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== Organization == Al-Qaeda only indirectly controls its day-to-day operations. Its philosophy calls for the [[centralization]] of decision making, while allowing for the [[decentralization]] of execution.<ref>al-Hammadi, Khalid, "The Inside Story of al-Qa'ida", part 4, ''Al-Quds al-Arabi'', March 22, 2005</ref> The top leaders of al-Qaeda have defined the organization's ideology and guiding strategy, and they have also articulated simple and easy-to-receive messages. At the same time, mid-level organizations were given autonomy, but they had to consult with top management before large-scale attacks and assassinations. Top management included the shura council as well as committees on military operations, finance, and information sharing. Through the information committees of al-Qaeda, Zawahiri placed special emphasis on communicating with his groups.<ref name=WilsonLeaders2015>{{Cite web|last=Glenn|first=Cameron|date=September 28, 2015|title=Al Qaeda v ISIS: Leaders & Structure|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/al-qaeda-v-isis-leaders-structure|access-date=March 3, 2021|website=Wilson Center|archive-date=March 8, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308155255/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/al-qaeda-v-isis-leaders-structure|url-status=live}}</ref> However, after the [[war on terror]], al-Qaeda's leadership has become isolated. As a result, the leadership has become decentralized, and the organization has become regionalized into several al-Qaeda groups.<ref>J. Feiser – {{cite web|url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FH13Ak05.html|title=Evolution of the al-Qaeda brand name|work=Asia Times|date=August 13, 2004|access-date=March 22, 2010|archive-url=http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20050423141837/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FH13Ak05.html|archive-date=April 23, 2005|url-status=unfit}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last=Atran|first=Scott|date=Spring 2006|title=The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism|url=http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/twq06spring_atran.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150623022648/http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/twq06spring_atran.pdf|archive-date=June 23, 2015|access-date=March 22, 2010}}</ref> The group was initially dominated by [[Egyptians]] and [[Saudis]], with some participation from [[Yemenis]] and [[Kuwaitis]]. Over time, it has evolved into a more international terrorist organization. While its core group originally shared a background in Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, it has since attracted fighters from other Arab groups, including [[Maghrebi Arabs|North Africans]], [[Jordanians]], [[Palestinians]], and [[Iraqis]]. In the decade following the 9/11 attacks, Muslims from non-Arab backgrounds, such as [[Pakistanis]], [[Afghans]], [[Turkish people|Turks]], [[Kurds]], and [[Islam in Europe|European converts to Islam]], have also joined the organization.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Steinberg|first=Guido|title=German Jihad: On the Internationalization of Islamist Terrorism|date=2013|publisher=Columbia University Press|isbn=978-0-231-50053-1|series=Columbia studies in terrorism and irregular warfare|location=New York|pages=15, 17|chapter=Unlikely Internationalists: Putting German Jihadism into Perspective}}</ref> Many Western analysts do not believe that the global jihadist movement is driven at every level by al-Qaeda's leadership. However, bin Laden held considerable ideological influence over revolutionary Islamist movements across the world. Experts argue that al-Qaeda has fragmented into a number of disparate regional movements, and that these groups bear little connection with one another.<ref name="FT Threat">{{Cite news|last1=Blitz|first1=James|date=January 19, 2010|title=A threat transformed|newspaper=[[Financial Times]]|url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/af31e344-0499-11df-8603-00144feabdc0.html|url-status=|url-access=subscription|access-date=December 11, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110502150747/http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/af31e344-0499-11df-8603-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1LCxJlXGb|archive-date=May 2, 2011}}</ref> This view mirrors the account given by Osama bin Laden in his October 2001 interview with [[Tayseer Allouni]]: {{blockquote| "this matter isn't about any specific person and{{spaces}}... is not about the al-Qa'idah Organization. We are the children of an Islamic Nation, with Prophet Muhammad as its leader, our Lord is one{{spaces}}... and all the true believers [mu'mineen] are brothers. So the situation isn't like the West portrays it, that there is an 'organization' with a specific name (such as 'al-Qa'idah') and so on. That particular name is very old. It was born without any intention from us. Brother Abu Ubaida{{spaces}}... created a military base to train the young men to fight against the vicious, arrogant, brutal, terrorizing Soviet empire{{spaces}}... So this place was called 'The Base' ['Al-Qa'idah'], as in a training base, so this name grew and became. We aren't separated from this nation. We are the children of a nation, and we are an inseparable part of it, and from those public demonstrations which spread from the far east, from the Philippines to Indonesia, to Malaysia, to India, to Pakistan, reaching Mauritania{{spaces}}... and so we discuss the conscience of this nation."<ref name=islamicawakening>{{cite web|url=http://www.islamicawakening.com/viewarticle.php?articleID=977&pageID=64|title=A Discussion on the New Crusader Wars: Tayseer Allouni with Usamah bin Laden|publisher=IslamicAwakening.com|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130621142756/http://www.islamicawakening.com/viewarticle.php?articleID=977&pageID=64|archive-date=June 21, 2013}}</ref>}} {{as of|2010}} however, [[Bruce Hoffman]] saw al-Qaeda as a cohesive network that was strongly led from the Pakistani tribal areas.