Editing Anti-Comintern Pact (section)

== Background ==
{{Events leading to World War II}}{{See also|Causes of World War II}}

=== Germany ===

==== "Anti-Komintern" (GDAV) ====
The ''[[Anti-Komintern]]'', officially the ''Gesamtverband Deutscher antikommunistischer Vereinigungen'' (abbr. GDAV, 'general association of German anti-communist federations'),<ref name="Waddington-2007">{{Cite journal |last=Waddington |first=Lorna L. |date=2007 |title=The Anti-Komintern and Nazi Anti-Bolshevik Propaganda in the 1930s |journal=Journal of Contemporary History |volume=42 |issue=4 |pages=573–594 |doi=10.1177/0022009407081488 |issn=0022-0094 |jstor=30036470 |s2cid=159672850}}</ref>{{Rp|576}} was a German agency established by [[Joseph Goebbels]] in 1933.<ref name="Waddington-2007" />{{Rp|573}} Its activities covered a wide range of operations designed to denounce communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular,<ref name="Waddington-2007" />{{Rp|580}} push [[antisemitic]] propaganda and garner domestic and international support for Nazi policy.<ref name="Waddington-2007" />{{Rp|574}} It was placed under the leadership Dr. [[Adolf Ehrt]] [<nowiki/>[[:de:Adolf Ehrt|de]]]. Under Ehrt's leadership, the Comintern was denounced as 'godless' in reference to its [[atheism]].<ref name="Waddington-2007" />{{Rp|581}} Beginning in July 1936, the [[Spanish Civil War]] became a main focus for the Anti-Komintern's publications.<ref name="Waddington-2007" />{{Rp|580}}

One of the Anti-Komintern's most significant outputs was the 1936 international release ''Der Weltbolschewismus'', in which it connected various anti-communist and anti-semitic conspiracy theories for the consumption of the international audience. The book was not released in Germany itself to avoid conflict between the book's varied accounts with German state propaganda.<ref name="Waddington-2007" />{{Rp|581}}

==== Anglo-German Naval Agreement ====
{{Main|Anglo-German Naval Agreement}}

On 18 June 1935, the United Kingdom and Germany signed the [[Anglo-German Naval Agreement]], which came as a surprise to the Japanese.<ref name="Boyd-1977">{{Cite journal |last=Boyd |first=Carl |date=1977 |title=The Role of Hiroshi Ōshima in the Preparation of the Anti-Comintern Pact |journal=Journal of Asian History |volume=11 |issue=1 |pages=49–71 |jstor=41930226}}</ref>{{Rp|53}} This marked the beginning of a series of attempts by [[Adolf Hitler]] to improve relations between the two countries. In Hitler's mind, a positive relationship towards the United Kingdom would weaken Britain's allies France and Italy (at that point still a German rival) and contain the Soviet Union.<ref name="Shirer-1960">{{Cite book |last=Shirer |first=William L. |title=The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany |publisher=Simon and Schuster, Inc. |year=1960 |edition=1st |location=New York |lccn=60-6729 |author-link=William L. Shirer}}</ref>{{Rp|289}} Hitler would later also send Ribbentrop to London with the specific task of securing British membership in the Anti-Comintern Pact during his 1936–1938 tenure as [[German Ambassador to the United Kingdom|German ambassador to the United Kingdom]], declaring British accession into the pact as his 'greatest wish'.<ref name="Michalka-1980">{{Cite book |last=Michalka |first=Wolfgang |url=https://digi20.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb00046007_00001.html |title=Ribbentrop und die deutsche Weltpolitik |publisher=Wilhelm Fink Verlag |year=1980 |isbn=3770514009 |location=Munich |language=de}}</ref>{{Rp|154–155}}<ref name="Steiner-2011">{{Cite book |last=Steiner |first=Zara |title=The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933–1939 |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2011 |isbn=9780199212002}}</ref>{{Rp|262–263}}

In Japan, the treaty was viewed with suspicion. Mushanokōji on 4 July 1935 in an embassy meeting{{Efn-la|Attendees of the embassy meeting: Kintomo Mushanokōji, Hiroshi Ōshima, Kojiro Inoue, Dr. Hiroo Furuuchi, Tadao Yokoi.|name=|group=}} stated his opinion that it would be unwise for Japan to rush into an alliance with Germany, as he (correctly) interpreted the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as a German attempt to ally the UK. The United States and Britain had been hostile towards Japan ever since the [[Mukden Incident]] of 1931, and Mushanokōji feared that Japan might isolate itself if Germany ended up choosing a partnership with Britain over a partnership with Japan.<ref name="Boyd-1977" />{{Rp|53}}

