Editing Hard problem of consciousness (section)

{{Short description|Philosophical concept}}

In the [[philosophy of mind]], the '''hard problem of consciousness''' is to explain why and how humans and other organisms have [[qualia]], [[Consciousness#Types of consciousness|phenomenal consciousness]], or [[subjective character of experience|subjective experience]].<ref name="Chalmers" /><ref name="Harnad"/> It is contrasted with the "easy problems" of explaining why and how physical systems give a human being the ability to discriminate, to integrate information, and to perform behavioural functions such as watching, listening, speaking (including generating an utterance that appears to refer to personal behaviour or belief), and so forth.<ref name="Chalmers" /> The easy problems are amenable to functional explanation—that is, explanations that are mechanistic or behavioural—since each physical system can be explained purely by reference to the "structure and dynamics" that underpin the phenomenon.<ref name="Chalmers" /><ref name="Cooney" />

Proponents of the hard problem argue that it is categorically different from the easy problems since no mechanistic or behavioural explanation could explain the character of an experience, not even in principle. Even after all the relevant functional facts are explicated, they argue, there will still remain a further question: "why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?"<ref name="Chalmers" /> To bolster their case, proponents of the hard problem frequently turn to various philosophical thought experiments, involving [[philosophical zombie]]s (which, they claim, are conceivable) or [[inverted spectrum|inverted qualia]], or the claimed [[Knowledge Argument|ineffability of colour experiences]], or the claimed unknowability of foreign states of consciousness, such as the experience of [[what is it like to be a bat?|being a bat]].

[[File:David Chalmers, delivering a talk at De La Salle University-Manila, March 27, 2012.jpg|thumb|right|265px|Chalmers on stage for an [[Alan Turing Year]] event at [[De La Salle University]], Manila, 27 March 2012]]

The terms "hard problem" and "easy problems" were coined by the [[philosopher]] [[David Chalmers]] in a 1994 talk given at [[The Science of Consciousness]] conference held in Tucson, Arizona.<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_lWp-6hH_6g|Hard Problem of Consciousness (Tuscan 1994)]</ref> The following year, the main talking points of Chalmers' talk were published in ''[[The Journal of Consciousness Studies]]''.<ref name="Chalmers" /> The publication gained significant attention from consciousness researchers and became the subject of a special volume of the journal,<ref>JCS vol. 4, pp. 3-46, 1997</ref><ref>{{
cite journal
| last=Chalmers
| first=David
| title=Moving forward on the problem of consciousness
| journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies
| volume=4
| issue=1
| pages=3–46}}</ref> which was later published into a book.<ref>{{
cite book
| last=Shear
| first=Jonathan
| year=1997
| title=Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem
| publisher=MIT Press|isbn=978-0262692212}}</ref> In 1996, Chalmers published ''[[The Conscious Mind]]'', a book-length treatment of the hard problem, in which he elaborated on his core arguments and responded to [[counterarguments]]. His use of the word ''easy'' is "tongue-in-cheek".<ref>{{Cite web|title=Episode 83, The David Chalmers Interview (Part I - Consciousness)|url=https://thepanpsycast.com/panpsycast2/episode83-1|access-date=2020-09-05|website=The Panpsycast Philosophy Podcast|date=19 July 2020|language=en-GB}}</ref> As the [[cognitive psychologist]] [[Steven Pinker]] puts it, they are about as easy as going to [[Mars]] or curing cancer. "That is, scientists more or less know what to look for, and with enough brainpower and funding, they would probably crack it in this century."<ref name="pinker-time">{{cite magazine|last1=Pinker|first1=Steven|author-link1=Steven Pinker|date=29 January 2007|title=The Brain: The Mystery of Consciousness|url=http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1580394-1,00.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130917143400/http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1580394-1,00.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=September 17, 2013|magazine=Time|access-date=19 December 2018}}</ref>