<ref name="FT Threat" /> [[File:Al-Qaida crée une brigade dirigée par des Touaregs (8246938011).jpg|thumb|upright=0.8|Al-Qaeda militant in [[Sahel]] armed with a [[Type 56 assault rifle]], 2012]] ===Affiliates=== Al-Qaeda has the following direct affiliates: {{Div col|colwidth=30em}} *[[Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula]] (AQAP) *[[Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent]] (AQIS) *[[Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb]] (AQIM) *[[Al-Shabaab (militant group)|Al-Shabaab]] *[[Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin]] (JNIM) {{div col end}} The following are presently believed to be indirect affiliates of al-Qaeda: {{Div col|colwidth=30em}} *[[Fatah al-Islam]]<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-lebanon/u-s-designates-fatah-al-islam-terrorist-group-idUSN1334969020070813|date=August 13, 2007|title=U.S. designates Fatah al-Islam 'terrorist' group|work=Reuters|access-date=August 11, 2019|archive-date=December 16, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201216225141/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-lebanon/u-s-designates-fatah-al-islam-terrorist-group-idUSN1334969020070813|url-status=live}}</ref> *[[Islamic Jihad Union]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/04/islamic-jihad-union-conducts-joint-raid-with-the-taliban.php|last1=Roggio|first1=Bill|last2=Weiss|first2=Caleb|date=April 10, 2018|title=Islamic Jihad Union conducts joint raid with the Taliban|website=Long War Journal|access-date=August 11, 2019|archive-date=December 16, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201216225214/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/04/islamic-jihad-union-conducts-joint-raid-with-the-taliban.php|url-status=live}}</ref> *[[Jaish-e-Mohammed]]<ref name="cisac">{{Cite web|url=https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/jaish-e-mohammed|title=Jaish-e-Mohammed|date=July 2018|publisher=Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University|access-date=August 11, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190717001529/https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/jaish-e-mohammed|archive-date=July 17, 2019|url-status=dead}}</ref> *[[Lashkar-e-Taiba]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/07/pakistan-charges-13-lashkar-e-taiba-leaders-under-anti-terrorism-act.php|last1=Roggio|first1=Bill|date=July 12, 2019|title=Pakistan charges 13 Lashkar-e-Taiba leaders under Anti-Terrorism Act|website=Long War Journal|access-date=August 12, 2019|archive-date=December 16, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201216225208/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/07/pakistan-charges-13-lashkar-e-taiba-leaders-under-anti-terrorism-act.php|url-status=live}}</ref> {{div col end}} Al-Qaeda's former affiliates include the following: {{Div col|colwidth=30em}} *[[Abu Sayyaf]] (pledged allegiance to [[Islamic State|ISIL]] in 2014<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/375074/news/nation/biff-abu-sayyaf-pledge-allegiance-t-islamic-state-jihadists|title=BIFF, Abu Sayyaf pledge allegiance to Islamic State jihadists|work=GMA News Online|date=August 16, 2014|access-date=April 12, 2016}}</ref>) *[[Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan]] (dissolved) *[[Caucasus Emirate]] (dissolved) *[[Hurras al-Din]] (dissolved in 2025) *[[Jemaah Islamiyah]]<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Gordon|first=David|year=2011|title=Jemaah Islamiyah|url=http://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/111101_Gordon_JemaahIslamiyah_WEB.pdf|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/111101_Gordon_JemaahIslamiyah_WEB.pdf|archive-date=October 9, 2022|url-status=live|journal=Homeland Security & Counterterrorism Program Transnational Threats Project|via=Center for Strategic & International Studies}}</ref> (dissolved in 2024) *[[Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group]]<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jesus|first1=Carlos Echeverria|date=March 2009|title=The Current State of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group|url=https://ctc.usma.edu/the-current-state-of-the-moroccan-islamic-combatant-group/|journal=CTC Sentinel|volume=2|issue=3|access-date=August 12, 2019|archive-date=December 16, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201216225208/https://ctc.usma.edu/the-current-state-of-the-moroccan-islamic-combatant-group/|url-status=dead}}</ref> (dissolved) *[[Al-Mourabitoun (militant group)|Al-Mourabitoun]] (joined [[Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin|JNIM]] in 2017<ref name="JNIM">{{cite web|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-al-qaeda-groups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php|last1=Joscelyn|first1=Thomas|date=March 13, 2017|title=Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize in West Africa|website=Long War Journal|access-date=August 16, 2019|archive-date=October 25, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191025023808/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-al-qaeda-groups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php|url-status=live}}</ref>) *[[Al-Qaeda in Iraq]] (became the [[Islamic State of Iraq]], which later seceded from al-Qaeda and became [[Islamic State|ISIL]]) *[[Ansaru|Al-Qaeda in the Lands Beyond the Sahel]] (inactive since 2015<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://jamestown.org/program/electronic-jihad-nigeria-boko-haram-using-social-media/|title=Electronic Jihad in Nigeria: How Boko Haram Is Using Social Media|first1=Jacob|last1=Zenn|work=[[Jamestown Foundation]]|date=December 9, 2017|access-date=July 16, 2018|archive-date=July 16, 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180716225757/https://jamestown.org/program/electronic-jihad-nigeria-boko-haram-using-social-media/|url-status=live}}</ref>) *[[Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan|Ansar al-Islam]] (majority merged with [[Islamic State|ISIL]] in 2014) *[[Ansar Dine]] (joined [[Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin|JNIM]] in 2017<ref name="JNIM"/>) *[[Islamic Jihad in Yemen]] (became [[Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula|AQAP]]) *[[Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa]] (merged with [[Al-Mulathameen]] to form [[Al-Mourabitoun (militant group)|Al-Mourabitoun]] in 2013) *[[Rajah Sulaiman Movement]]<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Banlaoi|first1=Rommel C.