Editing Intentionality (section)

{{Short description|Ability of the mind to form representations}}
{{about|the ability of the [[mind]] to form representations|the related [[logic]]al or [[semantics|semantic]] concept|Intension|the idea of doing something with a goal|Intention}}

'''Intentionality''' is the mental ability to refer to or represent something.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |url=http://www.science.uva.nl/~seop/entries/intentionality/ |title=Intentionality |date=Aug 31, 2010 |author=Jacob, P.  |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=21 December 2012 }}</ref> Sometimes regarded as the ''mark of the mental'', it is found in [[mental state]]s like perceptions, beliefs or desires. For example, the perception of a tree has intentionality because it represents a tree to the perceiver. A central issue for theories of intentionality has been the problem of ''intentional inexistence'': to determine the ontological status of the entities which are the objects of intentional states.

An early theory of intentionality is associated with [[Anselm of Canterbury]]'s [[ontological argument]] for the [[existence of God]], and with his tenets distinguishing between objects that exist in the understanding and objects that exist in reality.<ref>{{cite journal |author=Chisholm, Roderick M. |year=1967 |title=Intentionality |journal=The Encyclopedia of Philosophy |volume=4 |pages=201 }}</ref> The idea fell out of discussion with the end of the medieval [[scholastic philosophy|scholastic period]], but in recent times was resurrected by [[empirical psychologist]] [[Franz Brentano]] and later adopted by [[Contemporary philosophy|contemporary]] [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenological philosopher]] [[Edmund Husserl]]. Today, intentionality is a live concern among philosophers of mind and language.<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor = 43153848|title = Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality|journal = Philosophical Topics|volume = 12|issue = 1|pages = 121–145|last1 = Churchland|first1 = Paul M.|last2 = Churchland|first2 = Patricia Smith|year = 1981|doi = 10.5840/philtopics198112146}}</ref> A common dispute is between [[Metaphysical naturalism|naturalism]], the view that intentional properties are reducible to natural properties as studied by the [[natural sciences]], and the phenomenal intentionality theory, the view that intentionality is grounded in consciousness.