Editing Shell Crisis of 1915 (section)

{{short description|Political crisis in Britain}}
{{about|British responses to the ammunition shortages|the Russian shell shortage of 1915|Economic history of World War I|}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=April 2022}}
[[File:PMLloydGeorge--nsillustratedwar03londuoft.jpg|thumb|David Lloyd George]]
The '''Shell Crisis of 1915''' was a shortage of artillery shells on the front lines in the [[First World War]] that led to a political crisis in the [[United Kingdom]]. Previous military experience led to an over-reliance on shrapnel to attack infantry in the open, which was negated by the resort to trench warfare, for which [[High-explosive incendiary|high-explosive shells]] were better suited.{{sfn|Strachan|2001|pp=992–1,105}} At the start of the war there was a revolution in doctrine: instead of the idea that artillery was a useful support for infantry attacks, the new doctrine held that heavy guns alone would control the battlefield. Because of the stable lines on the [[Western Front (World War I)|Western Front]], it was easy to build railway lines that delivered all the shells the factories could produce. The 'shell scandal' emerged in 1915 because the high rate of fire over a long period was not anticipated and the stock of shells became depleted.{{sfn|French|1979|pp=192–205}} The inciting incident was the disastrous [[Battle of Aubers]], which reportedly had been stymied by a lack of shells.

The shortage was widely publicised in the press. ''[[The Times]]'', in cooperation with [[David Lloyd George]] and [[Alfred Harmsworth, 1st Viscount Northcliffe|Lord Northcliffe]], sought to force Parliament to adopt a national munitions policy with centralised control. This resulted in a transfer of the Munitions Department from the War Office to a cabinet level position in government, and a coalition government with Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions. In 1916 the long-term effects included the fall of the Prime Minister [[H. H. Asquith]] and his replacement by Lloyd George in December 1916.{{sfn|Fraser|1983|pp=77–94}}