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Democratic peace theory
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{{Short description|International relations theory}} {{Use mdy dates|date=December 2013}} {{Use shortened footnotes|date=July 2022}} [[File:Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-F015892-0010, Bonn, Konrad Adenauer und Charles de Gaulle.jpg|thumb|right|French President [[Charles de Gaulle]] shaking hands with West German Chancellor [[Konrad Adenauer]] in Bonn, in 1963]] {{democracy}} Proponents of '''democratic peace theory''' argue that both [[Representative democracy|electoral]] and [[Republicanism|republican]] forms of [[democracy]] are hesitant to engage in [[armed conflict]] with other identified democracies. Different advocates of this theory suggest that several factors are responsible for motivating peace between democratic states.{{sfn|Russett|1993}}{{sfn|Hegre|2014}}{{sfn|Doyle|2017|pp=503β533}}{{sfn|Deudney|2007}} Individual theorists maintain "monadic" forms of this theory (democracies are in general more peaceful in their international relations); "dyadic" forms of this theory (democracies do not go to war with other democracies); and "systemic" forms of this theory (more democratic states in the international system makes the international system more peaceful).{{sfn|Reiter|2012}} In terms of [[Social norm|norms]] and identities, it is hypothesized that democratic publics are more [[dovish]] in their interactions with other democracies, and that democratically elected leaders are more likely to resort to peaceful resolution in disputes (both in domestic politics and international politics). In terms of structural or institutional constraints, it is hypothesized that institutional [[Checks and Balances|checks and balances]], [[accountability]] of leaders to the public, and larger [[Selectorate theory|winning coalitions]] make it harder for democratic leaders to go to war unless there are clearly favorable ratio of benefits to costs. These structural constraints, along with the transparent nature of democratic politics, make it harder for democratic leaders to mobilize for war and initiate [[surprise attack]]s, which reduces fear and inadvertent escalation to war. The transparent nature of democratic political systems, as well as deliberative debates (involving [[opposition parties]], the [[Journalism|media]], experts, and bureaucrats), make it easier for democratic states to credibly [[Bargaining model of war|signal their intentions]]. The concept of [[audience cost]]s entails that threats issued by democratic leaders are taken more seriously because democratic leaders will be electorally punished by their publics from backing down from threats, which reduces the risk of misperception and miscalculation by states. The connection between peace and democracy has long been recognized, but theorists disagree about the [[Correlation does not imply causation|direction of causality]]. The democratic peace theory posits that democracy causes peace, while the [[territorial peace theory]] makes the opposite claim that peace causes democracy.{{sfn|Gibler|Miller|2021}} Other theories argue that [[Omitted-variable bias|omitted variables]] explain the correlation better than democratic peace theory. Alternative explanations for the correlation of peace among democracies include arguments revolving around [[Institutional liberalism|institutions]], [[Capitalist peace|commerce]], [[Economic interdependence|interdependence]], [[alliance]]s, [[Pax Americana|US world dominance]] and [[political stability]].{{sfn|Reiter|2017}}{{sfn|Hobson|2017}}{{sfn|Rosato|2003}}{{sfn|Downes|Sechser|2012}}
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