Editing Two truths doctrine (section)

{{Short description|Buddhist differentiation of conventional and ultimate truth}}
{{Buddhism}}

The [[Buddhism|Buddhist doctrine]] of '''the two truths''' ([[Sanskrit]]: {{Transliteration|sa|dvasatya}}'','' {{bo|w=bden pa gnyis}}) differentiates between two levels of ''[[satya]]'' (Sanskrit; [[Pāli]]: ''sacca''; meaning "[[truth]]" or "[[reality]]") in the teaching of [[Gautama Buddha|Śākyamuni Buddha]]: the "conventional" or "provisional" (''saṁvṛti'') truth, and the "absolute" or "ultimate" (''paramārtha'') truth.{{sfn|Matilal|2002|pp=203-208}}<ref name="Stanford 2022">{{cite encyclopedia |last=Thakchoe |first=Sonam |date=Summer 2022 |title=The Theory of Two Truths in Tibet |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-tibet/ |url-status=live |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |editor-link=Edward N. Zalta |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=The Metaphysics Research Lab, [[Center for the Study of Language and Information]], [[Stanford University]] |issn=1095-5054 |oclc=643092515 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220528014845/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-tibet/ |archive-date=28 May 2022 |access-date=5 July 2022}}</ref>

The exact meaning varies between the various [[Schools of Buddhism|Buddhist schools]] and [[Southern, Eastern and Northern Buddhism|traditions]]. The best known interpretation is from the [[Madhyamaka|Mādhyamaka]] school of [[Mahayana|Mahāyāna Buddhism]], whose founder was the 3rd-century [[History of Buddhism in India|Indian Buddhist]] monk and philosopher [[Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]].{{sfn|Matilal|2002|pp=203-208}} For Nāgārjuna, the two truths are ''epistemological truths''.<ref name="Stanford 2022"/> The phenomenal world is accorded a provisional existence.<ref name="Stanford 2022"/> The character of the phenomenal world is declared to be neither real nor unreal, but logically indeterminable.<ref name="Stanford 2022"/> Ultimately, [[Śūnyatā|all phenomena are empty]] (''śūnyatā'') of an inherent self or essence due to the [[Anattā|non-existence of the self]] (''anātman''),<ref name="Siderits 2015">{{cite encyclopedia |last=Siderits |first=Mark |date=Spring 2015 |title=Buddha: Non-Self |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/buddha/ |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |editor-link=Edward N. Zalta |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=The Metaphysics Research Lab, [[Center for the Study of Language and Information]], [[Stanford University]] |issn=1095-5054 |oclc=643092515 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230427183712/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/buddha/ |archive-date=27 April 2023 |access-date=24 June 2023 |quote=The [[Middle Way|Buddha's "middle path" strategy]] can be seen as one of first arguing that there is nothing that the word "[[Self-concept|I]]" genuinely denotes, and then explaining that our erroneous sense of an "I" stems from our employment of the useful fiction represented by the concept of the person. While the second part of this strategy only receives its full articulation in the later development of the [[Two truths doctrine|theory of two truths]], the first part can be found in the Buddha's own teachings, in the form of several [[Anattā|philosophical arguments for non-self]]. Best known among these is the [[Impermanence#Buddhism|argument from impermanence]] (S III.66–8) [...].<br /> It is the fact that this argument does not contain a premise explicitly asserting that the [[Skandha|five ''skandhas'']] (classes of psychophysical element) are exhaustive of the constituents of persons, plus the fact that these are all said to be empirically observable, that leads some to claim that the Buddha did not intend to deny the existence of a self ''tout court''. There is, however, evidence that the Buddha was generally hostile toward attempts to establish the existence of unobservable entities. In the ''[[Dīgha Nikāya|Poṭṭhapāda Sutta]]'' (D I.178–203), for instance, the Buddha compares someone who posits an unseen seer in order to explain our introspective awareness of cognitions, to a man who has conceived a longing for the most beautiful woman in the world based solely on the thought that such a woman must surely exist. And in the ''[[Dīgha Nikāya|Tevijja Sutta]]'' (D I.235–52), the Buddha rejects the claim of certain [[Brahmins]] to know the path to oneness with [[Brahman]], on the grounds that no one has actually observed this Brahman. This makes more plausible the assumption that the argument has as an implicit premise the claim that there is no more to the person than the five ''skandhas''.}}</ref> but temporarily exist [[Pratītyasamutpāda|depending on other phenomena]] (''pratītya-samutpāda'').{{sfn|Matilal|2002|pp=203-208}}<ref name="Stanford 2022"/>

In [[Chinese Buddhism]], the [[Madhyamaka|Mādhyamaka]] thought is accepted, and the two truths doctrine is understood as referring to two ''ontological'' truths. Reality exists in two levels, a relative level and an absolute level.{{sfn|Lai|2003|p=11}} Based on their understanding of the ''[[Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra]]'', the Chinese Buddhist monks and philosophers supposed that the teaching of the [[Buddha-nature]] (''tathāgatagarbha'') was, as stated by that Sūtra, the final Buddhist teaching, and that there is an essential truth above [[Śūnyatā|emptiness]] (''śūnyatā'') and the two truths.{{sfn|Lai|2003}}

The doctrine of [[Śūnyatā|emptiness]] (''śūnyatā'') is an attempt to show that it is neither proper nor strictly justifiable to regard any [[Metaphysics|metaphysical system]] as absolutely valid. The two truths doctrine doesn't lead to the extreme philosophical views of [[Sassatavada|eternalism]] (or [[Absolute (philosophy)|absolutism]]) and [[Ajita Kesakambali#From Buddhist sources|annihilationism]] (or [[nihilism]]), but strikes a [[Middle Way|middle course]] (''madhyamāpratipada'') between them.{{sfn|Matilal|2002|pp=203-208}}