|title=Media and Terrorism in the Philippines: The Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement|journal=Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism|date=April 1, 2009|volume=4|issue=1|pages=64–75|doi=10.1080/18335300.2009.9686924|s2cid=144035702}}</ref> *[[Al-Nusra Front]] (dissolved in 2017, merged with other Islamist organizations to form [[Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham]] and split ties){{div col end}} === Leadership === ==== Osama bin Laden (1988 – May 2011) ==== [[File:Hamid Mir interviewing Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri 2001.jpg|thumb|Osama bin Laden (left) and Ayman al-Zawahiri (right) photographed in 2001|alt=Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri photographed in 2001]] [[Osama bin Laden]] served as the emir of al-Qaeda from the organization's founding in 1988 until his assassination by US forces on May 1, 2011.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/05/al_qaeda_emir_osama.php|last1=Ardolino|first1=Bill|last2=Roggio|first2=Bill|date=May 1, 2011|title=Al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden confirmed killed by US forces in Pakistan|website=Long War Journal|access-date=August 5, 2019|archive-date=August 5, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190805214544/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/05/al_qaeda_emir_osama.php|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Atiyah Abd al-Rahman]] was alleged to be second in command prior to his death on August 22, 2011.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us-official-al-qaidas-no-2-leader-atiyah-abd-al-rahman-killed-in-pakistan/2011/08/27/gIQABVppiJ_story.html|title=Al Qaidas No. 2 leader Atiyah Abd al-Rahman killed in Pakistan|newspaper=The Washington Post|first1=Dan|last1=Balz|date=August 27, 2011}}{{dead link|date=June 2021|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref> Bin Laden was advised by a [[shura|Shura Council]], which consists of senior al-Qaeda members.<ref name=WilsonLeaders2015/> The group was estimated to consist of 20–30 people. ==== After May 2011 ==== [[Ayman al-Zawahiri]] had been al-Qaeda's deputy emir and assumed the role of emir following bin Laden's death. Al-Zawahiri replaced [[Saif al-Adel]], who had served as interim commander.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2011/06/16/world/middleeast/AP-ML-Al-Qaida-Zawahri.html|title=Al-Qaida Says Al-Zawahri Has Succeeded Bin Laden|agency=Associated Press|work=The New York Times|date=June 16, 2011|access-date=June 6, 2011}}</ref> On June 5, 2012, Pakistani intelligence officials announced that al-Rahman's alleged successor as second in command, [[Abu Yahya al-Libi]], had been killed in Pakistan.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/world/asia/qaeda-deputy-killed-in-drone-strike-in-pakistan.html|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220101/https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/world/asia/qaeda-deputy-killed-in-drone-strike-in-pakistan.html|archive-date=January 1, 2022|url-access=limited|title=Drone Strike Killed No. 2 in Al Qaeda, U.S. Officials Say|date=June 5, 2012|work=The New York Times|first1=Declan|last1=Walsh|first2=Eric|last2=Schmitt}}{{cbignore}}</ref> [[Nasir al-Wuhayshi]] was alleged to have become al-Qaeda's overall second in command and general manager in 2013. He was concurrently the leader of [[al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula]] (AQAP) until he was killed by a US airstrike in Yemen in June 2015.<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/world/middleeast/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-yemen-nasser-al-wuhayshi-killed.html Al-Qaeda Confirms U.S. Strike Killed Nasser al-Wuhayshi, Its Leader in Yemen] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170225141425/https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/world/middleeast/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-yemen-nasser-al-wuhayshi-killed.html |date=February 25, 2017 }}, ''The New York Times'', Kareem Fahim, June 16, 2015</ref> [[Abu Khayr al-Masri]], Wuhayshi's alleged successor as the deputy to Ayman al-Zawahiri, was killed by a US airstrike in Syria in February 2017.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/zawahiris-deputy-sought-to-unify-syrian-rebels.php|last1=Joscelyn|first1=Thomas|date=March 3, 2017|title=Zawahiri's deputy sought to 'unify' Syrian rebels|website=Long War Journal|access-date=August 5, 2019|archive-date=September 13, 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180913114337/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/zawahiris-deputy-sought-to-unify-syrian-rebels.php|url-status=live}}</ref> Al-Qaeda's next alleged number two leader, [[Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah]], was killed by Israeli agents. His pseudonym was Abu Muhammad al-Masri, who was killed in November 2020 in Iran. He was involved in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.<ref>{{Cite web|date=November 15, 2020|title=Report: Israeli agents assassinated Al-Qaeda's No. 2 in Iran|url=https://www.jns.org/report-israeli-agents-assassinated-al-qaedas-no-2-in-iran/|access-date=March 3, 2021|website=[[JNS.org]]|archive-date=March 5, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210305155904/https://www.jns.org/report-israeli-agents-assassinated-al-qaedas-no-2-in-iran/|url-status=live}}</ref> {{anchor|Committees}}<!--linked from Abu-Zaid al Kuwaiti-->Al-Qaeda's network was built from scratch as a conspiratorial network which drew upon the leadership of a number of regional nodes.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gunaratna|2002|p=54}}.</ref> The organization divided itself into several committees, which include: * The Military Committee, which is responsible for training operatives, acquiring weapons, and planning attacks. * The Money/Business Committee, which funds the recruitment and training of operatives through the ''[[hawala]]'' banking system. US-led efforts to eradicate the sources of "[[terrorist financing]]"<ref>{{Harvnb|State 2003}}.</ref> were most successful in the year immediately following the September 11 attacks.<ref>{{Harvnb|Basile|2004|p=177}}.</ref> Al-Qaeda continues to operate through unregulated banks, such as the 1,000 or so ''hawaladars'' in Pakistan, some of which can handle deals of up to {{US$|10}}{{spaces}}million.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wechsler|2001|p=135}}; cited in {{Harvnb|Gunaratna|2002|p=63}}.</ref> The committee also procures false passports, pays al-Qaeda members, and oversees profit-driven businesses.