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Daubert standard
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{{Short description|Expert witness evidence rule in American law}} {{DISPLAYTITLE:''Daubert'' standard}} In United States federal law, the '''''Daubert'' standard''' ({{IPAc-en|Λ|d|ΙΛ|b|Ιr|t}} {{respell|DAW|bΙrt}}<ref>{{Cite web |title=Pronouncing Dictionary of the Supreme Court of the United States|url=https://documents.law.yale.edu/pronouncing-dictionary |access-date=2022-12-05 |website=Documents Collection Center |publisher=Yale University}}</ref>) is a rule of evidence regarding the admissibility of [[expert witness]] [[testimony]]. A party may raise a '''''Daubert'' motion''', a special [[motion in limine|motion ''in limine'']] raised before or during [[trial]], to exclude the presentation of unqualified [[evidence (law)|evidence]] to the [[jury]]. The '''''Daubert'' trilogy''' are the three [[Supreme Court of the United States|United States Supreme Court]] cases that articulated the ''Daubert'' standard: *''[[Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.]]'' (1993), which held that Rule 702 of the [[Federal Rules of Evidence]] did not incorporate the [[Frye standard|''Frye'' standard]] as a basis for assessing the admissibility of scientific expert testimony, but that the rule incorporated a flexible reliability standard instead; *''[[General Electric Co. v. Joiner]]'' (1997),<ref>522 U.S. 136 (1997)</ref> which held that a district court judge may exclude expert testimony when there are gaps between the evidence relied on by an expert and that person's conclusion, and that an abuse-of-discretion standard of review is the proper standard for [[appellate court]]s to use in reviewing a trial court's decision of whether it should admit expert testimony; *''[[Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael]]'' (1999),<ref>526 U.S. 137 (1999)</ref> which held that the judge's gatekeeping function identified in ''Daubert'' applies to all expert testimony, including that which is non-scientific. Important appellate-level opinions that clarify the standard include Judge [[Alex Kozinski]]'s opinion in Daubert on remand,<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/92-102.ZO.html |title=''Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'', 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) |website=law.cornell.edu}}</ref> and Judge [[Edward R. Becker|Edward Becker]]'s opinion.<ref>{{cite web |title=In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994) |url=https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/678504/in-re-paoli-railroad-yard-pcb-litigation/?citation=35+F.3d+717 |website=CourtListener.com}}</ref>
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