Editing Direction of fit (section)

{{essay-like|date=December 2012}}
The term "'''direction of fit'''" is used in the philosophy of [[intentionality]] to distinguish between types of [[mental representation|representations]]. It is commonly applied in two related senses: first, to distinguish the [[mental states]] of belief and desire;<ref>[[Ruth Millikan]], "Pushmi-pullyu Representations" ''Philosophical Perspectives'' Vol. 9: AI, Connectionism and Philosophical Psychology, Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1995, p. 188.</ref> and second, to distinguish between types of linguistic [[utterances]], such as indicative and imperative sentences.<ref>Millikan, p. 185.</ref>

First, [[philosophy of mind|philosophers of mind]] distinguish between mind-to-world (i.e., mind-to-fit-world) and world-to-mind (i.e., world-to-fit-mind) directions of fit. In the former, mental states such as beliefs are subject to updates in order to fit evidence provided by the world (the mind changes to fit the world, thus beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit). In the latter, mental states such as desires motivate the agent to change the world in order to fit the desired state in the mind (the world changes to fit the mind, thus desires have a world-to-mind direction of fit).<ref>[[Bence Nanay]], ''Mental Imagery: Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience'', Oxford University Press, 2023, p. 129.</ref>

Similarly, [[philosophy of language|philosophers of language]], in particular advocates of [[Speech act|speech act theory]] such as [[John Searle]], distinguish between word-to-world and world-to-word directions of fit. In the former, utterances such as indicative sentences attempt to describe the world; for a statement, the state of affairs is considered appropriate if the content expressed by the words fit the way the world really is (a word-to-world direction of fit). In the latter, utterances such as imperative sentences attempt to cause a change in the world; for an order, the state of affairs is considered appropriate when the world changes to fit the words (a world-to-word direction of fit).<ref>[[John Searle]], ''Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind'', Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 7.</ref>

In both cases, the issue is how representations are considered satisfactory. Beliefs and descriptive statements are considered satisfactory when the states of affairs they represent match the world; i.e. when they are true. Desires and orders are considered satisfactory when world matches the state of affairs they represent; i.e. when they are fulfilled.<ref>Millikan, p. 189.</ref>