==== Competing authorities and ideologies in German foreign policy ====

The execution of German foreign policy was nominally left to [[Konstantin von Neurath]]'s foreign ministry, but [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] headed the semi-autonomous ''Dienststelle Ribbentrop'', created in late 1934,<ref name="Stratman-1970">{{Cite book |last=Stratman |first=George John |url=https://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3469&context=etd |title=Germany's diplomatic relations with Japan 1933–1941 |publisher=University of Montana |year=1970 |series=Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers |volume=2450}}</ref>{{Rp|14}} where he could carry out Hitler's personal foreign policy requests independently from foreign ministry consent. This created a rivalry between the two services.<ref name="Boyd-1977" />{{Rp|62}} While Hitler favored Ribbentrop as his personal foreign policy champion, he at least initially maintained Neurath's staff of career diplomats to maximize his government's diplomatic legitimacy abroad.<ref name="Stratman-1970" />{{Rp|12}} [[Hiroshi Ōshima]], Japanese military attaché in Berlin and the single most important individual on the Japanese side of the Anti-Comintern Pact's negotiations, interpreted the German foreign service structure as one where the power structure was such that "it was only Hitler and Ribbentrop who decided foreign policy, and that it was therefore of no use to talk to their subordinates". Ōshima thus attempted to get any important step of the negotiations to Ribbentrop's or Hitler's desks directly.<ref name="Boyd-1981">{{Cite journal |last=Boyd |first=Carl |date=1981 |title=The Berlin-Tokyo Axis and Japanese Military Initiative |journal=Modern Asian Studies |volume=15 |issue=2 |pages=311–338 |doi=10.1017/S0026749X00007095 |jstor=312095 |s2cid=145782449}}</ref>{{Rp|316–317}}[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-H04810, Joachim von Ribbentrop.jpg|thumb|[[Joachim von Ribbentrop]]]]

While Ribbentrop was Hitler's personal diplomat of choice, his personal view on geostrategic diplomacy varied quite distinctly from Hitler's during the late 1930s. Whereas Hitler favored a friendly policy towards Britain to eliminate the Soviet Union,<ref name="Michalka-1980" />{{Rp|154–155}} Ribbentrop saw the western allies as Germany's main enemy and designed much of German foreign policy, including the Anti-Comintern Pact, with the goal to contain the British Empire in mind as well.<ref name="Macmillan-1985">{{Cite book |title=Aspects of the Third Reich |publisher=Macmillan |year=1985 |isbn=9781349178919 |editor-last=Koch |editor-first=Hannsjoachim W. |location=Houndmills}}</ref>{{Rp|268}} When it came to Japan, Ribbentrop believed that the Japanese focus on the Soviet Union as its main antagonist could be redirected towards the United Kingdom also, thus enabling Japan to be a partner in Ribbentrop's anti-British coalition.<ref name="Macmillan-1985" />{{Rp|271}}

German alignment with Japan, against the wishes of the traditionally sinophile German foreign service and German public at large, began at the end of 1933.<ref name="Martin-1970">{{Cite journal |last=Martin |first=Bernd |date=1970 |title=Zur Vorgeschichte des deutsch-japanischen Kriegsbündnisses |url=https://freidok.uni-freiburg.de/data/2049 |journal=Wissenschaft und Unterricht |language=de |volume=21 |pages=606–615 |via=FreiDok plus}}</ref>{{Rp|609}}

==== German-Soviet interwar treaties ====
During the time of the [[Weimar Republic]], the German government had made major treaties with the USSR, including the [[1922 Treaty of Rapallo]] and the [[Treaty of Berlin (1926)|1926 Treaty of Berlin]].{{Efn-la|The Treaty of Berlin had built on the Treaty of Rapallo and designated it the basis of German-Soviet relations. This declaration by Weimar Germany had been seamlessly carried over into the Nazi state, which affirmed and extend the Treaty of Berlin on 5 May 1933.|name=|group=}}<ref name="Deist-1990">{{Cite book |last1=Deist |first1=Wilhelm |title=The Build-up of German Aggression |last2=Messerschmidt |first2=Manfred |last3=Volkmann |first3=Hans-Erich |last4=Wette |first4=Wolfram |publisher=Clarendon Press |year=1990 |isbn=019822866X |series=Germany and the Second World War |volume=1 |location=Oxford |translator-last=Falla |translator-first=P. S. |display-authors=1 |author-link=Wilhelm Deist}}</ref>{{Rp|575}}

