Editing Neutral monism (section)

{{Short description|Class of metaphysical theories in the philosophy of mind}}

'''Neutral monism''' is an umbrella term for a class of [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]] theories in the [[philosophy of mind]], concerning the relation of mind to matter. These theories take the fundamental nature of reality to be neither mental nor physical; in other words it is "neutral".<ref name="Edward Craig 1998 p. 816">[[Edward Craig (philosopher)|Craig, Edward]]. (1998). ''Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Routledge. p. 816. {{ISBN|0415-07310-3}}</ref>

Neutral monism has gained prominence as a potential solution to theoretical issues within the philosophy of mind, specifically the [[mind–body problem]] and the [[hard problem of consciousness]]. The mind–body problem is the problem of explaining how mind relates to matter. The hard problem is a related philosophical problem targeted at physicalist theories of mind specifically: the problem arises because it is not obvious how a purely physical universe could give rise to [[Consciousness|conscious experience]]. This is because physical explanations are mechanistic: that is, they explain phenomena by appealing to underlying functions and structures. And, though explanations of this sort seem to work well for a wide variety of phenomena, conscious experience seems uniquely resistant to functional explanations. As the philosopher [[David Chalmers]] has put it: "even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience - perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report - there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?".<ref>{{cite web |url=https://consc.net/papers/facing.html |title=Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness |last=Chalmers |first=David J. |date=1995 |website=consc.net |access-date=2023-06-19}}</ref>

With this, there has been growing demand for alternative [[Ontology|ontologies]] (such as neutral monism) that may provide explanatory frameworks more suitable for explaining the existence of consciousness. It has been accepted by several prominent English-speaking philosophers, such as [[William James]] and [[Bertrand Russell]].