Editing Quine's paradox (section)

{{Short description|Logical paradox concerning truth values}}
'''Quine's paradox''' is a [[paradox]] concerning [[truth value]]s, stated by [[Willard Van Orman Quine]].<ref name="Quine1962"/>  It is related to the [[liar paradox]] as a problem, and it purports to show that a sentence can be paradoxical even if it is not self-referring and does not use [[demonstrative]]s or [[indexicality|indexicals]] (i.e. it does not explicitly refer to itself). The paradox can be expressed as follows:

:"yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation" yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation.

If the paradox is not clear, consider each part of the above description of the paradox incrementally:

:it = ''yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation''
:its quotation = ''"yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation"''
:it preceded by its quotation = ''"yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation" yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation.''

With these tools, the description of the paradox may now be reconsidered; it can be seen to assert the following:
:The statement "''{{'}}yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation{{'}}'' yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation" is false.

In other words, the sentence implies that it is false, which is paradoxical—for if it is false, what it states is in fact true.