Editing 1992 Consensus (section)

{{Short description|Notion in the relations across the Strait of Taiwan}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=May 2024}}
{{Infobox Chinese
|t= 九二共識|s= 九二共识
|l= Nine-Two Consensus
|p= Jiǔ-Èr Gòngshí (in [[China]])<br />Jiǔ-Èr Gòngshì (in [[Taiwan]])
|w= Chiu³-Êrh⁴ Kong⁴-shih² (in [[China]])<br />Chiu³-Êrh⁴ Kong⁴-shih⁴ (in [[Taiwan]])
|j= gau2 ji6 gung6 sik1
|poj= Kiú-jī Kiōng-sek}}
The '''1992 Consensus''' is a political term referring to the alleged outcome of a meeting in 1992 between the semiofficial representatives of the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP)-led [[China|People's Republic of China]] (PRC) in [[mainland China]] and the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT)-led [[Taiwan|Republic of China]] (ROC) on [[Taiwan (island)|Taiwan]].  They are often credited as creating a diplomatic basis for semi-official cross-strait exchanges which began in the early 1990s and is a precondition set by the PRC for engaging in cross-strait dialogue.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Grossman |first1=Derek |title=Is the '1992 Consensus' Fading Away in the Taiwan Strait? |url=https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/06/is-the-1992-consensus-fading-away-in-the-taiwan-strait.html |website=[[RAND Corporation]] |date=3 June 2020 |access-date=10 March 2021}}</ref><ref name="rand2020">{{cite web |last1=Derek |first1=Grossman |last2=Millan |first2=Brandon Alexander |title=Taiwan's KMT May Have a Serious '1992 Consensus' Problem |url=https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/09/taiwans-kmt-may-have-a-serious-1992-consensus-problem.html |website=[[Rand Corporation]] |date=25 September 2020 |access-date=11 March 2021}}</ref>

Whether the meetings truly resulted in a consensus is disputed in the ROC. The KMT understanding of the consensus is "one China, different interpretations" (一中各表, 一個中國各自表述), i.e. that the ROC and PRC "agree" that there is [[One China]], but [[Policy of deliberate ambiguity|disagree]] about what "China" means (i.e. ROC vs. PRC).  The PRC's position is that there is one China (including Taiwan), of which PRC is the sole [[Two Chinas|legitimate representative of China]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.storm.mg/article/301816|title=新華社發佈報導禁用詞：「中華民國、臺灣政府」通通不准用，「九二共識」不可提「一中各表」|trans-title=Xinhua News Agency publishes report on banned terms: "Republic of China", "Taiwan government" are both not allowed to be used. The "1992 consensus" cannot mention "One China, Separate Interpretation".|language=zh|date=2017-07-20|access-date=2018-05-14}}</ref> This discrepancy has been criticized by Taiwan's [[Democratic Progressive Party]] (DPP) who has been the ruling party since 2016. The DPP has never acknowledged the existence of the 1992 Consensus ever achieved by the semi-official meetings,<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Chen |first1=Yu-Jie |last2=Cohen |first2=Jerome A. |title=China-Taiwan relations re-examined: the "1992 consensus" and Cross-Strait agreement |url=https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=alr |journal=Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository |publisher=[[University of Pennsylvania Law School]] |date=2019 |access-date=20 July 2024|quote= Unlike her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen has not recognized the existence of the “1992 Consensus.” Yet, she has tried to reach a middle ground between Beijing’s stance and that of her own party, the DPP. In her inaugural speech, she carefully worded her position, acknowledging the first meeting between [[Straits Exchange Foundation|SEF]] and [[Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits|ARATS]] in 1992 as “historical fact.” She stated that the meeting had “arrived at various joint acknowledgments and understandings” and was conducted “in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences,” a phrase often used by Beijing... In other words, while Tsai did not accept the “1992 Consensus,” she acknowledged that the 1992 meeting took place in a positive spirit that should lay the groundwork for sustaining crossstrait peace.<br> ...Under international law, the 1992 SEF-ARATS exchanges would not amount to a legally binding agreement on the meaning of “One China” and other sovereignty questions. While SEF and ARATS apparently possessed the capacity to represent their own governments in concluding agreements on cross-strait cooperation, the intention of each organization was to sign legal instruments recording their agreement on the specific matters under negotiation... The parties never evinced an intention to conclude an agreement on sovereignty matters involving the notion of “One China” precisely because they could not reach agreement on the thorny issues involved. Instead, they bypassed the “One China” issues and went on to conclude formal written agreements on technical matters. In other words, the element of intent to create legal obligations on sovereignty questions did not exist. This is evident from the caution of SEF—it carefully avoided committing itself to a written agreement with regard to the all-important political issue and suggested that each side orally state its differing position separately. This poses a contrast with the formal agreements later concluded by the two organizations on various economic and technical matters. None of these cross-strait agreements touched upon the “One China” issue, and all were concluded without regard to it. }}</ref> and also rejects any claim that both sides of the [[Taiwan Strait]] are "One China".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=BEC36A4A0BB0663C&sms=BF821F021B282251&s=DC2AE73162A42D37|title=The DPP Administration's Logic and Policy on China|publisher=[[Mainland Affairs Council]]|access-date=10 December 2022|archive-date=10 December 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210113902/https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=BEC36A4A0BB0663C&sms=BF821F021B282251&s=DC2AE73162A42D37|url-status=live}}</ref>

Critics have also stated that the term was not used contemporaneously during the meeting: the term was invented in April 2000 by former [[National Security Council (Republic of China)|National Security Council]] secretary-general [[Su Chi]], eight years after the 1992 meetings.<ref>{{cite news |last=Wang |first=Chris |title=Tsai details DPP's cross-strait policies |work=Taipei Times |page=1 |date=2011-08-24 |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/08/24/2003511508}}</ref>  The then-[[President of the Republic of China|President of ROC]] in 1992, [[Lee Teng-hui]], denied the Consensus in 2006.<ref name="Shih Hsiu-chuan 2006-02-22">{{cite news |author=Shih Hsiu-chuan |title=Su Chi admits the '1992 consensus' was made up |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/22/2003294106 |date=February 22, 2006 |newspaper=[[Taipei Times]] |access-date=Jun 10, 2017}}</ref> The concept and application of the 1992 Consensus were clearly rebuked by another DPP president, [[Tsai Ing-wen]], who argued in a 2019 speech that [[one country, two systems]] is associated with the use of this term by CCP.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Feng |first1=John |title=Taiwan's Pro-China Opposition Suffers Identity Crisis as Chief Admits Beijing Threat |url=https://www.newsweek.com/taiwans-pro-china-opposition-suffers-identity-crisis-chief-admits-beijing-threat-1575078 |access-date=10 March 2021 |work=[[Newsweek]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Highlights of Xi's speech at Taiwan message anniversary event |url=https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/02/WS5c2c1ad2a310d91214052069_1.html |access-date=10 March 2021 |work=[[China Daily]]}}</ref>