Editing Ethical intuitionism (section)

{{short description|Family of views in moral epistemology}}
{{about|the view in moral epistemology|the book by [[Michael Huemer]] defending the view|Ethical Intuitionism (book)}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=June 2020}}

{{Ethical frameworks sidebar}}

'''Ethical intuitionism''' (also called '''moral intuitionism''') is a view or family of views in moral [[epistemology]] (and, on some definitions, [[metaphysics]]). It is [[foundationalism]] applied to moral knowledge, the thesis that some moral truths can be known non-inferentially (i.e., known without one needing to infer them from other truths one believes). Such an epistemological view is by definition committed to the existence of knowledge of moral truths; therefore, ethical intuitionism implies [[Cognitivism (ethics)|cognitivism]].

As a foundationalist epistemological position, ethical intuitionism contrasts with [[coherentism|coherentist]] positions in moral epistemology, such as those that depend on [[reflective equilibrium]].{{sfn|Shafer-Landau|Cuneo|2012|p=385}}

Despite the name "ethical intuitionism", ethical intuitionists need not (though often do) accept that [[Intuition (knowledge)|intuitions]] of value (or of evaluative facts) form the foundation of ethical knowledge; the common commitment of ethical intuitionists is to a non-inferential foundation for ethical knowledge, regardless of whether such a non-inferential foundation consists in ''intuitions'' as such.{{sfn|Cowan|2015}}

Throughout the philosophical literature, the term "ethical intuitionism" is frequently used with significant variation in its sense. This article's focus on foundationalism reflects the core commitments of contemporary self-identified ethical intuitionists.{{sfn|Shafer-Landau|Cuneo|2012}}{{sfn|Stratton-Lake|2014}}

Sufficiently broadly defined, ethical intuitionism can be taken to encompass cognitivist forms of [[moral sense theory]].{{sfn|Stratton-Lake|2013|p=337}} It is usually furthermore taken as essential to ethical intuitionism that there be [[self-evidence|self-evident]] or ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' moral knowledge; this counts against considering moral sense theory to be a species of intuitionism. (see the [[#Rational intuition versus moral sense|Rational intuition versus moral sense]] section of this article for further discussion).