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Appeasement
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{{short description|Diplomatic policy of concessions}} {{Use dmy dates|date=May 2022}} {{EngvarB|date= October 2020}} [[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1976-063-32, Bad Godesberg, Münchener Abkommen, Vorbereitung.jpg|thumb|right| [[Adolf Hitler]] greets [[British Prime Minister]] [[Neville Chamberlain]] at the beginning of the [[Bad Godesberg]] meeting on 24 September 1938 in which Hitler demanded annexation of [[Sudetenland|Czech border areas]] without delay, leading to the [[Godesberg Memorandum]].]] {{Conflict resolution sidebar}} {{War}} '''Appeasement''', in an [[International relations|international context]], is a [[diplomacy|diplomatic]] [[negotiation]] policy of making political, material, or territorial concessions to an aggressive [[power (international relations)|power]] with intention to avoid conflict.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.history.co.uk/explore-history/ww2/appeasement.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130404054019/http://www.history.co.uk/explore-history/ww2/appeasement.html|url-status=unfit|title=Appeasement — World War 2 on History|archive-date=4 April 2013|website=www.history.co.uk}}</ref> The term is most often applied to [[Foreign relations of the United Kingdom|the foreign policy]] between 1935 and 1939 of the British governments of [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|Prime Ministers]] [[Ramsay MacDonald]], [[Stanley Baldwin]] and most notably [[Neville Chamberlain]] towards [[Nazi Germany]] and [[Fascist Italy]].<ref>Mallett, Robert (1997). "The Anglo-Italian war trade negotiations, contraband control and the failure to appease Mussolini, 1939–40." ''Diplomacy and Statecraft'' 8.1: 137–67.</ref> Under [[United Kingdom|British]] pressure, appeasement of Nazism and Fascism also played a role in [[History of French foreign relations|French foreign policy]] of the period but was always much less popular there than in the [[United Kingdom]].<ref> {{cite book | last1 = Hucker | first1 = Daniel | year = 2011 | title = Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=NEsGDAAAQBAJ | location = London | publisher = Routledge | publication-date = 2016 | isbn = 978-1-317-07354-3 | access-date = 12 October 2020 }} </ref> In the early 1930s, appeasing concessions were widely seen as desirable because of the [[anti-war]] reaction to the trauma of [[World War I]] (1914–1918), second thoughts about the perceived vindictive treatment by some of [[Weimar Republic|Germany]] during the 1919 [[Treaty of Versailles]], and a perception that [[fascism]] was a useful form of [[anti-communism]]. However, by the time of the [[Munich Agreement]], which was concluded on 30 September 1938 between Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, the policy was opposed by the [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]] and by a few [[Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative]] dissenters such as future Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]], Secretary of State for War [[Duff Cooper]], and future Prime Minister [[Anthony Eden]]. Appeasement was strongly supported by the [[upper class (UK)|British upper class]], including [[British royal family|royalty]], [[big business]] (based in the [[City of London]]), the [[House of Lords]], and [[mass media in the United Kingdom|media]] such as the [[BBC]] and ''[[The Times]].''<ref>Andrew Roberts, "'Appeasement' Review: What Were They Thinking? Britain's establishment coalesced around appeasement and bared its teeth at those who dared to oppose it", [https://www.wsj.com/articles/appeasement-review-what-were-they-thinking-11572619353 ''Wall Street Journal'' 1 Nov. 2019).]</ref>{{Better source needed|reason=The current source is insufficiently reliable ([[WP:NOTRS]]).|date=March 2025}} As alarm grew about the rise of fascism in Europe, Chamberlain resorted to attempts at news [[censorship]] to control [[public opinion]].<ref>{{cite book|author= McDonough, Frank |title= Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement, and the British Road to War|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=3tQoAEo9Y6oC&pg=PA114|year= 1998|publisher= Manchester UP|page= 114|isbn= 978-0-7190-4832-6}}Compare: {{cite book|author= Frank McDonough|title= Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement, and the British Road to War|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=3tQoAEo9Y6oC|year= 1998|publisher= Manchester UP|page= 124|isbn= 978-0-7190-4832-6 | quote = By and large, the Chamberlain government tried to persuade editors to operate an informal self-censorship. [...] Editors of leading national newspapers were asked to support Chamberlain's efforts to gain a peaceful settlement and to avoid critical comment. Yet the freedom enjoyed by the press ensured that total government control was never feasible and critical comment continued to appear. <br /> Government pressure to restrict criticism of appeasement on BBC radio was far more successful. Radio coverage of foreign policy during the inter-war years was severely restricted through a combination of discreet pressure, self-censorship and guidance from Downing Street and the foreign office.}}</ref> He confidently announced after Munich that he had secured "[[peace for our time]]".<ref>Hunt, ''The Makings of the West'' p. 861.</ref> Academics, politicians and diplomats have intensely debated the 1930s appeasement policies ever since they occurred. Historians' assessments have ranged from condemnation ("[[Lesson of Munich]]") for allowing Hitler's Germany to grow too strong to the judgment that Germany was so strong that it might well win a war and that postponing a showdown was in the best interests of the West.
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