Editing Cumulative voting (section)

{{Short description|Multiple-winner electoral system}}
{{Electoral systems}}

'''Cumulative voting''' (sometimes called the '''single divisible vote''') is an election system where a voter casts multiple votes but can lump votes on a specific candidate or can split their votes across multiple candidates. The candidates elected are those receiving the largest number of votes cast in the election, up to the number of representatives to be elected.

Cumulative voting can simplify [[strategic voting]], by allowing larger groups of voters to elect multiple representatives by splitting their vote between multiple candidates. This removes the complexity associated with [[Mixed strategy|randomized]] or [[Correlated equilibrium|coordinated]] strategies.

It may be thought of as a variant of [[Plurality block voting|block voting]]. Under both cumulative voting and block voting, a voter casts multiple votes but in the case of cumulative voting, can lump them all on one candidate (the equivalent of engaging in [[Bullet voting|plumping]]). When voters do this, the result is similar to [[Single non-transferable vote|SNTV]]. When supporters of a minority candidate do this, they may be of sufficient strength to elect that minority representative, not a likely occurrence under either [[First-past-the-post voting|first past the post voting]] or block voting. Thus, cumulative voting generally produces similar results to SNTV (especially if voters are informed and rational, in which case they will tend to engage in [[Bullet voting|plumping]]. Plumping though reduces cumulative voting's effectiveness at reducing need for strategic voting by allowing the voter to cast a split vote.).

Cumulative voting can also be thought of as a form of [[cardinal voting]]: a variant on [[score voting]] where the total scores for each candidate must add up to a fixed value (e.g. 100%). If instead the [[Sum of squares function|sum of squares]] must add up to a fixed value, the method becomes [[quadratic voting]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance {{!}} The University of Chicago Law Review |url=https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/print-archive/quadratic-voting-efficient-corporate-governance |access-date=2024-07-01 |website=lawreview.uchicago.edu}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Lalley |first1=Steven P. |last2=Weyl |first2=E. Glen |date=May 2018 |title=Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy |url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pandp.20181002 |journal=AEA Papers and Proceedings |language=en |volume=108 |pages=33–37 |doi=10.1257/pandp.20181002 |issn=2574-0768}}</ref>

Cumulative voting is [[Semi-proportional representation|semi-proportional]], allowing for more representative government than [[First-past-the-post|winner-take-all]] elections using [[block voting|block plurality voting]] or [[Block preferential voting|block instant-runoff voting]]. Cumulative voting is commonly-used in corporate governance, where it is mandated by 7 U.S. states.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=758|title=FairVote - State Regulations on Cumulative Voting for Corporate Boards|website=archive.fairvote.org|access-date=2016-10-18}}</ref>

The method can also be used in [[participatory budgeting]].<ref>[http://www.torontohousing.ca/participatory_budgeting Explanation of the Toronto Community Housing participatory budgeting process.] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091211185446/http://www.torontohousing.ca/participatory_budgeting|date=December 11, 2009}}</ref>