<ref>Businesses are run from below, with the council only being consulted on new proposals and collecting funds.<br />See: * {{Harvnb|Hoffman|2002}}.</ref> In the ''[[9/11 Commission Report]]'', it was estimated that al-Qaeda required $30{{spaces}}million per year to conduct its operations. * The Law Committee reviews [[Sharia law]], and decides upon courses of action conform to it. * The Islamic Study/''[[Fatwā|Fatwah]]'' Committee issues religious edicts, such as an edict in 1998 telling Muslims to kill Americans. * The Media Committee ran the now-defunct newspaper ''Nashrat al Akhbar'' ({{langx|en|Newscast}}) and handled [[public relations]]. * In 2005, al-Qaeda formed [[As-Sahab]], a media production house, to supply its video and audio materials. ==== After Al-Zawahiri (2022 – present) ==== Al-Zawahiri was killed on July 31, 2022, in a drone strike in Afghanistan.<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Engelbrecht|first1=Cora|last2=Ward|first2=Euan|date=August 2, 2022|title=The Killing of Ayman al-Zawahri: What We Know|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/world/asia/al-qaeda-al-zawahri-killing.html|access-date=August 2, 2022|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=August 2, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220802205000/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/world/asia/al-qaeda-al-zawahri-killing.html|url-status=live}}</ref> In February 2023, a report from the United Nations, based on member state intelligence, concluded that de facto leadership of al-Qaeda had passed to [[Saif al-Adel]], who was operating out of Iran. Adel, a former Egyptian army officer, became a military instructor in al-Qaeda camps in the 1990s and was known for his involvement in the Battle of Mogadishu. The report stated that al-Adel's leadership could not officially be declared by al-Qaeda because of "political sensitivities" of [[Afghan Government|Afghan government]] in acknowledging the death of Al-Zawahiri as well as due to "theological and operational" challenges posed by the location of al-Adel in [[Iran]].<ref>{{Cite news|last=Jeong|first=Andrew|title=Militant in Iran identified as al-Qaeda's probable new chief in U.N. report|newspaper=The Washington Post|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/15/al-qaeda-leader-saif-al-adel/|access-date=February 15, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230215142558/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/15/al-qaeda-leader-saif-al-adel/|archive-date=February 15, 2023|issn=0190-8286}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|date=February 15, 2023|title=United Nations report identifies new al Qaeda leader with $10 million bounty|work=[[The Hill (newspaper)|The Hill]]|url=https://thehill.com/policy/international/3859954-united-nations-report-identifies-new-al-qaida-leader-with-10-million-bounty/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230215224549/https://thehill.com/policy/international/3859954-united-nations-report-identifies-new-al-qaida-leader-with-10-million-bounty/|archive-date=February 15, 2023}}</ref> === Command structure === Most of al-Qaeda's top leaders and operational directors were veterans who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were the leaders who were considered the operational commanders of the organization.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Al Qaeda|url=https://www.adl.org/resources/profiles/al-qaeda|access-date=March 3, 2021|website=Anti-Defamation League|archive-date=April 3, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210403025553/https://www.adl.org/resources/profiles/al-qaeda|url-status=live}}</ref> Nevertheless, al-Qaeda was not [[Military operation|operationally]] managed by Ayman al-Zawahiri. Several operational groups exist, which consult with the leadership in situations where attacks are in preparation.<ref name=WilsonLeaders2015/> "...{{spaces}}Zawahiri does not claim to have direct hierarchical control over al Qaeda's vast, networked structure. Al Qaeda's core leadership seeks to centralize the organization's messaging and strategy rather than to manage the daily operations of its franchises. But formal affiliates are required to consult with al Qaeda's core leadership before carrying out large-scale attacks." Al-Qaeda central (AQC) is a conglomerate of expert committees, each in supervision of distinct tasks and objectives. Its membership is mostly composed of [[Islam in Egypt#Islamic political movements|Egyptian Islamist]] leaders who participated in the [[anti-communist]] [[Afghan Jihad]]. Assisting them are hundreds of Islamic field operatives and commanders, based in various regions of the [[Muslim World]]. The central leadership assumes control of the doctrinal approach and overall propaganda campaign; while the regional commanders were empowered with independence in military strategy and political maneuvering. This novel hierarchy made it possible for the organisation to launch wide-range offensives.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=J. Tompkins, Crossett|first1=Paul, Chuck|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SPZdWxjMd6cC|title=Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009|last2=Spitaletta, Marshal|first2=Jason, Shana|publisher=United States Army Special Operations Command|year=2012|location=Fort Bragg, North Carolina|pages=544, 545|chapter=19- Al-Qaeda: 1988–2001}}</ref> When asked in 2005 about the possibility of al-Qaeda's connection to the [[July 7, 2005 London bombings]], [[Metropolitan Police Commissioner]] [[Sir Ian Blair]] said: "Al-Qaeda is not an organization. Al-Qaeda is a way of working{{spaces}}... but this has the hallmark of that approach{{spaces}}... Al-Qaeda clearly has the ability to provide training{{spaces}}... to provide expertise{{spaces}}... and I think that is what has occurred here."<ref name="foxnewsblair">{{Cite news|title=Cops: London Attacks Were Homicide Blasts|date=July 15, 2005|url=https://www.foxnews.com/story/cops-london-attacks-were-homicide-blasts|publisher=Fox News|access-date=June 15, 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080420155421/http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,162476,00.html|archive-date=April 20, 2008|url-status=live}}</ref> On August 13, 2005, ''[[The Independent]]'' newspaper, reported that the July{{spaces}}7 bombers had acted independently of an al-Qaeda mastermind.