Editing Majority rule (section)

{{short description|Decision rule that selects alternatives which have a majority}}

{{for multi|the Canadian comedy series|Majority Rules!{{!}}''Majority Rules!''|the band|Majority Rule (band)|the political philosophy|majoritarianism}}
{{Stack|{{Electoral systems sidebar|expanded=Social and collective choice}} {{Democracy sidebar}}}}
In [[social choice theory]], the '''majority rule''' ('''MR''') is a [[social choice rule]] which says that, when comparing two options (such as [[Bill (law)|bills]] or [[Candidate|candidates]]), the option preferred by more than half of the voters (a ''majority'') should win.

In [[political philosophy]], the ''majority rule'' is one of two major competing notions of [[democracy]]. The most common alternative is given by the [[utilitarian rule]] (or other [[welfarist]] rules), which identify the spirit of [[liberal democracy]] with the [[equal consideration of interests]].<ref name=":0">Ball, Terence and Antis Loizides, [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/james-mill "James Mill"], The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).</ref> Although the two rules can disagree in theory, [[political philosophers]] beginning with [[James Mill]] have argued the two can be reconciled in practice, with majority rule being a valid approximation to the utilitarian rule whenever voters share similarly-strong preferences.<ref name=":0" /><ref name="laslier112">{{cite Q|Q108664719}}</ref> This position has found strong support in many [[Social choice theory|social choice]] models, where the [[Utilitarian rule|socially-optimal winner]] and the [[Condorcet winner|majority-preferred winner]] often overlap.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Pivato |first=Marcus |date=2015-08-01 |title=Condorcet meets Bentham |url=https://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2014-17.pdf |journal=Journal of Mathematical Economics |volume=59 |pages=58–65 |doi=10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.04.006 |issn=0304-4068 |quote=We show that if the statistical distribution of utility functions in a population satisfies a certain condition, then a Condorcet winner will not only exist, but will also maximize the utilitarian social welfare function. |via=}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last1=Krishna |first1=Vijay |last2=Morgan |first2=John |date=2015 |title=Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43949040 |journal=American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |volume=7 |issue=4 |pages=339–375 |doi=10.1257/mic.20140038 |jstor=43949040 |issn=1945-7669}}</ref>

Majority rule is the most common social choice rule worldwide, being heavily used in [[Deliberative assembly|deliberative assemblies]] for [[Dichotomy|dichotomous]] decisions, e.g. whether or not to pass a bill.<ref name="Tyranny">{{cite journal |author=Anthony J. McGann |year=2002 |title=The Tyranny of the Supermajority: How Majority Rule Protects Minorities |url=http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=csd |format=PDF |publisher=Center for the Study of Democracy |access-date=2008-06-09}}</ref> [[Mandatory referendum|Mandatory referendums]] where the question is yes or no are also generally decided by majority rule.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Vatter |first1=Adrian |date=2000 |title=Consensus and direct democracy:Conceptual and empirical linkages |url=https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007137026336 |journal=European Journal of Political Research |volume=38 |issue=2 |pages=171–192 |doi=10.1023/A:1007137026336|url-access=subscription }}</ref> It is one of the basic rules of [[parliamentary procedure]], as described in handbooks like ''[[Robert's Rules of Order]].<ref name=":0" />''