Editing Truth-conditional semantics (section)

{{Short description|Truth-based approach to semantics}}
{{Missing information|article|what the theory is, before the criticism section|date=March 2023|talksection=Article does not explain the concept before criticizing it}}

'''Truth-conditional semantics''' is an approach to semantics of [[natural language]] that sees meaning (or at least the meaning of assertions) as being the same as, or reducible to, their [[truth condition]]s. This approach to semantics is principally associated with [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]], and attempts to carry out for the semantics of natural language what [[Alfred Tarski|Tarski]]'s [[semantic theory of truth]] achieves for the [[Formal semantics (logic)|semantics of logic]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Davidson|first=Donald|date=1967|title=Truth and meaning|journal=[[Synthese]]|language=en|volume=17|issue=3|pages=304–323|doi= 10.1007/BF00485035|s2cid=14720789 }}</ref>

Truth-conditional theories of semantics attempt to define the meaning of a given proposition by explaining when the sentence is true. So, for example, because 'snow is white' is true [[if and only if]] snow is white, the meaning of 'snow is white' is snow is white.