Editing Substance theory (section)

{{Short description|Basic ontological concept}}
'''Substance theory''', or '''substance–attribute theory''', is an [[ontology|ontological]] theory positing that [[Object (philosophy)|objects]] are constituted each by a ''substance'' and [[property (philosophy)|properties]] borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a ''substratum'' or a ''[[thing-in-itself]]''.<ref name="Benovsky">{{cite journal |last1=Benovsky |first1=Jiri |title=The Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory: Deadly Enemies or Twin Brothers? |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2008 |volume=141 |issue=2 |pages=175–190 |doi=10.1007/s11098-007-9158-0 |s2cid=18712931 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BENTBT-2}}</ref><ref name=Langton>{{cite book |title=Kantian humility: our ignorance of things in themselves |author=Rae Langton |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DpHUgZzu0EkC&pg=PA28 |page=28 |isbn=0-19-924317-4 |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2001}}</ref> ''Substances'' are [[particulars]] that are [[Ontology#Ontological dependence|ontologically independent]]: they are able to exist all by themselves.<ref name="kim">{{cite book |last1=Kim |first1=Jaegwon |last2=Sosa |first2=Ernest |last3=Rosenkrantz |first3=Gary S. |title=A Companion to Metaphysics |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMACT-9 |chapter=substance|date=1994 }}</ref><ref name="Borchert2">{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MONMEO-3 |chapter=Ontology}}</ref> Another defining feature often attributed to substances is their ability to ''undergo changes''. Changes involve something existing ''before'', ''during'' and ''after'' the change. They can be described in terms of a persisting substance gaining or losing properties.<ref name="kim"/> ''Attributes'' or ''properties'', on the other hand, are entities that can be exemplified by substances.<ref name="Orilia">{{cite web |last1=Orilia |first1=Francesco |last2=Paolini Paoletti |first2=Michele |title=Properties |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2020}}</ref> Properties characterize their bearers; they express what their bearer is like.<ref name="Borchert2"/>

''Substance'' is a key concept in [[ontology]], the latter in turn part of [[metaphysics]], which may be classified into [[monist]], [[Mind-body dualism|dualist]], or [[pluralism (philosophy)|pluralist]] varieties according to how many substances or individuals are said to populate, furnish, or exist in the world. According to monistic views, there is only one substance. [[Stoicism]] and [[Spinoza]], for example, hold monistic views, that [[pneuma]] or [[God]], respectively, is the one substance in the world. These modes of thinking are sometimes associated with the idea of [[immanence]]. Dualism sees the world as being composed of two fundamental substances (for example, the Cartesian [[substance dualism]] of [[Mental substance|mind]] and [[Res extensa|matter]]). Pluralist philosophies include [[Plato]]'s [[Theory of Forms]] and [[Aristotle]]'s [[hylomorphic]] [[categories (Aristotle)|categories]].