first developed by Ellen M. Immergut in 1990, in a comparative case study of healthcare reform in different political systems.Template:Sfn Breaking with earlier scholarship, Immergut argued that "we have veto points within political systems and not veto groups within societies."<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

Veto player analysis draws on game theory. George Tsebelis first developed it in 1995 and set it forth in detail in 2002 Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work.Template:Sfn A veto player is a political actor who has the ability to stop a change from the status quo.Template:Sfn There are institutional veto players, whose consent is required by constitution or statute; for example, in US federal legislation, the veto players are the House, Senate and presidency.Template:Sfn There are also partisan veto players, which are groups that can block policy change from inside an institutional veto player.Template:Sfn In a coalition government the partisan veto players are typically the members of the governing coalition.Template:Sfn<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

According to Tsebelis' veto player theorem, policy change becomes harder the more veto players there are, the greater the ideological distance between them, and the greater their internal coherence.Template:Sfn For example, Italy and the United States have stable policies because they have many veto players, while Greece and the United Kingdom have unstable policies because they have few veto players.Template:Sfn

While the veto player and veto point approaches complement one another, the veto players framework has become dominant in the study of policy change.Template:Sfn Scholarship on rational choice theory has favored the veto player approach because the veto point framework does not address why political actors decide to use a veto point.Template:Sfn In addition, because veto player analysis can apply to any political system, it provides a way of comparing very different political systems, such as presidential and parliamentary systems.Template:Sfn Veto player analyses can also incorporate people and groups that have de facto power to prevent policy change, even if they do not have the legal power to do so.Template:Sfn

Some literature distinguishes cooperative veto points (within institutions) and competitive veto points (between institutions), theorizing competitive veto points contribute to obstructionism.<ref name="McGann"/> Some literature disagrees with the claim of veto player theory that multiparty governments are likely to be gridlocked.<ref name="McGann">Template:Cite journal</ref>

See alsoEdit

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Works citedEdit

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ReferencesEdit

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