<ref>{{Cite news|title=London bombings: the truth emerges|url=http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article305547.ece|first1=Jason|last1=Bennetto|first2=Ian|last2=Herbert|work=The Independent|location=UK|date=August 13, 2005|access-date=December 3, 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061026100045/http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article305547.ece|archive-date=October 26, 2006|url-status=dead}}</ref> Nasser al-Bahri, who was Osama bin Laden's bodyguard for four years in the run-up to 9/11 wrote in his memoir a highly detailed description of how the group functioned at that time. Al-Bahri described al-Qaeda's formal administrative structure and vast arsenal.<ref>Al-Bahri, Nasser, ''Guarding bin Laden: My Life in al-Qaeda''. p. 185. Thin Man Press. London. {{ISBN|9780956247360}}</ref> However, the author [[Adam Curtis]] argued that the idea of al-Qaeda as a formal organization is primarily an American invention. Curtis contended the name "Al-Qaeda" was first brought to the attention of the public in the 2001 trial of bin Laden and the four men accused of the [[1998 US embassy bombings]] in East Africa. Curtis wrote: {{blockquote|The reality was that bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri had become the focus of a loose association of disillusioned Islamist militants who were attracted by the new strategy. But there was no organization. These were militants who mostly planned their own operations and looked to bin Laden for funding and assistance. He was not their commander. There is also no evidence that bin Laden used the term "al-Qaeda" to refer to the name of a group until after September 11 attacks, when he realized that this was the term the Americans had given it.<ref name="The Power of Nightmares">[https://archive.org/details/ThePowerOfNightmares ''The Power of Nightmares''], BBC Documentary.</ref>}} During the 2001 trial, the [[United States Department of Justice|US Department of Justice]] needed to show that bin Laden was the leader of a criminal organization in order to charge him [[trial in absentia|''in absentia'']] under the [[Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act]]. The name of the organization and details of its structure were provided in the testimony of [[Jamal al-Fadl]], who said he was a founding member of the group and a former employee of bin Laden.<ref>{{cite web|last1=McCloud|first1=Kimberly|title=WMD Terrorism and Usama bin Laden|url=http://cns.miis.edu/reports/binladen.htm|work=CNS Reports|publisher=James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies|access-date=May 4, 2011|author2=Osborne, Matthew|date=March 7, 2001|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110506145417/http://cns.miis.edu/reports/binladen.htm|archive-date=May 6, 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> Questions about the reliability of al-Fadl's testimony have been raised by a number of sources because of his history of dishonesty, and because he was delivering it as part of a [[plea bargain]] agreement after being convicted of conspiring to attack US military establishments.<ref name="first informant">{{Harvnb|McGeary|2001}}.</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/02/13/Embassy.bombings.trial/|title=Witness: Bin Laden planned attack on U.S. embassy in Saudi Arabia|publisher=CNN|date=February 13, 2001|access-date=June 12, 2007|archive-date=January 4, 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070104203956/http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/02/13/Embassy.bombings.trial/|url-status=live}}</ref> Sam Schmidt, a defense attorney who defended al-Fadl, said: {{blockquote|There were selective portions of al-Fadl's testimony that I believe was false, to help support the picture that he helped the Americans join together. I think he lied in a number of specific testimony about a unified image of what this organization was. It made al-Qaeda the new Mafia or the new Communists. It made them identifiable as a group and therefore made it easier to prosecute any person associated with al-Qaeda for any acts or statements made by bin Laden.<ref name="The Power of Nightmares" />}} === Field operatives === [[File:Hamid Mir interviewing Osama bin Laden.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|Pakistani journalist [[Hamid Mir]] interviewing [[Osama bin Laden]] in Afghanistan, 1997]] The number of individuals in the group who have undergone proper military training, and are capable of commanding insurgent forces, is largely unknown. Documents captured in the raid on bin Laden's compound in 2011 show that the core al-Qaeda membership in 2002 was 170.<ref>[https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/9243503/Secret-Osama-bin-Laden-files-reveal-al-Qaeda-membership.html Secret Osama bin Laden files reveal al Qaeda membership] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180627064136/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/9243503/Secret-Osama-bin-Laden-files-reveal-al-Qaeda-membership.html |date=June 27, 2018 }}, ''The Telegraph'' accessed July 26, 2013</ref> In 2006, it was estimated that al-Qaeda had several thousand commanders embedded in 40 countries.<ref name="Cassidy">{{Harvnb|Cassidy|2006|p=9}}.</ref> {{as of|2009}}, it was believed that no more than 200–300 members were still active commanders.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.slate.com/id/2211994/|title=The Terrorists-Are-Dumb Theory: Don't mistake these guys for criminal masterminds|first1=Timothy|last1=Noah|author-link=Timothy Noah|work=Slate|date=February 25, 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090227091408/http://www.slate.com/id/2211994/|archive-date=February 27, 2009}}</ref> According to the 2004 BBC documentary ''[[The Power of Nightmares]]'', al-Qaeda was so weakly linked together that it was hard to say it existed apart from bin Laden and a small clique of close associates. The lack of any significant numbers of convicted al-Qaeda members, despite a large number of arrests on terrorism charges, was cited by the documentary as a reason to doubt whether a widespread entity that met the description of al-Qaeda existed.