Editing Direct and indirect realism (section)

{{Short description|Debate in the philosophy of mind}}
{{For|representationalism in the arts|Realism (visual arts)}}
[[Image:Naive realism.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|Direct realism, also known as naïve realism, argues we perceive the world directly.]]

In the [[philosophy of perception]] and [[philosophy of mind]], '''[[Direct realism|direct]]''' or '''naïve realism''', as opposed to '''indirect''' or '''representational realism''', are differing models that describe the nature of [[Consciousness|conscious]] [[Qualia|experiences]].<ref name=lehar>Lehar, Steve. (2000). [http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/webstuff/consc1/consc1.html The Function of Conscious Experience: An Analogical Paradigm of Perception and Behavior] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190603205924/http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/webstuff/consc1/consc1.html |date=2019-06-03 }}, ''Consciousness and Cognition''.</ref><ref name=ce>Lehar, Steve. (2000). [http://sharp.bu.edu/~slehar/epist/naive-philos.html Naïve Realism in Contemporary Philosophy] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120811172229/http://sharp.bu.edu/~slehar/epist/naive-philos.html |date=2012-08-11 }}, ''The Function of Conscious Experience''.</ref> The debate arises out of the [[metaphysical]] question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by our [[consciousness|conscious]] experience.

Indirect perceptual realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of [[perception]] that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework.<ref>Schacter, Daniel (2011). Psychology. Worth Publishers. ISBN 9781429237192.</ref> Furthermore, indirect realism is a core tenet of the [[Cognitivism (psychology)|cognitivism]] paradigm in [[psychology]] and [[cognitive science]]. While there is superficial overlap, the indirect model is unlike the standpoint of [[idealism]], which holds that only ideas are real, but there are no mind-independent objects.<ref>{{Cite web |date=Dec 5, 2016 |title=Epistemological Problems of Perception - 2.2 Idealism and Phenomenalism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-episprob/#IdeaPhen |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220426001259/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-episprob/ |archive-date=Apr 26, 2022 |access-date=Apr 27, 2022 |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref>

Conversely, direct perceptual realism postulates that conscious subjects view the world directly, treating concepts as a 1:1 correspondence. Furthermore, the framework rejects the premise that knowledge arrives via a representational medium, as well as the notion that concepts are interpretations of sensory input derived from a real external world.