Editing Fact–value distinction (section)

{{Short description|Distinction between what is and what ought to be}}
{{More citations needed|date=September 2017|talk=Citations needed}}

The '''fact–value distinction''' is a fundamental [[epistemological]] distinction described between:<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Väyrynen |first1=Pekka |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |title=Thick Ethical Concepts |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thick-ethical-concepts/#OughGapFactValuDist |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 October 2019 |date=2019}}</ref>

# Statements of fact (positive or descriptive statements), which are based upon [[reason]] and [[physical observation|observation]], and examined via the [[empirical method]].
# Statements of value (normative or prescriptive statements), which encompass [[ethics]] and [[aesthetics]], and are studied via [[axiology]].

This barrier between fact and value, as construed in epistemology, implies it is impossible to derive ethical claims from factual arguments, or to defend the former using the latter.<ref>Prior, AN (1960). The Autonomy of Ethics, ''Australasian Journal of Philosophy'', 38(3): 199–206.</ref>

The fact–value distinction is closely related to, and derived from, the [[is–ought problem]] in moral philosophy, characterized by [[David Hume]].<ref>{{Citation |last=Pigden |first=Charles |title=No-Ought-From-Is, the Naturalistic Fallacy, and the Fact/Value Distinction: The History of a Mistake |date=2018-12-06 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781316717578%23CN-bp-4/type/book_part |work=The Naturalistic Fallacy |pages=73–95 |editor-last=Sinclair |editor-first=Neil |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/9781316717578.006 |isbn=978-1316717578 |access-date=2022-12-06|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The terms are often used interchangeably, though [[philosophical]] discourse concerning the is–ought problem does not usually encompass aesthetics.<ref name="Zangwill_2023">{{cite journal | vauthors = Zangwill N | title = Aesthetic Judgment. | journal = The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2023 Edition) | editor1=Nodelman U | editor2=Zalta EN | volume = | issue = | pages = | date = 2023| pmid = | doi = | s2cid = | url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-judgment/#Norm }}</ref>