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Gerges|first1=Fawaz A|title=The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global|publisher=Cambridge University Press|date=2005|isbn=0-521-79140-5|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/farenemywhyjihad0000gerg}}</ref> al-Qaeda's commanders, as well as its sleeping agents, are hiding in different parts of the world to this day. They are mainly hunted by the American and Israeli secret services. === Insurgent forces === According to author Robert Cassidy, al-Qaeda maintains two separate forces which are deployed alongside insurgents in Iraq and Pakistan. The first, numbering in the tens of thousands, was "organized, trained, and equipped as insurgent combat forces" in the Soviet–Afghan war.<ref name="Cassidy" /> The force was composed primarily of foreign ''mujahideen'' from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Many of these fighters went on to fight in Bosnia and Somalia for global ''jihad''. Another group, which numbered 10,000 in 2006, live in the West and have received rudimentary combat training.<ref name="Cassidy" /> Other analysts have described al-Qaeda's rank and file as being "predominantly Arab" in its first years of operation, but that the organization also includes "other peoples" {{as of|2007|lc=y}}.<ref>[http://www.meforum.org/article/1710 Jihad's New Leaders] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070704191032/http://www.meforum.org/article/1710 |date=July 4, 2007 }} by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, ''Middle East Quarterly'', Summer 2007</ref> It has been estimated that 62 percent of al-Qaeda members have a university education.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=c841b52c-b2e7-4e41-b27e-33d10245b935&k=0|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070929120758/http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=c841b52c-b2e7-4e41-b27e-33d10245b935&k=0|url-status=dead|archive-date=September 29, 2007|title=Today's jihadists: educated, wealthy and bent on killing?|publisher=Canada.com|date=July 3, 2007|access-date=March 22, 2010}}</ref> In 2011 and the following year, the Americans successfully settled accounts with Osama bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, the organization's chief propagandist, and Abu Yahya al-Libi's deputy commander. The optimistic voices were already saying it was over for al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, it was around this time that the Arab Spring greeted the region, the turmoil of which came great to al-Qaeda's regional forces. Seven years later, Ayman al-Zawahiri became arguably the number one leader in the organization, implementing his strategy with systematic consistency. Tens of thousands loyal to al-Qaeda and related organizations were able to challenge local and regional stability and ruthlessly attack their enemies in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe and Russia alike. In fact, from Northwest Africa to South Asia, al-Qaeda had more than two dozen "franchise-based" allies. The number of al-Qaeda militants was set at 20,000 in Syria alone, and they had 4,000 members in Yemen and about 7,000 in Somalia. The war was not over.<ref name=CFR2021>{{Cite web|title=Al-Qaeda's Resurrection|url=https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection|access-date=March 3, 2021|website=Council on Foreign Relations|archive-date=August 23, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210823041933/https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection|url-status=live}}</ref> In 2001, al-Qaeda had around 20 functioning cells and 70,000 insurgents spread over sixty nations.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=J. Tompkins, Crossett|first1=Paul, Chuck|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SPZdWxjMd6cC|title=Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962-2009|last2=Spitaletta, Marshal|first2=Jason, Shana|publisher=United States Army Special Operations Command|year=2012|location=Fort Bragg, North Carolina|pages=544|chapter=19- Al-Qaeda: 1988–2001}}</ref> According to latest estimates, the number of active-duty soldiers under its command and allied militias have risen to approximately 250,000 by 2018.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Klausen|first=Jytte|title=Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2021|isbn=978-0-19-887079-1|location=United Kingdom|pages=1|chapter=1: Introduction}}</ref> === Financing === Al-Qaeda usually does not disburse funds for attacks, and very rarely makes wire transfers.<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Eichenwald|first1=Kurt|author-link=Kurt Eichenwald|title=A Nation Challenged: The Money; Terror Money Hard to Block, Officials Find|work=The New York Times|date=December 10, 2001|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/10/world/a-nation-challenged-the-money-terror-money-hard-to-block-officials-find.html|access-date=May 4, 2011|archive-date=February 19, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110219091943/http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/10/world/a-nation-challenged-the-money-terror-money-hard-to-block-officials-find.html|url-status=live}}</ref> In the 1990s, financing came partly from the personal wealth of Osama bin Laden.<ref name="Forbes_May_5_2011">[https://www.forbes.com/2001/09/14/0914whoisobl.html Who is Bin Laden?] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170729115149/https://www.forbes.com/2001/09/14/0914whoisobl.html |date=July 29, 2017 }}. Retrieved May 5, 2011</ref> Other sources of income included the [[heroin trade]] and donations from supporters in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic [[Arab states of the Persian Gulf|Gulf states]].<ref name="Forbes_May_5_2011" /> A 2009 [[United States diplomatic cables leak|leaked diplomatic cable]] stated that "terrorist funding emanating from Saudi Arabia remains a serious concern."<ref>Eric Lichtbau and Eric Schmitt [https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/06/world/middleeast/06wikileaks-financing.html Cash Flow to Terrorists Evades U.S. Efforts] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170307185846/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/06/world/middleeast/06wikileaks-financing.html|date=March 7, 2017 }} ''[[The New York Times]]'', December 5, 2010</ref> Among the first pieces of evidence regarding Saudi Arabia's support for al-Qaeda was the so-called "[[The Golden Chain|Golden Chain]]", a list of early al-Qaeda funders seized during a 2002 raid in Sarajevo by Bosnian police.