Germany was already agitating against the Soviet Union in 1935 when after a previous [[German–Polish declaration of non-aggression]], through [[Hermann Goring]] proposed a military alliance with Poland against the Soviet Union, but this was rejected. Germany made later approaches to Poland nevertheless.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Weinberg |first1=Gerhard L. |title=Hitler's Foreign Policy 1933–1939: The Road to World War II |date=1 March 2010 |publisher=Enigma Books |isbn=978-1-936274-84-0 |page=152 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=o5FiQbU_nAkC&dq=goring+poland+alliance&pg=PA152 |access-date=25 July 2024 |language=en}}</ref>

In a note on the day of the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact, 25 November 1936, Ribbentrop informed Mushanokōji that the German government viewed these two treaties' terms as void under the secret additional protocol.<ref name="Weinberg-1954" />{{Rp|199}} Mushanokōji replied on the same day, expressing the Japanese government's "sincere satisfaction" with the German stance.<ref name="Weinberg-1954" />{{Rp|199–200}} This had been partially a result of the Japanese government's insistence, most notably in a request on 24 July 1936, to clarify the treaty's implications for past bilateral treaties between either party and the Soviet Union.<ref name="Ohata-1976" />{{Rp|33–34}}

=== Japan ===

==== Racial Equality Proposal of 1919, Washington Naval Conference of 1922 ====
{{Main|Racial Equality Proposal|Washington Naval Conference}}

[[Japan during World War I|Japan had fought in the Great War]] on the side of the victorious [[Entente Powers]]. However, as part of the [[Washington Naval Conference|Washington Naval Conference of 1922]], the United States and United Kingdom successfully managed to both limit Japan's naval forces by treaty and to force Japan to surrender her gains in China made during World War I. While there were some advantages for Tokyo gained during the conference – it was granted parity with USA and UK in the Pacific Ocean and was entitled to build a navy that would outmatch the French and Italian navies, as well as being recognized as the world's only non-western colonial power – the treaty was unpopular in Japan. Japanese nationalists, as well as the Imperial Japanese Navy, denounced the treaty's restrictive aspects.<ref name="Boog-2001">{{Cite book |last1=Boog |first1=Horst |title=The Global War: Widening of the Conflict into a World War and the Shift of the Initiative 1941–1943 |last2=Rahn |first2=Werner |last3=Stumpf |first3=Reinhard |last4=Wegner |first4=Bernd |publisher=Clarendon Press |year=2001 |series=Germany and the Second World War |volume=6 |location=Oxford |translator-last=Osers |translator-first=Ewald |display-authors=1 |author-link=Horst Boog}}</ref>{{Rp|193–194}}<ref name="Bix-2007">{{Cite book |last=Bix |first=Herbert P. |title=Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan |title-link=Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan |publisher=HarperCollins e-books |year=2007 |isbn=9780061570742 |location=New York City |author-link=Herbert P. Bix |orig-year=2000}}</ref>{{Rp|101}}

Culturally, the 1922 Washington Treaty was viewed as yet another betrayal by the Western powers, after the Japanese [[Racial Equality Proposal|proposals for guaranteed racial equality]] under the [[League of Nations]] had been rejected in 1919.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Shimazu |first=Naoko |title=Japan, Race, and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 |year=1998 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=9780203207178}}</ref><ref name="Bix-2007" />{{Rp|68}} This perception of national humiliation was further accelerated by the economic downturn that Japan experienced in the 1920s, exemplified by the 1927 financial panic in Japan ([[Shōwa financial crisis]]), which had also caused political instability and the fall of the first cabinet of [[Reijirō Wakatsuki]], and by the 1929 [[Great Depression]].<ref name="Ohata-1976">{{Cite book |last=Ohata |first=Tokushiro |url=https://archive.org/details/deterrentdiploma00morl/page/1 |title=Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935–1940: Selected Translations from Taiheiyō sensō e no michi, kaisen gaikō shi |publisher=Columbia University Press |year=1976 |isbn=9780231089692 |editor-last=Morley |editor-first=James William |location=New York City |pages=[https://archive.org/details/deterrentdiploma00morl/page/1 1–112] |translator-last=Baerwald |translator-first=Hans H. |chapter=The Anti-Comintern Pact, 1935-1939 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/deterrentdiploma00morl}}</ref>{{Rp|9}} German historian [[Bernd Martin (historian)|Bernd Martin]] dubbed the Washington Naval Conference the "Japanese '[[Versailles Treaty|Versailles]]'."<ref name="Martin-1970" />{{Rp|607}}

