Editing Incompatibilism (section)

{{Short description|Contradiction of free will and determinism}}[[File:Uhrwerkszerlegung 01 GW 02.jpg|thumb|right|140px|Classical incompatibilists hold that [[determinism]] leaves no room for [[free will]]. ]]
'''Incompatibilism''' is the view that the thesis of [[determinism]] is logically incompatible with the classical thesis of free will. The term  was coined in the 1960s, most likely by philosopher [[Keith Lehrer]].<ref>van Inwagen, Peter, 'The Problem of Fr** W*ll', in Hugh J. McCann (ed.), ''Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology'' (New York, 2017; online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 Dec. 2016), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190611200.003.0001, accessed 20 Aug. 2023. Open-access article available at: https://andrewmbailey.com/pvi/</ref><ref>Lehrer, Keith Edward (1960). ''Ifs, Cans, and Causes''. Brown University ProQuest Dissertations Publishing,  1960. 6205755.</ref> The term ''[[compatibilism]]'' was coined (also by Lehrer) to name the view that the classical free will thesis is logically compatible with determinism, i.e. it is possible for an ordinary human to exercise free will (the freedom-relevant ability to do otherwise), even in a universe where determinism is true. These terms were originally coined for use within a research paradigm that was dominant among academics during the so-called "classical period" from the 1960s to 1980s,<ref>van Inwagen, Peter, 'The Problem of Fr** W*ll', in Hugh J. McCann (ed.), Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology (New York, 2017; online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 Dec. 2016). Open-access copy available at: https://andrewmbailey.com/pvi/</ref> or what has been called the "classical analytic paradigm".<ref>Mickelson, Kristin, Joe Campbell, and V. Alan White, "Introduction," in A Companion to Free Will (Campbell, Joe; Mickelson, Kristin M. & White, V. Alan (eds.) (2023). Wiley-''Blackwell:1-19. Available open-access at'' https://philarchive.org/rec/CAMWCT-2</ref> Within the classical analytic paradigm, the problem of free will and determinism was understood as a compatibility question: "Is it possible for an ordinary human to exercise free will (classically defined as an ability to do otherwise) when determinism is true?"<ref>{{Citation |title=Peter van Inwagen - Big Questions in Free Will |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AgDt5I2uib8 |access-date=2023-08-22 |language=en}}</ref> Those working in the classical analytic paradigm who answered "no" were ''incompatibilists'' in the original, classical-analytic sense of the term, now commonly called ''classical incompatibilists''; they proposed that determinism precludes free will because it precludes the ability to do otherwise. Those who answered "yes" were ''compatibilists'' in the original sense of the term, now commonly called ''classical compatibilists''.<ref>{{Citation |title=Daniel Dennett - What is Free Will? |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0hUvEOcIqC0 |access-date=2023-08-22 |language=en}}</ref>
Given that classical free will theorists (i.e. those working in the classical analytic paradigm) agreed that it is at least metaphysically possible for an ordinary human to exercise free will,<ref>Van Inwagen, Peter (1983). An Essay on Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.</ref><ref>Vihvelin, Kadri (2013). ''Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter''. New York, NY, USA: Oup Usa.</ref> all classical compatibilists accepted a compossibilist account of free will (i.e. a compossibilist interpretation of the ability to do otherwise) and all classical incompatibilists accepted a libertarian (a.k.a. libertarianist) account of free will (i.e. a libertarian/libertarianist interpretation of the ability to do otherwise).

The classical analytic paradigm has fallen out of favor over the last few decades, largely because philosophers no longer agree that free will is equivalent to some kind of ability to do otherwise;<ref>Frankfurt, Harry G., 1969, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility", The Journal of Philosophy, 66(23): 829–839. Reprinted in Fischer 1986, pp. 143–52; in Frankfurt 1988, pp. 1–10; and in Widerker and McKenna 2003, pp. 17–25. doi:10.2307/2023833</ref> many hold that it is, instead, a type of sourcehood that does not require an ability to do otherwise.<ref>Pereboom, Derk (2001). Living Without Free Will. New York: Cambridge University Press.</ref> The number of philosophers who reject the classical assumption of anthropocentric possibilism, i.e. the view that it is at least metaphysically possible for a human to exercise free will, has also risen in recent years.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Free Will is Impossible. Interview with Derk Pe... |url=https://hardproblem.ru/en/posts/interviews/free-will-is-impossible-interview-with-derk/ |access-date=2023-08-22 |website=hardproblem.ru}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility By Neil Levy |url=https://free.4books.live/show/book/12914943/hard-luck-how-luck-undermines-free-will-and-moral-responsibility/12896583/3b280bb2/d4d3d3327b8eeb6/jamaludin/ |access-date=2023-08-22 |website=Free Unlimited Books PDF eBook or Kindle ePUB free |language=en-US}}</ref> As philosophers adjusted Lehrer's original (classical) definitions of the terms ''incompatibilism'' and ''compatibilism'' to reflect their own perspectives on the location of the purported "fundamental divide" among free will theorists, the terms ''incompatibilism'' and ''compatibilism'' have been given a variety of new meanings. At present, then, there is no standard meaning of the term ''incompatibilism'' (or its complement ''compatibilism'').