<ref name="history commons">{{cite web|url=http://www.historycommons.org/searchResults.jsp?searchtext=al-qaeda%20saudi%20arabia&events=on&entities=on&articles=on&topics=on&timelines=on&projects=on&titles=on&descriptions=on&dosearch=on&search=Go|title=History Commons|access-date=June 21, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160805191322/http://www.historycommons.org/searchResults.jsp?searchtext=al-qaeda%20saudi%20arabia&events=on&entities=on&articles=on&topics=on&timelines=on&projects=on&titles=on&descriptions=on&dosearch=on&search=Go|archive-date=August 5, 2016|url-status=dead}}</ref> The hand-written list was validated by al-Qaeda defector Jamal al-Fadl, and included the names of both donors and beneficiaries.<ref name="history commons" /><ref name="auto">[https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/United_States_of_America_v._Usama_bin_Laden/Day_2_6_February_2001 United States of America v. Usama bin Laden] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150710090442/https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/United_States_of_America_v._Usama_bin_Laden/Day_2_6_February_2001 |date=July 10, 2015 }}. Wikisource. Retrieved June 10, 2016.</ref> Osama bin-Laden's name appeared seven times among the beneficiaries, while 20 Saudi and Gulf-based businessmen and politicians were listed among the donors.<ref name="history commons" /> Notable donors included Adel Batterjee, and [[Wael Hamza Julaidan]]. Batterjee was designated as a terror financier by the US Department of the Treasury in 2004, and Julaidan is recognized as one of al-Qaeda's founders.<ref name="history commons" /> Documents seized during the 2002 Bosnia raid showed that al-Qaeda widely exploited charities to channel financial and material support to its operatives across the globe.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB104794563734573400|title=List of Early al Qaeda Donors Points to Saudi Elite, Charities|first1=Glenn R.|last1=Simpson|date=March 19, 2003|access-date=June 21, 2016|newspaper=The Wall Street Journal|archive-date=August 22, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190822011925/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB104794563734573400|url-status=live}}</ref> Notably, this activity exploited the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the Muslim World League (MWL). The IIRO had ties with al-Qaeda associates worldwide, including al-Qaeda's deputy Ayman al Zawahiri. Zawahiri's brother worked for the IIRO in Albania and had actively recruited on behalf of al-Qaeda.<ref name="steve emerson">Emerson, Steve (2006). ''Jihad Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the US''. Prometheus Books. p. 382.</ref> The MWL was openly identified by al-Qaeda's leader as one of the three charities al-Qaeda primarily relied upon for funding sources.<ref name="steve emerson" /> ==== Allegations of Qatari support ==== {{See also|Qatar and state-sponsored terrorism|Qatar diplomatic crisis}} Several Qatari citizens have been accused of funding al-Qaeda. This includes [[Abd Al-Rahman al-Nuaimi]], a Qatari citizen and a human-rights activist who founded the Swiss-based [[non-governmental organization]] (NGO) [[Alkarama]]. On December 18, 2013, the [[US Treasury]] designated Nuaimi as a terrorist for his activities supporting al-Qaeda.<ref name="treasury press">{{cite web|url=https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2249.aspx|title=Treasury Designates Al-Qa'ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen|access-date=June 21, 2016|archive-date=May 8, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190508002454/https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/jl2249.aspx|url-status=live}}</ref> The US Treasury has said Nuaimi "has facilitated significant financial support to al-Qaeda in Iraq, and served as an interlocutor between al-Qaeda in [[Iraq]] and Qatar-based donors".<ref name="treasury press" /> Nuaimi was accused of overseeing a $2{{spaces}}million monthly transfer to al-Qaeda in Iraq as part of his role as [[mediation|mediator]] between Iraq-based al-Qaeda senior officers and Qatari citizens.<ref name="treasury press" /><ref name="fiscal times qatar">{{cite web|url=http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/12/29/How-Qatar-Funding-al-Qaeda-and-Why-Could-Help-US|title=How Qatar Is Funding al-Qaeda – and Why That Could Help the US|access-date=June 21, 2016|archive-date=January 23, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190123003345/http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/12/29/How-Qatar-Funding-al-Qaeda-and-Why-Could-Help-US|url-status=live}}</ref> Nuaimi allegedly entertained relationships with Abu-Khalid al-Suri, al-Qaeda's top envoy in Syria, who processed a $600,000 transfer to al-Qaeda in 2013.<ref name="treasury press" /><ref name="fiscal times qatar" /> Nuaimi is also known to be associated with Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Humayqani, a [[Yemen]]i politician and founding member of [[Alkarama]], who was listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) by the US Treasury in 2013.<ref name="bin ki moon">{{cite web|url=http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/ban-ki-moon-shakes-hands-with-alleged-al-qaeda-emir.php|title=Ban Ki-Moon shakes hands with alleged al Qaeda emir|website=The Long War Journal|date=June 23, 2015|access-date=June 21, 2016|archive-date=May 19, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190519235851/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/ban-ki-moon-shakes-hands-with-alleged-al-qaeda-emir.php|url-status=live}}</ref> The US authorities claimed that Humayqani exploited his role in Alkarama to fundraise on behalf of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).<ref name="treasury press" /><ref name="bin ki moon" /> A prominent figure in AQAP, Nuaimi was also reported to have facilitated the flow of funding to AQAP affiliates based in Yemen. Nuaimi was also accused of investing funds in the charity directed by Humayqani to ultimately fund AQAP.<ref name="treasury press" /> About ten months after being sanctioned by the US Treasury, Nuaimi was also restrained from doing business in the UK.