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Alliance
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== Effects == Scholars are divided as to the impact of alliances. Several studies find that defensive alliances deter conflict.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Fang|first1=Songying|last2=Johnson|first2=Jesse C.|last3=Leeds|first3=Brett Ashley|author-link3=Brett Ashley Leeds|date=2014-10-01|title=To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances|journal=International Organization|volume=68|issue=4|pages=775β809|doi=10.1017/S0020818314000137|s2cid=49250140 |issn=0020-8183}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Leeds|first1=Brett Ashley|last2=Johnson|first2=Jesse C.|date=2016-11-10|title=Theory, Data, and Deterrence: A Response to Kenwick, Vasquez, and Powers|journal=The Journal of Politics|pages=335β340|doi=10.1086/687285|issn=0022-3816|volume=79|s2cid=55385304 |url=https://uknowledge.uky.edu/polsci_facpub/7|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Johnson|first1=Jesse C.|last2=Leeds|first2=Brett Ashley|date=2011-01-01|title=Defense Pacts: A Prescription for Peace?1|journal=Foreign Policy Analysis|language=en|volume=7|issue=1|pages=45β65|doi=10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00122.x|issn=1743-8594}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Leeds|first=Brett Ashley|date=2003-07-01|title=Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes|journal=American Journal of Political Science|language=en|volume=47|issue=3|pages=427β439|doi=10.1111/1540-5907.00031|issn=1540-5907}}</ref> One study questions these findings, showing that alliance commitments deterred conflict in the prenuclear era but has no statistically meaningful impact on war in the postnuclear era.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Kenwick|first1=Michael R.|last2=Vasquez|first2=John A.|last3=Powers|first3=Matthew A.|s2cid=9921552|date=2015-10-01|title=Do Alliances Really Deter?|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=77|issue=4|pages=943β954|doi=10.1086/681958|issn=0022-3816}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Kenwick|first1=Michael R.|last2=Vasquez|first2=John A.|date=2016-11-10|title=Defense Pacts and Deterrence: Caveat Emptor|journal=The Journal of Politics|pages=329β334|doi=10.1086/686700|issn=0022-3816|volume=79|s2cid=157263860 }}</ref> Another study finds that while alliance commitments deter conflict between sides with a recent history of conflict, alliances tend to provoke conflicts between states without such a history.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Morrow|first=James D.|date=2016-11-10|title=When Do Defensive Alliances Provoke Rather than Deter?|journal=The Journal of Politics|pages=341β345|doi=10.1086/686973|issn=0022-3816|volume=79|s2cid=157788422 }}</ref> A 2000 study in the ''[[Journal of Conflict Resolution]]'' found that allies fulfill their alliance commitments approximately 75% of the time.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Leeds|first=Brett Ashley|date=2003-01-01|title=Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties|journal=International Organization|volume=57|issue=4|pages=801β827|doi=10.1017/s0020818303574057|jstor=3594847|s2cid=154260997 }}</ref> Most research suggests that democracies are more reliable allies than non-democracies.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/05/31/allies-cant-rely-on-america-like-they-used-to-and-not-just-because-of-trump/|title=Analysis {{!}} Allies can't rely on America like they used to. And not just because of Trump.|newspaper=Washington Post|access-date=2017-05-31}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Gaubatz|first=Kurt Taylor|date=1996-01-01|title=Democratic states and commitment in international relations|journal=International Organization|volume=50|issue=1|pages=109β139|doi=10.1017/S0020818300001685|s2cid=154562172 |issn=1531-5088}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Leeds|first1=Brett Ashley|last2=Mattes|first2=Michaela|last3=Vogel|first3=Jeremy S.|date=2009-04-01|title=Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments|journal=American Journal of Political Science|language=en|volume=53|issue=2|pages=461β476|doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00381.x|issn=1540-5907}}</ref> A 2004 study did however question whether alliance commitments by democracies are more durable.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Gartzke|first1=Erik|last2=Gleditsch|first2=Kristian Skrede|date=2004-10-01|title=Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies|journal=American Journal of Political Science|language=en|volume=48|issue=4|pages=775β795|doi=10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00101.x|issn=1540-5907}}</ref> A 2018 study updated and extended the data from the 2000 ''Journal of Conflict Resolution'' study and found that allies only fulfill their commitments about 50% of the time from 1816 to 2003.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|date=2018|title=Reassessing the fulfillment of alliance commitments in war|journal=Research & Politics|volume=5|issue=2|pages=205316801877969|doi=10.1177/2053168018779697|last1=Berkemeier|first1=Molly|last2=Fuhrmann|first2=Matthew|doi-access=free}}</ref> According to the study, "States honored their alliance commitments 66% of the time prior to 1945 but the compliance rate drops to 22% from 1945 to 2003. Moreover, the rates of fulfillment for defense pacts (41%) and nonaggression pacts (37%) are dramatically lower than offensive alliances (74%) and neutrality agreements (78%)."<ref name=":0" /> One of the most profound effects of alliances can be seen in technological innovation, due to conduits of knowledge flows that are open between allies but closed between rivals.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Schmid|first1=Jon|last2=Brummer|first2=Matthew|last3=Taylor|first3=Mark Zachary|date=2017|title=Innovation and Alliances|journal=Review of Policy Research|language=en|volume=34|issue=5|pages=588β616|doi=10.1111/ropr.12244|issn=1541-1338}}</ref>
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