==== Japanese societal militarization and aggression against China ====
{{Main|Mukden Incident|January 28 incident|Pacification of Manchukuo|Defense of the Great Wall|Battle of Rehe|Actions in Inner Mongolia (1933–1936)}}
[[File:Mukden 1931 japan shenyang.jpg|thumb|Japanese troops entering [[Shenyang]] during the 1931 [[Mukden Incident]]]]
The Mukden Incident of 18 September 1931 began the period of Japanese aggression in Asia between 1931 and 1945, sometimes called the ''Fifteen Years War''.<ref name="Nish-2000">{{Cite book |title=The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1931–2000 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2000 |isbn=9781403919670 |editor-last=Nish |editor-first=Ian |series=The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000 |volume=2 |location=Houndmills |editor-last2=Kibata |editor-first2=Yoichi}}</ref>{{Rp|1–2}}

The diplomatic reaction of the European great powers to Japan's attack against China was insufficient to stop the Japanese advance, despite continued Chinese appeals to the [[League of Nations]]. This attack, which had no central order from Tokyo precede it and was rather an autonomous decision by the [[Kwantung Army]] leadership,<ref name="Martin-1970" />{{Rp|608–609}} was kept confined to [[North East China]] by the Japanese commanders in the hopes that this would be enough to keep European responses lukewarm and thus further Japanese advances. This estimation proved to be accurate, and the United Kingdom in particular was more than happy to let Japan proceed in Manchuria as long as British interests in southern and central China remained undisturbed. Even after the [[Shanghai Incident]] of 28 January 1932, the British attitude remained on the whole friendly to the Japanese cause and indifferent towards Chinese pleas for assistance. Among the few exceptions to this were British efforts to bring about peace in the city of Shanghai itself, where the UK had direct economic interests.

The Japanese [[Pacification of Manchukuo]] on the other hand was viewed in Britain as a positive development that ultimately would help to disperse bandit activity.<ref name="Nish-2000" />{{Rp|3–6}} In February 1932, the Japanese established a puppet state in North East China, the [[Manchukuo|State of Manchuria]], nominally headed by [[Puyi]], the dethroned last emperor of the [[Qing dynasty]] (r. 1908–1912, 1917).<ref>{{Cite book |last=Duara |first=Prasenjit |title=Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers |year=2003 |isbn=0742525775 |location=Oxford}}</ref>{{Rp|65–73}}

Following the [[Lytton Report]], which laid the blame for the conflict in Manchuria firmly at the feet of the Japanese, [[Sir John Simon]], the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom, failed to condemn Japan in his speech on 7 December 1932, and subsequently earned the favor of Japanese politicians such as [[Yōsuke Matsuoka]], who viewed the lackluster British response as further encouragement for the Japanese course in China. Japan left the League of Nations as a result of the Lytton Report in February 1933.<ref name="Nish-2000" />{{Rp|6–7}}

The [[Tanggu Truce]] ended the hostilities in Manchuria, but Japanese ambition in China was not yet satisfied. Between 1933 and 1936, Japanese foreign minister [[Kōki Hirota]] pursued the {{transliteration|ja|Hirota wakyo gaiko}}, the 'friendly diplomacy of Hirota'. Summed up by the [[Amau Doctrine]] of 1934, Japan viewed itself as the protective power of all of East Asia, mirroring the role of the United States in the Americas under the [[Monroe Doctrine]] of 1823. This posturing was again permitted by the European great powers, and [[Neville Chamberlain]] even attempted to negotiate an Anglo–Japanese non-aggression pact to improve British relations with Japan in 1934.<ref name="Nish-2000" />{{Rp|6–7}} In secret, Hirota's foreign policy leadership set an array of highly ambitious goals for Japan's diplomacy. This included an industrial buildup in Manchukuo, the acquisition of resources from North China via subjugation, conquest of the western Pacific and South East Asia, and preparations for a war against the Soviet Union.<ref name="Bix-2007" />{{Rp|308}}{{Quote box
| quote = Cooperative diplomacy will not solve the present emergency, which is not an isolated incident but represents a world emergency that has come about despite the great efforts that have been made by all countries since the World War. Japan must take advantage of the glorious challenge posed by the Manchurian Incident and our withdrawal from the League of Nations. We must accept our fate, firmly refusing to be weakened by avoiding the challenge, and must have the courage to use this opportunity to formulate a great plan for our country's next hundred years.
| source = Ohata, Tokushiro (1976). "The Anti-Comintern Pact, 1935–1939". In Morley, James William (ed.). "Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935–1940". p. 12. {{ISBN|9780231089692}}.
| align = right
| title = "The Essence of National Defense and Proposals to Strengthen It" (October 1934)
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}}The Japanese army in October 1934 published a pamphlet entitled "The Essence of National Defense and Proposals to Strengthen It", going directly against the attempt of diplomatic reconciliation that was at the same time (at least half-heartedly) attempted by the civilian government in Tokyo (named "Shidehara diplomacy" after former Prime Minister [[Kijūrō Shidehara]]). The pamphlet demanded a complete subjugation of all aspects of foreign and domestic policy to the all-encompassing question of "national defense" and the nation's preparation for total war. It further denounced "cooperative diplomacy", lauded the Japanese decision to withdraw from the League of Nations, and called upon Japan to accept its fate and to formulate a great plan for the next 100 years.

