Editing Free-rider problem (section)

{{Short description|Market failure benefitting non-paying users}}
{{About|the economic phenomenon||Freeriding (disambiguation)}}
[[File:Turnstile jumping in Moscow Metro (1).jpg|thumb|right|Passengers who circumvent payment [[turnstile]]s are "free-riding" on the train.]]
In economics, the '''free-rider problem''' is a type of [[market failure]] that occurs when those who benefit from resources, [[Public good (economics)|public good]]s and [[common pool resource]]s{{efn|Examples of such goods are public roads or libraries, or other communal services.}} do not pay for them<ref name=Baumol>{{cite book |last=Baumol |first=William |title=Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State |year=1952 |publisher=Harvard University Press |location=Cambridge, Massachusetts}}</ref> or under-pay.  Free riders may overuse common pool resources by not paying for them, neither directly through fees or tolls, nor indirectly through taxes. Consequently, the common pool resource may be under-produced, overused, or degraded.<ref>Rittenberg and Tregarthen. ''Principles of Microeconomics'', [http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/ECON101-3.2.pdf Chapter 6, Section 4. p. 2] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130319152336/http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/ECON101-3.2.pdf |date=19 March 2013 }}. Retrieved 20 June 2012</ref> Additionally, despite evidence that people tend to be cooperative by nature (a prosocial behaviour), the presence of free-riders has been shown to cause cooperation to deteriorate, perpetuating the free-rider problem.<ref>Choi, T & Robertson, P. Contributors and Free-Riders in Collaborative Governance: A Computational Exploration of Social Motivation and Its Effects [https://academic.oup.com/jpart/article/29/3/394/5168276], Journal Of Public Administration Research and Theory, 29(3), 394-413. doi:10.1093/jopart/muy068</ref>

In social science, the free-rider problem is the question of how to limit free riding and its negative effects in these situations, such as the free-rider problem of when [[property right]]s are not clearly defined and imposed.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Pasour Jr. |first1=E. C. |title=The Free Rider as a Basis for Government Intervention |url=https://direct.mises.org/journals/jls/5_4/5_4_6.pdf |publisher=Libertarian Studies |access-date=2014-10-25 |date=2014-07-30 |archive-date=2014-10-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141028195146/https://direct.mises.org/journals/jls/5_4/5_4_6.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> The free-rider problem is common with [[Public good (economics)|public goods]] which are [[non-excludability|non-excludable]]{{efn|'''Non-excludable''' means that a good cannot be denied to those who do not pay for it.}} and [[Rivalry (economics)|non-rivalrous]].{{efn|'''Non-rival''' consumption stipulates that the use of a good or service by one consumer does not reduce its availability for other consumers.}} The non-excludability and non-rivalry of public goods results in there being little incentive for consumers to contribute to a collective resource as they enjoy its benefits.{{According to whom|date=August 2021}}

A free rider may enjoy a non-excludable and non-rivalrous good such as a government-provided road system without contributing to paying for it. Another example is if a coastal town builds a lighthouse, ships from many regions and countries will benefit from it, even though they are not contributing to its costs, and are thus "free riding" on the navigation aid. A third example of non-excludable and non-rivalrous consumption would be a crowd watching fireworks. The number of viewers, whether they paid for the entertainment or not, does not diminish the fireworks as a resource. In each of these examples, the cost of excluding non-payers would be prohibitive, while the collective consumption of the resource does not decrease how much is available.{{Citation needed|date=August 2021}}

Although the term "free rider" was first used in economic theory of public goods, similar concepts have been applied to other contexts, including [[collective bargaining]], [[antitrust law]], psychology, [[political science]], and [[vaccine]]s.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hendriks |first=Carolyn M. |date=December 2006 |title=When the Forum Meets Interest Politics: Strategic Uses of Public Deliberation |journal=Politics & Society  |volume=34 |issue=4 |pages=571–602 |doi=10.1177/0032329206293641|s2cid=144875493 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ibuka |first1=Yoko |last2=Li |first2=Meng |last3=Vietri |first3=Jeffrey |last4=Chapman |first4=Gretchen B |last5=Galvani |first5=Alison P |title=Free-riding behavior in vaccination decisions: an experimental study |journal=PLOS ONE |date=24 January 2014 |volume=9 |issue=3 |pages=e87164 |doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0087164 |pmid=24475246 |pmc=3901764 |bibcode=2014PLoSO...987164I |doi-access=free }}</ref> For example, some individuals in a team or community may reduce their contributions or performance if they believe that one or more other members of the group may free ride.<ref>Ruël, Gwenny Ch.; Bastiaans, Nienke and Nauta, Aukje. [http://som.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/FILES/reports/themeA/2003/03A42/03a42.pdf "Free-riding and team performance in project education"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130602145757/http://som.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/FILES/reports/themeA/2003/03A42/03a42.pdf |date=2013-06-02 }}</ref>

The economic free-rider problem is equally pertinent within the realm of global politics, often presenting challenges in international cooperation and collective action. In global politics, states are confronted with scenarios where certain actors reap the benefits of collective goods or actions without bearing the costs or contributing to the efforts required to achieve these shared objectives. This phenomenon creates imbalances and hampers cooperative endeavors, particularly in addressing transnational challenges like climate change, global security, or humanitarian crises. For instance, in discussions on [[climate change mitigation]], countries with lesser contributions to greenhouse gas emissions might still benefit from global efforts to reduce emissions, enjoying a stable climate without proportionally shouldering the costs of emission reductions. This creates a disparity between states' contributions and their gains, leading to challenges in negotiating and implementing effective international agreements. The economic free-rider problem's manifestation in global politics underscores the complexities and obstacles encountered in fostering collective action and equitable burden-sharing among nations to address pressing global issues.<ref>AHNLID, ANDERS. “Free or Forced Riders? Small States in the International Political Economy: The Example of Sweden.” Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 27, no. 3, 1992, pp. 241–76. JSTOR, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/45083885].</ref>