Editing Metaethics (section)

{{short description|Branch of ethics seeking to understand ethical properties}}
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In [[metaphilosophy]] and [[ethics]], '''metaethics''' is the study of the nature, scope, ground, and meaning of [[moral judgment]], ethical belief, or [[Value_(ethics)|values]]. It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by [[philosopher]]s, the others being [[normative ethics]] (questions of how one ought to be and act) and [[applied ethics]] (practical questions of right behavior in given, usually contentious, situations).

While normative ethics addresses such questions as "What should I do?", evaluating specific practices and principles of action, metaethics addresses questions about the nature of [[good]]ness, how one can discriminate good from evil, and what the proper account of moral knowledge is. Similar to accounts of [[epistemology|knowledge]] generally, the threat of skepticism about the possibility of [[ethics|moral]] knowledge and cognitively meaningful moral propositions often motivates positive accounts in metaethics.<ref>{{cite book |last=Audi |first=Robert |author-link= |date=2015 |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ISBN1107015057 |location=Cambridge |publisher=Cambridge University Press |page=331-2 |isbn=978-1107015050}}</ref> Another distinction is often made between the nature of questions related to each: first-order (substantive) questions belong to the domain of normative ethics, whereas metaethics addresses second-order (formal) questions.

Some theorists argue that a [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]] account of [[morality]] is necessary for the proper evaluation of actual moral theories and for making practical moral decisions; others reason from opposite premises and suggest that studying moral judgments about proper actions can guide us to a true account of the nature of morality.