Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
Handicap principle
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
{{good article}} {{Short description|Hypothesis in evolutionary biology}} [[File:Peacock Flying.jpg|thumb|300px|right|The peacock tail in flight, a classic example of what [[Amotz Zahavi]] proposed was a handicapped signal of male quality.<ref name="Grafen 1990"/>|alt=Photo of a peacock with its enormous tail]] The '''handicap principle''' is a [[hypothesis]] proposed by the Israeli biologist [[Amotz Zahavi]] in 1975. It is meant to explain how "signal selection" during mate choice may lead to [[Signalling theory|"honest" or reliable signalling]] between male and female animals which have an obvious motivation to bluff or deceive each other.<ref name="Zahavi 1975 pp. 205โ214">{{cite journal |last=Zahavi |first=Amotz |author-link=Amotz Zahavi |title=Mate selectionโA selection for a handicap |journal=Journal of Theoretical Biology |publisher=Elsevier BV |volume=53 |issue=1 |year=1975 |issn=0022-5193 |doi=10.1016/0022-5193(75)90111-3 |pages=205โ214|pmid=1195756 |bibcode=1975JThBi..53..205Z }}</ref><ref name="Zahavi 1977 pp. 603โ605">{{cite journal |last=Zahavi |first=Amotz |author-link=Amotz Zahavi |title=The cost of honesty |journal=Journal of Theoretical Biology |publisher=Elsevier BV |volume=67 |issue=3 |year=1977 |issn=0022-5193 |doi=10.1016/0022-5193(77)90061-3 |pages=603โ605|pmid=904334 |bibcode=1977JThBi..67..603Z }}</ref><ref name="Zahavi Zahavi 1997">{{cite book |last1=Zahavi |first1=Amotz |author1-link=Amotz Zahavi |last2=Zahavi |first2=Avishag |title=The handicap principle: a missing piece of Darwin's puzzle |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York |year=1997 |isbn=978-0-19-510035-8 |oclc=35360821 |url=http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/261475/1/10.1.1.40.3266.pdf}}</ref> The handicap principle suggests that secondary [[sexual characteristics]] are '''costly signals''' which must be reliable, as they cost the signaller resources that individuals with less of a particular trait could not afford. The handicap principle further proposes that animals of greater [[fitness (biology)|biological fitness]] signal this through handicapping [[ethology|behaviour]], or [[Morphology (biology)|morphology]] that effectively lowers overall fitness. The central idea is that sexually selected traits function like [[conspicuous consumption]], signalling the ability to afford to squander a resource. Receivers then know that the signal indicates quality, because inferior-quality signallers are unable to produce such wastefully extravagant signals.<ref name="Davis 1976" /><ref name="Eshel 1978" /><ref name="Kirkpatrick 1986" /><ref name="Pomiankowski 1987" /><ref name="Maynard Smith 1976" /> The handicap principle is supported by [[game theory]] modelling representing situations such as nestlings begging for food, predator-deterrent signalling, and threat displays. However, honest signals are not necessarily costly, undermining the theoretical basis for the handicap principle, which remains unconfirmed by empirical evidence.
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)