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11172244/Terrorist-paymaster-targeted-by-Britain.html|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220110/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11172244/Terrorist-paymaster-targeted-by-Britain.html|archive-date=January 10, 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|title=Terrorist paymaster targeted by Britain|date=October 18, 2014|access-date=June 21, 2016}}{{cbignore}}</ref> Another Qatari citizen, Kalifa Mohammed Turki Subayi, was sanctioned by the US Treasury on June 5, 2008, for his activities as a "Gulf-based Al-Qaeda financier". Subayi's name was added to the [[UN Security Council]]'s Sanctions List in 2008 on charges of providing financial and material support to al-Qaeda senior leadership.<ref name="fiscal times qatar" /><ref name="un press">{{cite web|url=https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11790.doc.htm|title=Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Amends One Entry on Its Sanctions List – Meetings Coverage and Press Releases|access-date=June 21, 2016|archive-date=November 5, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161105193910/http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11790.doc.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> Subayi allegedly moved al-Qaeda recruits to South Asia-based training camps.<ref name="fiscal times qatar" /><ref name="un press" /> He also financially supported Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a Pakistani national and senior al-Qaeda officer who is believed to be the mastermind behind the September 11 attack according to the ''[[9/11 Commission Report]]''.<ref name="9-11commission.gov">{{Cite web|url=http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf|archive-date=October 9, 2022|url-status=live|title=The 9/11 Commission Report<!--bot generated title-->}}</ref> Qataris provided support to al-Qaeda through the country's largest NGO, the [[Qatar Charity]]. Al-Qaeda defector al-Fadl, who was a former member of Qatar Charity, testified in court that Abdullah Mohammed Yusef, who served as Qatar Charity's director, was affiliated to al-Qaeda and simultaneously to the [[National Islamic Front]], a political group that gave al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden harbor in [[Sudan]] in the early 1990s.<ref name="auto" /> It was alleged that in 1993 [[Osama bin Laden]] was using [[Middle East]] based [[Sunni]] charities to channel financial support to al-Qaeda operatives overseas. The same documents also report Bin Laden's complaint that the failed assassination attempt of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had compromised the ability of al-Qaeda to exploit charities to support its operatives to the extent it was capable of before 1995.<ref>{{Cite web|date=January 1, 2024|title=Osama bin Laden {{!}} Biography, al-Qaeda, Terrorist Attacks, Death, & Facts|url=https://www.britannica.com/biography/Osama-bin-Laden|access-date=January 28, 2024|website=Encyclopædia Britannica|archive-date=June 16, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150616235439/https://www.britannica.com/biography/Osama-bin-Laden|url-status=live}}</ref> Qatar financed al-Qaeda's enterprises through al-Qaeda's former affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra. The funding was primarily channeled through [[kidnapping]] for ransom.<ref name="funding al nusra">{{cite web|url=http://stopterrorfinance.org/blog/510652383-funding-al-nusra-through-ransom-qatar-and-the-myth-of-humanitarian-principle|title=Funding Al Nusra Through Ransom: Qatar and the Myth of 'Humanitarian Principle'|first1=CATF|last1=Reports|website=stopterrorfinance.org|access-date=June 6, 2017}}</ref> The Consortium Against Terrorist Finance (CATF) reported that the Gulf country has funded al-Nusra since 2013.<ref name="funding al nusra" /> In 2017, ''[[Asharq Al-Awsat]]'' estimated that Qatar had disbursed $25{{spaces}}million in support of al-Nusra through kidnapping for ransom.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://aawsat.com/home/article/510121/%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-25-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%80%C2%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9%C2%BB-%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B4-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84|title=صفقة العسكريين: 25 مليون دولار لـ"النصرة"... وهامش تحرك في عرسال|website=الشرق الأوسط|access-date=November 12, 2019|archive-date=November 12, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191112020038/https://aawsat.com/home/article/510121/%25D8%25B5%25D9%2581%25D9%2582%25D8%25A9-%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25B9%25D8%25B3%25D9%2583%25D8%25B1%25D9%258A%25D9%258A%25D9%2586-25-%25D9%2585%25D9%2584%25D9%258A%25D9%2588%25D9%2586-%25D8%25AF%25D9%2588%25D9%2584%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B1-%25D9%2584%25D9%2580%25C2%25AB%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D9%2586%25D8%25B5%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A9%25C2%25BB-%25D9%2588%25D9%2587%25D8%25A7%25D9%2585%25D8%25B4-%25D8%25AA%25D8%25AD%25D8%25B1%25D9%2583-%25D9%2581%25D9%258A-%25D8%25B9%25D8%25B1%25D8%25B3%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584|url-status=live}}</ref> In addition, Qatar has launched fundraising campaigns on behalf of al-Nusra. Al-Nusra acknowledged a Qatar-sponsored campaign "as one of the preferred conduits for donations intended for the group".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syrian-conflict-said-to-fuel-sectarian-tensions-in-persian-gulf/2013/12/18/e160ad82-6831-11e3-8b5b-a77187b716a3_story.html|title=Syrian conflict said to fuel sectarian tensions in Persian Gulf|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|access-date=June 21, 2016|archive-date=January 26, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210126131441/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syrian-conflict-said-to-fuel-sectarian-tensions-in-persian-gulf/2013/12/18/e160ad82-6831-11e3-8b5b-a77187b716a3_story.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/08/analysis-qatar-still-negligent-on-terror-finance.php|title=Analysis: Qatar still negligent on terror finance – The Long War Journal|date=August 19, 2015|access-date=June 21, 2016|archive-date=April 17, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210417142200/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/08/analysis-qatar-still-negligent-on-terror-finance.php|url-status=live}}</ref>
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