Editing Absentee ballot (section)

==Methods==
===Voting at a different polling station===
Among countries where voters are allocated to one or several specific polling station(s) (such as the polling station closest to the voter's residential address, or polling stations within a particular district, province or state), some countries provide a mechanism by which voters can nevertheless cast their ballots on election day at a different polling station.

The reasons for allocating voters to specific polling stations are generally logistical. Absentee voting at a different polling station might be catered for by, for example, designating some larger polling stations as available for absentee voting, and equipping such polling stations with the ballot papers (or the means to produce ballot papers) applicable to an absentee voter.

===Postal voting===
In a [[postal vote]], the ballot papers are posted out to the voter – usually only on request – who must then fill them out and return them, often with the voter's signature and sometimes a witness signature to prove the voter's identity.<ref name="ncsl-wit">{{Cite web |title=Verification of Absentee Ballots |url=https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/verification-of-absentee-ballots.aspx#other |access-date=2020-07-02 |website=www.ncsl.org}}</ref> Signature verification is an imperfect endeavor; the best academic researchers have 10-14% error rates.<ref name="hafe-lr">These systems handle scanned ("offline") signatures from multiple people ("WI, writer-independent"). {{Cite book |last=Hafemann |first=Luiz G. |last2=Sabourin |first2=Robert |last3=Oliveira |first3=Luiz S. |title=2017 Seventh International Conference on Image Processing Theory, Tools and Applications (IPTA) |chapter=Offline handwritten signature verification — Literature review |date=2017-10-16 |pages=1–8 |doi=10.1109/IPTA.2017.8310112 |arxiv=1507.07909 |isbn=978-1-5386-1842-4 |s2cid=206932295 }}</ref> Some jurisdictions use special paper, [[Ballot Tracking in the United States|ballot tracking]], or printing to minimize forged ballots.<ref name="pbs520">{{Cite news |date=2020-05-04 |title='We've got to get going.' States under pressure to plan for the general election amid a pandemic |language=en-us |work=[[PBS NewsHour]] |url=https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/weve-got-to-get-going-states-under-pressure-to-plan-for-the-general-election-amid-a-pandemic |access-date=2020-07-25}}</ref><ref name="farley">{{Cite news |last=Farley |first=Robert |date=2020-06-25 |title=Trump's Shaky Warning About Counterfeit Mail-In Ballots |language=en-US |url=https://www.factcheck.org/2020/06/trumps-shaky-warning-about-counterfeit-mail-in-ballots/ |access-date=2020-07-25}}</ref>

===All-postal voting===
''All-postal'' voting is the form of postal voting where all electors receive their ballot papers through the post, not just those who requested an absentee ballot. Depending on the system applied, electors may have to return their ballot papers by post, or there may be an opportunity to deliver them by hand to a specified location.

There is some evidence that this method of voting leads to higher turnout than one where people vote in person or have to apply for a postal vote. Critics suggest that this is only a temporary impact, and that there are dangers in people using ballot papers intended for other electors.{{Citation needed|date=November 2018}}

It has been tested by a large number of local authorities in the [[United Kingdom]] for their elections, and in 2004 it was used for elections to the European Parliament and local authorities in four of the English regions (see below for more details). In 2016, the [[Australian Marriage Law Postal Survey]] was conducted via all-postal voting with a turnout of 79.5 percent.

===Proxy voting===
{{Main|Proxy voting}}
To cast a proxy vote, the user appoints someone as their ''proxy'', by authorizing them to cast or secure their vote in their stead. The proxy must be trusted by the voter, as in a [[secret ballot]] there is no way of verifying that they voted for the correct candidate. In an attempt to solve this, it is not uncommon for people to nominate an official of their chosen party as their proxy.

