Editing Foundationalism (section)

{{Short description|Epistemological theory}}
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'''Foundationalism''' concerns [[epistemology|philosophical theories of knowledge]] resting upon non-inferential [[knowledge|justified belief]], or some secure foundation of certainty such as a conclusion inferred from a basis of sound premises.<ref name=foundationalism>Simon Blackburn, ''The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy'', 2nd (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), [https://books.google.com/books?id=5wTQtwB1NdgC&pg=PA139&dq=foundationalism p 139].</ref> The main rival of the '''foundationalist theory of justification'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> is the [[coherence theory of justification]], whereby a body of knowledge, not requiring a secure foundation, can be established by the interlocking strength of its components, like a puzzle solved without prior certainty that each small region was solved correctly.<ref name=foundationalism/>

Identifying the alternatives as either [[circular reasoning]] or [[infinite regress]], and thus exhibiting the [[regress problem]], [[Aristotle]] made foundationalism his own clear choice, positing [[basic belief]]s underpinning others.<ref name=Poston>Ted Poston, [http://www.iep.utm.edu/found-ep "Foundationalism"] (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</ref> [[René Descartes|Descartes]], the most famed foundationalist, discovered a foundation in the fact of his own existence and in the "clear and distinct" ideas of reason,<ref name=foundationalism/><ref name=Poston/> whereas [[John Locke|Locke]] found a foundation in [[experience]].  Differing foundations may reflect differing [[epistemological]] emphases—[[empiricist]]s emphasizing ''experience'', [[rationalist]]s emphasizing ''reason''—but may blend both.<ref name=foundationalism/>

In the 1930s, debate over foundationalism revived.<ref name=Poston/> Whereas [[Moritz Schlick]] viewed scientific knowledge like a pyramid where a special class of statements does not require [[verificationism|verification]] through other beliefs and serves as a foundation, [[Otto Neurath]] argued that scientific knowledge lacks an ultimate foundation and acts like a raft.<ref name=Poston/> In the 1950s, the dominance of foundationalism was challenged by a number of philosophers such as [[Willard Van Orman Quine]] and [[Wilfrid Sellars]].<ref name=Poston/> Quine's [[ontological relativity]] found any belief networked{{clarification needed|date=May 2021}} to one's beliefs on all of reality, while auxiliary beliefs somewhere in the vast network are readily modified to protect desired beliefs.

Classically, foundationalism had posited [[infallibility]] of basic beliefs and [[deductive reasoning]] between beliefs—a strong foundationalism.<ref name=Poston/> Around 1975, weak foundationalism emerged.<ref name=Poston/> Thus recent foundationalists have variously allowed [[fallibilism|fallible]] basic beliefs, and [[inductive reasoning]] between them, either by [[enumerative induction]] or by [[inference to the best explanation]].<ref name=Poston/> And whereas [[internalism|internalists]] require [[cognitive]] access to justificatory means, [[externalism|externalists]] find justification without such access.