Editing Anglo-Russian Convention (section)

== Background ==
{{Further|International relations of the Great Powers (1814–1919)#The Eastern Question}}
During the last third of the nineteenth century, the [[Russian Empire]]'s advances into [[Central Asia]] and the consolidation of Great Britain's domination of [[South Asia]] led to intense rivalry between the two European powers. The conflicting interests centered on Afghanistan, Iran, and Tibet, three states that constituted buffers between the two powers. The emergence of the [[German Empire]] as a world power and the defeat in 1905 of Russia by a nascent Asian power, the [[Empire of Japan]], in the [[Russo-Japanese War]], helped to persuade some British and Russian officials of a need to resolve their respective differences in Asia.<ref name="SiegelSiegel2002">{{cite book |author1=Siegel |first=Jennifer |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sY2UYtcAfd8C |title=Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia |date=2002 |publisher=I.B.Tauris |isbn=978-1-85043-371-2 |page=177}}</ref>{{Failed verification|date=May 2024|reason=The page number looks wrong}} There was talk of an entente during the 1880s and 1890s, especially after Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882. However, there was stiff resistance in Britain to a deal with Russia.{{sfn|Langer|1929|p=68}} In the leadup to the convention, there were discussions on the [[Turkish Straits |Straits question]]. [[Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (UK)|Foreign Minister]] Sir [[Edward Grey, 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon|Edward Grey]] thought entente with Russia a good idea. On 20 October 1905, during the election, he said:{{sfn|Langer|1929|p=67}}
<blockquote>...if Russia accepts, cordially and whole-heartedly, our intention to preserve the peaceable possession of our Asiatic possessions, then I am quite sure that in this country no government will make it its business to thwart or obstruct Russia's policy in Europe. On the contrary, it is urgently desirable that Russia's position and influence be re-established in the councils of Europe.</blockquote>
and later, writing to his ambassador to Russia Sir [[Arthur_Nicolson, 1st Baron Carnock|Arthur Nicolson]]:{{sfn|Langer|1929|p=68}}
<blockquote>It is not for us to propose changes with regard to the treaty conditions of the Dardanelles. I  think some change in the direction desired by Russia would be admissible and we should be prepared to discuss the question if Russia introduces it.</blockquote>
In early 1907, [[Alexander Izvolsky]], the Russian ambassador at Paris, raised the question and talks were carried on in London with Russian Ambassador [[Count Alexander Benckendorff]]. Little is known but the "suggestion appears to have been made that Russia should have free egress from the Black Sea through the Straits, while other powers should have the right to send their vessels of war into the Straits without going into the Black Sea" together with some talk of "Russia's occupying the Bosphorus and England the Dardanelles, after which the Straits might be opened to other warships as well." In the event nothing came of the discussions at the time.{{sfn|Langer|1929|p=68}}

=== Rise of Germany ===
{{Main|History of German foreign policy#1871–1919}}
{{Events leading to World War I}}
On May 20, 1882, Germany entered into the [[Triple Alliance (1882)|Triple Alliance]] with [[Kingdom of Italy|Italy]] and [[Austria-Hungary]], complementing its industrial and socio-political ascendance in the world arena. Furthermore, Germany dramatically increased its military output from the early 1900s up to the outbreak of the First World War. Under the [[Unification of Germany|unified]] German state, [[Otto von Bismarck]] worked to increase the nation's global influence and reach what was then the zenith of German power. While Britain and Russia were hostile to German designs in the region, members of the Triple Alliance were in turn opposed to Anglo-Russian influence in Asia. Thus, military and territorial expansion was Germany's key to making itself a major player in the international arena of power. Germany's interest in the Middle East took a secondary position, one subordinate to Germany's primary policy toward Europe, throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries. While of secondary importance, it was a tool that was used to manipulate the Middle Eastern attempt to play off the Western powers against each other. Berlin peacefully made inroads into the [[Ottoman Empire]] and had few colonial aspirations in the region.<ref>Erich Eyck, ''Bismarck and the German Empire'' (1963) pp 261–297. [https://archive.org/details/bismarckgermanem0000unse online].</ref>

=== Trouble in Persia ===
{{see also|Persian Constitutional Revolution|Russian Empire involvement in the Persian Constitutional Revolution}}

In 1905, revolutionary activity spread throughout [[Tehran]], forcing the [[Mozaffar ad-Din Shah Qajar|shah]] to accept a [[Persian Constitution of 1906|constitution]], allow the formation of a ''[[majles]]'' (parliamentary assembly), and hold elections. Major figures in the revolution had secular goals, which then created rifts in the clergy to the advantage of the monarchy. Neither the British nor the Russian governments approved of the new political arrangement, which was both liberal and unstable, and preferred a stable [[puppet government]], which allowed foreign concessions and supported their designs in the region.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.magepublishers.com/the-strangling-of-persia-a-story-of-european-diplomacy-and-oriental-intrigue/|author=[[Morgan Shuster]]|title = The Strangling of Persia: A Story of European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue|page=283}}</ref>

To facilitate their goals in Persia, the British and the Russian governments discussed splitting it into three zones. The agreement stipulated that it would "allocate the north, including [[Isfahan]], to Russia; the south-east, especially [[Kerman Province|Kerman]], [[Sistan]], and [[Balochistan (region)|Baluchistan]] to Britain; and demarcate the remaining land between the two powers as a neutral zone". The division of Persia would reinforce the control of Britain and Russia over their respective territorial and economic interests in the country as well as allowed for continued interference in Persia's political system. With foreign help, the revolutionaries became outflanked by a combination of European and monarchist activities. The Persian government quickly came to realise that an Anglo-Russian alliance posed a larger threat to Iranian sovereignty than the two powers being hostile.<ref>Beryl J. Williams, "The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente of August 1907." ''Historical Journal'' 9#3 (1966): 360–73. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2637986 online].</ref> Consequently, in 1907, Britain and Russia signed an agreement to regulate their economic and political interests.