Editing New riddle of induction (section)

{{Short description|Philosophical paradox introduced by Nelson Goodman}}
{{redirect|Grue and bleen|the linguistic term "grue", used for translation from natural languages|Blue–green distinction in language}}

The '''new riddle of induction''' was presented by [[Nelson Goodman]] in ''[[Fact, Fiction, and Forecast]]'' as a successor to [[problem of induction|Hume's original problem]]. It presents the logical [[Predicate (mathematical logic)|predicates]] '''grue''' and '''bleen''' which are unusual due to their time-dependence. Many have tried to solve the new riddle on those terms, but [[Hilary Putnam]] and others have argued such time-dependency depends on the language adopted, and in some languages it is equally true for natural-sounding predicates such as "green". For Goodman they illustrate the problem of projectible predicates and ultimately, which empirical generalizations are [[Scientific law|law-like]] and which are not.<ref name="Goodman.1946">{{cite journal |author=Nelson Goodman |title=A Query on Confirmation |journal=The Journal of Philosophy |date=Jul 1946 |volume=43 |number=14 |pages=383–385 |url=http://wordsmatter.caltech.edu/~franz/Confirmation%20and%20Induction/PDFs/Nelson%20Goodman%20-%20A%20Query%20on%20Confirmation.pdf |doi=10.2307/2020332 |jstor=2020332 |access-date=2014-01-27 |archive-date=2016-05-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160528160630/http://wordsmatter.caltech.edu/~franz/Confirmation%20and%20Induction/PDFs/Nelson%20Goodman%20-%20A%20Query%20on%20Confirmation.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>{{sfn|Goodman|1983|p=74}} Goodman's construction and use of ''grue'' and ''bleen'' illustrates how philosophers use simple examples in [[analytic philosophy|conceptual analysis]].