Editing Analytic philosophy (section)

== Emergence in Germany and Austria ==
[[File:Franz Brentano in Vienna, 1890.png|thumb|upright=0.8|Franz Brentano introduced the problem of intentionality.]]
Analytic philosophy was deeply influenced by what is called [[Austrian realism]] in the former state of [[Austria-Hungary]], so much so that Michael Dummett has remarked that analytic philosophy is better characterized as Anglo-Austrian rather than the usual Anglo-American.<ref>{{Harvnb|Dummett|1993|page=2}}</ref>

[[University of Vienna]] philosopher and psychologist [[Franz Brentano]]—in ''[[Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint]]'' (1874) and through the subsequent influence of the [[School of Brentano]] and its members, such as [[Edmund Husserl]] and [[Alexius Meinong]]—gave to analytic philosophy the problem of [[intentionality]] or of aboutness.<ref>{{Harvnb|Dummett|1993|page=28}}</ref> For Brentano, all mental events have a real, non-mental intentional object, which the thinking is directed at or "about".

Meinong is known for his unique [[ontology]] of real [[nonexistent objects]] as a solution to the problem of [[empty name]]s.<ref>Everett, Anthony and [[Thomas Hofweber]] (eds.) (2000), ''Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence.''</ref> The [[Graz School]] followed Meinong. The Polish [[Lwów–Warsaw school]], founded by [[Kazimierz Twardowski]] in 1895, grew as an offshoot of the Graz School. It was closely associated with the [[Warsaw School of Mathematics]].

=== Frege ===
[[File:Young frege.jpg|thumb|upright=0.8|Gottlob Frege, the father of analytic philosophy]]
[[Gottlob Frege]] (1848–1925) was a German [[geometry]] professor at the [[University of Jena]] who is understood as the father of analytic philosophy. Frege proved influential as a [[philosopher of mathematics]] in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century. He advocated [[logicism]], the project of reducing [[arithmetic]] to pure logic.

==== Logic ====
As a result of his logicist project, Frege developed [[predicate logic]] in his book ''[[Begriffsschrift]]'' (English: ''Concept-script'', 1879), which allowed for a much greater range of sentences to be parsed into logical form than was possible using the ancient [[Aristotelian logic]]. An example of this is the [[problem of multiple generality]].

==== Number ====
[[Neo-Kantianism]] dominated the late 19th century in German philosophy. Edmund Husserl's 1891 book ''[[Philosophy of Arithmetic|Philosophie der Arithmetik]]'' argued that the concept of the [[cardinal number]] derived from psychical acts of grouping objects and counting them.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Willard |first=Dallas |title=Husserl on a Logic that Failed |journal=Philosophical Review |pages=52–53 |volume=89 |issue=1 |jstor=2184863 |year=1980}}</ref>

In contrast to this "[[psychologism]]", Frege in ''[[The Foundations of Arithmetic]]'' (1884) and ''The Basic Laws of Arithmetic'' ({{langx|de|link=no|Grundgesetze der Arithmetik}}, 1893–1903), argued similarly to [[Mathematical platonism|Plato]] or [[Bernard Bolzano|Bolzano]] that mathematics and logic have their own public objects, independent of the private judgments or mental states of individual mathematicians and logicians. Following Frege, the logicists tended to advocate a kind of [[Philosophy of mathematics|mathematical Platonism]].

==== Language ====
Frege also proved influential in the [[philosophy of language]] and analytic philosophy's interest in [[Semantics|meaning]].<ref name="Speaks">Jeff Speaks, [https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/2011-12/83104/handouts/frege-reference.pdf "Frege's theory of reference"] (2011)</ref> [[Michael Dummett]] traces the [[linguistic turn]] to Frege's ''Foundations of Arithmetic'' and his [[context principle]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Dummett|1993|p=5}}</ref>

Frege's paper "[[On Sense and Reference]]" (1892) is seminal, containing [[Frege's puzzles]] and providing a [[mediated reference theory]]. His paper "[[The Thought]]: A Logical Inquiry" (1918) reflects both his anti-idealism or anti-psychologism and his interest in language. In the paper, he argues for a [[Platonist]] account of [[proposition]]s or thoughts.