Editing Is–ought problem (section)

{{Short description|Philosophical problem articulated by David Hume}}
[[Image:David Hume.jpg|right|thumb|[[David Hume]] raised the is–ought problem in his ''[[Treatise of Human Nature]]''.]]

The '''is–ought problem''', as articulated by the Scottish [[philosopher]] and [[historian]] [[David Hume]], arises when one makes claims about what ''ought'' to be that are based solely on statements about what ''is''. Hume found that there seems to be a significant difference between [[Descriptive Statement|descriptive statements]] (about what is) and [[Prescriptive statement|prescriptive statements]] (about what ought to be), and that it is not obvious how one can coherently transition from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones.

'''Hume's law''' or '''Hume's guillotine'''<ref name="Black1964">{{cite journal|last1=Black|first1=Max |author1-link=Max Black |title=The Gap Between "Is" and "Should"|journal=[[The Philosophical Review]] |volume=73|issue=2|year=1964|pages=165–181|issn=0031-8108|doi=10.2307/2183334|jstor=2183334}}</ref> is the thesis that an [[Ethics|ethical]] or judgmental conclusion cannot be inferred from purely descriptive factual statements.<ref name="sep">{{Cite encyclopedia |title=Hume's Moral Philosophy |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/hume-moral |last=Cohon |first=Rachel |date=29 October 2004 |orig-date=29 October 2004 |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |editor-link=Edward N. Zalta |edition=Fall 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230525190538/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/hume-moral/ |archive-date=25 May 2023}}</ref>

A similar view is defended by [[G. E. Moore]]'s [[open-question argument]], intended to refute any identification of [[Morality|moral]] properties with natural [[Property (philosophy)|properties]], which is asserted by [[Ethical naturalism|ethical naturalists]], who do not deem the [[naturalistic fallacy]] a fallacy.

The is–ought problem is closely related to the [[fact–value distinction]] in [[epistemology]]. Though the terms are often used interchangeably, academic discourse concerning the latter may encompass [[aesthetics]] in addition to [[ethics]].