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Nominalism
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{{Short description|Philosophy emphasizing names and labels}} [[File:William_of_Ockham.png|thumb|[[William of Ockham]]]] In [[metaphysics]], '''nominalism''' is the view that [[Universal (metaphysics)|universals]] and [[abstract object]]s do not actually exist other than being merely names or labels.<ref>{{Cite dictionary |url=http://www.lexico.com/definition/nominalism |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210826005738/https://www.lexico.com/definition/nominalism |url-status=dead |archive-date=August 26, 2021 |title=nominalism |dictionary=[[Lexico]] UK English Dictionary |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]}}</ref><ref>Mill (1872); Bigelow (1998).</ref> There are two main versions of nominalism. One denies the existence of universals β that which can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things (e.g., strength, humanity). The other version specifically denies the existence of abstract objects ''as such'' β objects that do not exist in space and time.<ref>Rodriguez-Pereyra (2008) writes: "The word 'Nominalism', as used by contemporary philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition, is ambiguous. In one sense, its most traditional sense deriving from the Middle Ages, it implies the rejection of universals. In another, more modern but equally entrenched sense, it implies the rejection of abstract objects" (Β§1).</ref> Most nominalists have held that only physical [[Particular|particulars]] in space and time are real, and that universals exist only ''post res'', that is, subsequent to particular things.<ref>Feibleman (1962), p. 211.</ref> However, some versions of nominalism hold that some particulars are abstract entities (e.g., [[number]]s), whilst others are concrete entities β entities that do exist in space and time (e.g., pillars, snakes, and bananas). Nominalism is primarily a position on the [[problem of universals]]. It is opposed to [[Philosophical realism|realist]] philosophies, such as [[Platonic realism]], which assert that universals do exist over and above particulars, and to the [[Hylomorphism|hylomorphic]] substance theory of Aristotle, which asserts that universals are [[Immanent realism|immanently real]] within them; however, the name "nominalism" emerged from debates in medieval philosophy with [[Roscellinus]]. The term ''nominalism'' stems from the [[Latin]] ''nomen'', "name". [[John Stuart Mill]] summarised nominalism in his [[aphorism|apothegm]] "there is nothing general except names".<ref>[[John Stuart Mill|Mill, J.S.]] (1865/1877). [https://books.google.com/books?id=5HBEAQAAMAAJ ''An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy'', Volume II], Chapter XVII, p. 50.</ref> In [[philosophy of law]], nominalism finds its application in what is called '''constitutional nominalism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->.<ref>An overview of the philosophical problems and an application of the concept to a case of the Supreme Court of the State of California, gives Thomas Kupka, 'Verfassungsnominalismus', in: ''Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy'' 97 (2011), 44β77, [https://ssrn.com/abstract=2343741 PDF].</ref>
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