===Internet voting===

{{Main|Electronic voting#Online voting}}
Security experts have found security problems in every attempt at online voting,<ref name="appel-dem">{{Cite web |last=Appel |first=Andrew |date=2020-06-08 |title=Democracy Live internet voting: unsurprisingly insecure, and surprisingly insecure |url=https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2020/06/08/democracy-live-internet-voting-unsurprisingly-insecure-and-surprisingly-insecure/ |access-date=2020-06-23 |website=Princeton University}}</ref>
<ref name="vv-int">{{Cite web |title=Internet Voting  |url=https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/ |access-date=2020-06-20 |website=Verified Voting |language=en-US}}</ref>
<ref name="nas-sec">"Secure Internet voting will likely not be feasible in the near future... At the present time, the Internet (or any network connected to the Internet) should not be used for the return of marked ballots" {{Cite book |last=National Academies of Sciences |date=2018-09-06 |title=Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy |doi=10.17226/25120 |isbn=978-0-309-47647-8 |s2cid=158434942 |url=https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy |access-date=2020-06-23 |language=en}}</ref>
<ref name="eac-nist">"Electronic ballot return faces significant security risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of voted ballots. These risks can ultimately affect the tabulation and results and, can occur at scale... Even with ... technical security considerations, electronic ballot return remains a high-risk activity." {{Cite web |publisher=Election Assistance Commission, National Institute of Standards and Technology, FBI, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency |date=2020-05-11 |title=RISK MANAGEMENT FOR ELECTRONIC BALLOT DELIVERY, MARKING, AND RETURN |url=http://s3.amazonaws.com/ftt-uploads/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/07210015/Final_-Risk_Management_for_Electronic-Ballot_05082020-1.pdf |access-date=2020-06-23}}</ref>
including systems in Australia,<ref name="aust">{{Cite conference |last=Halderman |first=J. Alex |last2=Teague |first2=Vanessa |title=E-Voting and Identity |date=2015-08-13 |chapter=The New South Wales iVote System: Security Failures and Verification Flaws in a Live Online Election |series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science |volume=9269 |pages=35–53 |doi=10.1007/978-3-319-22270-7_3 |conference=International Conference on E-Voting and Identity |arxiv=1504.05646 |isbn=978-3-319-22269-1 }}</ref>
Estonia<ref name="estan">{{citation|last1=Springall|first1=Drew|last2=Finkenauer|first2=Travis|last3=Durumeric|first3=Zakir|last4=Kitcat|first4=Jason|last5=Hursti|first5=Harri|last6=MacAlpine| first6=Margaret| last7=Halderman|first7=Alex| title=Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security |chapter=Security Analysis of the Estonian Internet Voting System| year=2014 | pages=703–715 | doi=10.1145/2660267.2660315 | isbn=9781450329576 | s2cid=1985090 |access-date=3 December 2017|chapter-url=https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2660315|url=https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ivoting-ccs14.pdf}}</ref><ref name="osce-est">"The OSCE/ODIHR EAM was made aware of a program that could, if it was running on a voter's computer, change the vote without the possibility for the voter to detect it. The case was brought to the attention of the project manager who assessed this threat to be theoretically plausible but nearly impossible to implement in reality." {{Cite web |date= 6 March 2011  |title=ESTONIA PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report |url=https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/9/77557.pdf |access-date=2020-06-20 |website=OSCE}}</ref>
Switzerland,<ref name="swiss-sctyl">{{Cite web |last=Zetter |first=Kim |date=2019-03-12 |title=Researchers Find Critical Backdoor in Swiss Online Voting System |url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/researchers-find-critical-backdoor-in-swiss-online-voting-system/ |access-date=2020-06-20 |website=Vice |language=en}}</ref>
Russia,<ref>{{Cite news|last=Gupta|first=Manhar|title=Russia's Blockchain Voting Turned Into A Fiasco|work=Cryptotrends|url=https://cryptotrends.in/russias-blockchain-voting-turned-into-a-fiasco/}}</ref><ref name="moscow">{{Cite conference |last=Gaudry |first=Pierrick |last2=Golovnev |first2=Alexander |date=2020-02-10 |title=Breaking the Encryption Scheme of the Moscow Internet Voting System |url=http://fc20.ifca.ai/preproceedings/178.pdf |conference=Financial Cryptography 2020 |via=International Financial Cryptography Association}}</ref><ref name="risks-moscow">{{Cite journal|title=Electronic voting systems |last=Anderson |first=Ross |date=2020-02-21 |url=http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/31/59#subj2.1 |journal=The RISKS Digest |issue=59 |language=en |volume=31 |via=Newcastle University}}</ref>
and the United States.<ref name="vice-mit">{{Cite news |last=Zetter |first=Kim |date=2020-02-13 |title='Sloppy' Mobile Voting App Used in Four States Has 'Elementary' Security Flaws |language=en |work=VICE |url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/sloppy-mobile-voting-app-used-in-four-states-has-elementary-security-flaws/ |access-date=2020-06-23}}</ref><ref name="appel-dem"/> More information is in the sections for each country [[Electronic voting#Documented problems with electronic voting|below]].

Online voting is widely used privately for shareholder votes.<ref name="penobscot">{{Cite news |last=Weil |first=Gordon |date=2020-07-04 |title=Maine system combined with shareholder-style voting could overcome false fraud fears, boost turnout |language=en |work=Penobscot Bay Pilot |url=https://www.penbaypilot.com/node/135568 |access-date=2020-07-29}}</ref><ref name="fisch">{{Cite web |last=Fisch |first=Jill |date=2017 |title=Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor |url=https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2759&context=faculty_scholarship |access-date=2020-07-29 |website=Minnesota Law Review}}</ref> The election management companies do not promise accuracy or privacy.<ref name="esc">Election Services Co. {{Cite web |title=Terms of Use & Privacy Policy |url=http://www.electionservicesco.com/pages/terms-privacy.php |access-date=2020-07-29 |website=www.electionservicesco.com}}</ref><ref name="broad-terms">ProxyVote {{Cite web |title=Terms of Use & Linking Policy |url=https://www.broadridge.com/legal/terms-of-use |access-date=2020-07-29 |website=www.broadridge.com |language=en}}</ref><ref name="cshare">Proxydirect {{Cite web |title=Online Service Terms & Conditions |url=https://www.computershare.com/us/online-service-terms-conditions |access-date=2020-07-29 |website=www.computershare.com}}</ref> In fact one company uses an individual's past votes for research,<ref name="brav">{{Cite web |last=Brav |first=Alon |last2=Cain |first2=Matthew D. |last3=Zytnick |first3=Jonathon |date=November 2019 |title=Retail Shareholder Participation in the Proxy Process: Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting |url=http://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/GOVERNANCEPROFESSIONALS/a8892c7c-6297-4149-b9fc-378577d0b150/UploadedImages/Retail.pdf |access-date=2020-07-29 |website= European Corporate Governance Institute}}</ref> and to target ads.<ref name="broad-target">{{Cite web |title=Proxy Services for Mutual Funds and ETF Providers |url=https://www.broadridge.com/financial-services/asset-management/mutual-funds-etf/drive-a-successful-proxy-outcome/proxy-services |access-date=2020-07-29 |website=www.broadridge.com |language=en}}</ref>