Editing Universal prescriptivism (section)

{{Short description|Meta-ethical view}}
{{distinguish|Linguistic prescription}}
{{original research|date=January 2012}}

<!-- Image with inadequate rationale removed: [[File:RMHare.jpg|thumb|right|R. M. Hare]] -->
'''Universal prescriptivism''' (often simply called '''prescriptivism''') is the [[meta-ethics|meta-ethical]] view that claims that, rather than expressing [[proposition]]s, ethical [[Sentence (linguistics)|sentence]]s function similarly to [[Imperative mood|imperative]]s which are [[universalizability|universalizable]]—whoever makes a moral judgment is committed to the same judgment in any situation where the same relevant facts pertain.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Ethics - Existentialism|url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethics-philosophy|website=Encyclopedia Britannica|language=en|access-date=2020-05-28}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Dahl|first=Norman O.|date=1987|title=A Prognosis for Universal Prescriptivism|journal=Philosophical Studies|volume=51|issue=3|pages=383–424|doi=10.1007/BF00354045|jstor=4319897|issn=0031-8116}}</ref>

This makes prescriptivism a [[moral universalism|universalist]] form of [[non-cognitivism]]. Prescriptivism stands in opposition to other forms of non-cognitivism (such as [[emotivism]] and [[quasi-realism]]), as well as to all forms of [[Cognitivism (ethics)|cognitivism]] (including both [[moral realism]] and [[ethical subjectivism]]).<ref>{{Cite journal |last=van Roojen |first=Mark |date=2004-01-23 |title=Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/moral-cognitivism/}}</ref>

Since prescriptivism was introduced by philosopher [[R. M. Hare]] in his 1952 book ''The Language of Morals'', it has been compared to emotivism and to the [[categorical imperative]] of [[Immanuel Kant]].<ref>Brandt, ''Theory'', 221: "[''The Language of Morals''] by R. M. Hare has proposed a view, otherwise very similar to the emotive theory, with modifications ..."</ref><ref>Brandt, ''Theory'', 224: "Hare's [universalizability] proposal is reminiscent of Kant's view that an act is morally permissible [[if and only if]] the maxim in terms of which the agent thinks of it could possibly serve as a universal rule of conduct, and if the agent is prepared to accept it as such."</ref> Unlike Kant, however, Hare does not invoke [[universalizability]] as a test of moral permissibility. Instead, he sees it as a consistency requirement that is built into the logic of moral language and helps to make moral thinking a rational enterprise.