Editing Postcognitivism (section)

{{Short description|Movements in cognitive science critical of cognitivism}}
Movements in [[cognitive science]] are considered to be '''post-cognitivist''' if they are opposed to or move beyond the [[Cognitivism (psychology)|cognitivist]] theories posited by [[Noam Chomsky]], [[Jerry Fodor]], [[David Marr (psychologist)|David Marr]], and others.

Postcognitivists challenge tenets within cognitivism, including ontological [[wikt:dualism|dualism]], [[direct and indirect realism|representational realism]], that cognition is independent of processes outside the mind and nervous system, that the electronic computer is an appropriate analogy for the mind, and that cognition occurs only within individuals.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Wallace |first1=B |last2=Ross |first2=A |last3=Davies |first3=J.B |last4=Anderson |first4=T |title=The Mind, the Body and the World: Psychology after Cognitivism |date=2007 |publisher=Imprint Academic |location=London |isbn=978-1-84540-073-6}}</ref>

Researchers who have followed post-cognitive directions include [[James J. Gibson]], [[Hubert Dreyfus]], [[Gregory Bateson]], [[Michael Turvey]], [[Bradd Shore]], [[Jerome Bruner]], [[Vittorio Guidano]], [[Humberto Maturana]] and [[Francisco Varela]].<ref>Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.</ref>