Editing Metaphysical necessity (section)

{{Short description|Philosophical concept}}
In [[philosophy]], '''metaphysical necessity''', sometimes called '''broad logical necessity''',<ref>Brian Leftow, ''God and Necessity'' (2012). {{ISBN|0191654876}}, 9780191654879</ref> is one of many different kinds of [[wikt:necessity|necessity]], which sits between logical necessity and [[nomological]] (or physical) necessity, in the sense that logical necessity entails metaphysical necessity, but not vice versa, and metaphysical necessity entails physical necessity, but not vice versa. A [[proposition]] is said to be ''necessary'' if it could not have failed to be the case. [[nomology|Nomological]] necessity is necessity according to the laws of physics and logical necessity is necessity according to the laws of logic, while metaphysical necessities are necessary in the sense that the world could not possibly have been otherwise. What facts are metaphysically necessary, and on what basis we might view certain facts as metaphysically but not logically necessary are subjects of substantial discussion in contemporary philosophy.

The concept of a metaphysically necessary being plays an important role in certain [[existence of God|arguments for the existence of God]], especially the [[ontological argument]], but metaphysical necessity is also one of the central concepts in late 20th century [[analytic philosophy]]. Metaphysical necessity has proved a controversial concept, and criticized by [[David Hume]], [[Immanuel Kant]], [[J. L. Mackie]], and [[Richard Swinburne]], among others.