The existence of the hard problem is disputed. It has been accepted by some [[Philosophy of mind|philosophers of mind]] such as [[Joseph Levine (philosopher)|Joseph Levine]],<ref>
{{Cite journal|last=Levine|first=Joseph|date=2009-01-15|title=The Explanatory Gap|url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199262618-e-17|journal=The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind|pages=281–291|doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0017|isbn=978-0199262618|url-access=subscription}}</ref> [[Colin McGinn]],<ref name="mcginn-2012">{{cite web|url=http://www.newstatesman.com/ideas/2012/02/consciousness-mind-brain|title=All machine and no ghost?|last=McGinn|first=Colin|author-link=Colin McGinn|date=20 February 2012|work=[[New Statesman]]|access-date=27 March 2012}}</ref> and [[Ned Block]]<ref name="harder-problem">{{cite journal|last1=Block|first1=Ned|title=The Harder Problem of Consciousness|journal=The Journal of Philosophy|date=2002|volume=99|issue=8|pages=391–425|jstor=3655621|doi=10.2307/3655621|s2cid=111383062|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BLOTHP}}
</ref> and [[Cognitive neuroscience|cognitive neuroscientists]] such as [[Francisco Varela]],<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Varela|first1=F.J.|title=Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy for the hard problem|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|date=1 April 1996|volume=3|issue=4|pages=330–349|url=https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1996/00000003/00000004/718}}</ref> [[Giulio Tononi]],<ref name="iit-koch-et-al">{{cite journal|last1=Tononi|first1=Giulio|last2=Boly|first2=Melanie|last3=Massimini|first3=Marcello|last4=Koch|first4=Christof|title=Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate|journal=Nature Reviews Neuroscience|date=July 2016|volume=17|issue=7|pages=450–461|doi=10.1038/nrn.2016.44|pmid=27225071|s2cid=21347087}}</ref><ref name="tononi+koch">{{cite journal|last1=Tononi|first1=Giulio|last2=Koch|first2=Christof|title=Consciousness: here, there and everywhere?|journal=Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences|date=March 2015|volume=370|issue=1668|pages=20140167|doi=10.1098/rstb.2014.0167|pmid=25823865|pmc=4387509}}</ref> and [[Christof Koch]].<ref name="iit-koch-et-al"/><ref name="tononi+koch"/> On the other hand, its existence is denied by other philosophers of mind, such as [[Daniel Dennett]],<ref name=Dennett/> [[Massimo Pigliucci]],<ref name=Pigliucci2013>
{{cite journal|author1=Massimo Pigliucci|author-link=Massimo Pigliucci|title=What hard problem?|journal=Philosophy Now|date=2013|issue=99|url=http://philpapers.org/archive/PIGWHP.pdf}}
</ref> [[Thomas Metzinger]], [[Patricia Churchland]],<ref name="pat-churchland-1996">{{cite journal|last1=Churchland|first1=Patricia|title=The Hornswoggle Problem|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|date=1996|volume=3|issue=5–6|pages=402–408|url=http://joelvelasco.net/teaching/2300/hornswoggleprob.pdf|access-date=10 January 2021}}</ref> and [[Keith Frankish]],<ref name="frankish">
{{cite journal|last1=Frankish|first1=Keith| author-link=Keith Frankish| title=Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|date=2016|volume=23|issue=11–12|pages=11–39|url=https://nbviewer.jupyter.org/github/k0711/kf_articles/blob/master/Frankish_Illusionism%20as%20a%20theory%20of%20consciousness_eprint.pdf|access-date=20 December 2018}}</ref> and by cognitive neuroscientists such as [[Stanislas Dehaene]],<ref name="Dehaene" /> [[Bernard Baars]],<ref name="dc-gw">{{cite journal|last1=Edelman|first1=Gerald|last2=Gally|first2=Joseph|last3=Baars|first3=Bernard|title=Biology of Consciousness|journal=Frontiers in Psychology|date=2011|volume=2|issue=4|pages=4|doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00004|pmid=21713129|pmc=3111444 
|doi-access=free}}</ref> [[Anil Seth]],<ref name="seth-aeon"/> and [[Antonio Damasio]].<ref>{{cite podcast| url=https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/podcast/2019/04/29/episode-44-antonio-damasio-on-feelings-thoughts-and-the-evolution-of-humanity/| title=Sean Carroll's Mindscape| website=Preposterousuniverse.com| publisher=Sean Carroll| host=Sean Carroll| date=29 April 2019| time=1:04.46| quote= I’m just saying that the idea of a hard problem that you cannot transpose, I think is wrong.}}</ref> Clinical neurologist and sceptic [[Steven Novella]] has dismissed it as "the hard non-problem".<ref>{{cite web|title=Psychological Scales. The Hard Problem of Consciousness.|url=https://scales.arabpsychology.com/2022/11/19/hard-problem-of-consciousness-2/|website=arabpsychology.com|access-date=2023-10-29}}</ref> According to a 2020 [[PhilPapers]] survey, a majority (62.42%) of the philosophers surveyed said they believed that the hard problem is a genuine problem, while 29.72% said that it does not exist.{{r|philpapers2020}}

There are a number of other potential [[List of philosophical problems|philosophical problems]] that are related to the Hard Problem. Ned Block believes that there exists a "Harder Problem of Consciousness", due to the possibility of different physical and functional neurological systems potentially having phenomenal overlap.<ref name="harder-problem"/> Another potential philosophical problem which is closely related to Benj Hellie's [[vertiginous question]]<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hellie |first1=Benj |last2= |first2= |date=2013 |title=Against Egalitarianism |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HELCFC |journal=Analysis |volume=73 |issue= |publisher= |pages=304–320 |doi=10.1093/analys/ans101 |access-date=}}</ref>, dubbed "The Even Harder Problem of Consciousness", refers to why a given individual has their own particular [[personal identity]], as opposed to existing as someone else.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Roberts|first=Tim S.|title=''The Even Harder Problem of Consciousness'' by Roberts. Tim S.|journal=NeuroQuantology|date=September 2007|volume=5|issue=2|pages=214–221|doi=10.14704/nq.2007.5.2.129 |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228618472}}</ref>