Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
Kerckhoffs's principle
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
{{short description|Cryptographic principle that states everything except the key can be public knowledge}} {{Distinguish|Kirchhoff's laws (disambiguation){{!}}Kirchhoff's laws}} [[File:Auguste_Kerckhoffs.jpg|thumb|Auguste Kerckhoffs]] '''Kerckhoffs's principle''' (also called '''Kerckhoffs's desideratum''', '''assumption''', '''axiom''', '''doctrine''' or '''law''') of [[cryptography]] was stated by [[Dutch people|Dutch-born]] cryptographer [[Auguste Kerckhoffs]] in the 19th century. The principle holds that a [[cryptosystem]] should be secure, even if everything about the system, except the [[cryptographic key|key]], is public knowledge. This concept is widely embraced by cryptographers, in contrast to [[security through obscurity]], which is not. Kerckhoffs's principle was phrased by American mathematician [[Claude E. Shannon|Claude Shannon]] as "the [[Adversary (cryptography)|enemy]] knows the system",<ref name=Shannon>{{cite journal|last1=Shannon|first1=Claude|title=Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems|journal=Bell System Technical Journal|date=4 October 1949|volume=28|issue=4|page=662|doi=10.1002/j.1538-7305.1949.tb00928.x|url=https://archive.org/stream/bstj28-4-656#page/n5/mode/2up|access-date=20 June 2014|ref=Shannon}}</ref> i.e., "one ought to design systems under the assumption that the enemy will immediately gain full familiarity with them". In that form, it is called '''Shannon's maxim'''. Another formulation by American researcher and professor [[Steven M. Bellovin]] is: <blockquote>In other words—design your system assuming that your opponents know it in detail. (A former official at NSA's National Computer Security Center told me that the standard assumption there was that serial number 1 of any new device was delivered to the Kremlin.)<ref name="Bellovin">{{cite journal|last1=Bellovin|first1=Steve|title=Security through obscurity|journal=RISKS Digest|date=23 June 2009|volume=25|issue=71|url=http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/25.71.html#subj19|access-date=18 September 2010|archive-date=10 June 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110610065131/http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/25.71.html#subj19|url-status=live}}</ref></blockquote>
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)