Editing Homunculus argument (section)

{{Short description|Informal fallacy}}
[[File:Infinite regress of homunculus.png|thumb|upright=1.2|Idea of "internal viewer" generates [[infinite regress]] of internal viewers.]]

The '''homunculus argument''' is an [[informal fallacy]] whereby a concept is explained in terms of the concept itself, [[recursion|recursively]], without first defining or explaining the original concept.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Kenny |first1=Anthony |editor1-last=Grene |editor1-first=Marjorie |title=Interpretations of Life and Mind: Essays around the problem of reduction |date=1971 |publisher=Humanities Press |location=New York |isbn=978-0-391-00144-2 |pages=65-74 |language=English |chapter=The Homunculus Fallacy}}</ref>  This fallacy arises most commonly in the theory of [[Visual perception|vision]]. One may explain human vision by noting that [[light]] from the outside world forms an image on the [[retina]]s in the [[human eye|eye]]s and something (or someone) in the [[human brain|brain]] looks at these images as if they are images on a movie screen (this theory of vision is sometimes termed the theory of the [[Cartesian theater]]: it is most associated, nowadays, with the psychologist [[David Marr (psychologist)|David Marr]]).  The question arises as to the nature of this internal viewer. The assumption here is that there is a "little man" or "[[homunculus]]" inside the brain "looking at" the movie.

The reason why this is a fallacy may be understood by asking how the homunculus "sees" the internal movie. The answer{{Citation needed|date=June 2022}} is that there is another homunculus inside the first homunculus's "head" or "brain" looking at this "movie." But that raises the question of how ''this'' homunculus sees the "outside world." To answer that seems to require positing ''another'' homunculus inside this second homunculus's head, and so forth. In other words, a situation of [[infinite regress]] is created. The problem with the homunculus argument is that it tries to account for a phenomenon in terms of the very phenomenon that it is supposed to explain.<ref>Richard  L. Gregory. (1987), ''The Oxford Companion to the Mind'', Oxford University Press</ref>