The military subsequently continued its practice of publishing pamphlets with overt political content without prior coordination with the civilian government. In November 1936, about the time of the Anti-Comintern Pact's conclusion, the army pamphlet "Perfecting the Army's Preparedness and the Spirit Required" advocated strengthening the army and openly called for the reform of the civilian government and the reform of the Japanese state to better suit the military's goals.<ref name="Ohata-1976" />{{Rp|12–13}}

==== Domestic power struggles about Japanese foreign policy ====
{{See also|Interservice rivalry#Japan}}The Japanese imperial state's system was dubbed "a cone without vertex" by Japanese historian [[Ken Ishida]]. The [[Imperial Japanese Army]] (IJA), [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] (IJN) and the Japanese foreign ministry each had its own agenda with regards as to how Japan should orient its foreign policy. The Japanese system, highly traditional and based around the spiritual and socio-cultural value of [[Emperor Hirohito]], also involved the imperial court, which served as a buffer between these three rival groups and the Emperor at the top, which allowed Hirohito to escape direct political responsibilities for any failures and setbacks that the system might produce.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Ishida |first=Ken |title=Japan, Italy and the Road to the Tripartite Alliance |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2018 |isbn=9783319962238 |lccn=2018948205}}</ref>{{Rp|6–8}}

==== Japanese–Soviet fishery treaty negotiations and border disputes ====
At the time of the negotiations for the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Japanese government was also in negotiations with the Soviet government over fishing rights in the [[Sea of Japan]]. As the Anti-Comintern Pact's secret additional protocol between Germany and Japan against the USSR was to forbid political treaties by either state with the Soviet Union without the express consent of the other party to the Anti-Comintern Pact, Japanese ambassador Mushanokōji was concerned whether the Pact would result in consequences for the Japanese-Soviet negotiations. He inquired about it in a letter to Ribbentrop after the signing of the treaty on 25 November, and also mentioned the issue of border questions between Japanese-controlled Manchukuo and the USSR. Ribbentrop confirmed the German government's assent that Japan was autonomous and free to proceed in the matters mentioned by Mushanokōji his reply on the same day.<ref name="Weinberg-1954" />{{Rp|198}}

=== Ideological similarities and contradictions between Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan ===
{{See also|Nazism|Statism in Shōwa Japan|Honorary Aryan|Germany–Japan relations}}
The Anti-Comintern Pact was more of a statement than an actual political commitment, and the statement was one of mutual ideological alignment and diplomatic attachment to one another.<ref name="Schroeder-1958">{{Cite book |last=Schroeder |first=Paul W. |url=https://archive.org/details/axisalliancejapa00paul |title=The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations 1941 |publisher=Cornell University Press |year=1958 |isbn=0801403715 |author-link=Paul W. Schroeder |url-access=registration}}</ref>{{Rp|7}}<ref name="Kershaw-2000">{{Cite book |last=Kershaw |first=Ian |url=https://archive.org/details/hitler193645neme00kers |title=Hitler: 1936-45 - Nemesis |publisher=W. W. Norton & Company |year=2000 |isbn=0393049949 |location=New York City |url-access=registration}}</ref>{{Rp|27}} Both countries shared examples of very politically significant racial ideologies, with [[Alfred Rosenberg]] in Germany and [[Shūmei Ōkawa]] in Japan becoming the leading racialist ideologues. Whereas Rosenberg enjoyed government backing and was a central party figure after the Nazis' rise to power in 1933, Ōkawa's audience was more limited. Ōkawa found his main support base with young nationalistic military officers, particularly those in the Kwantung Army, the military unit that instigated Japan's initial invasion of North East China in 1931.<ref name="Martin-1970" />{{Rp|608}} Ōkawa's work was in late 1936 furthered by [[Nimiya Takeo|Takeo Nimiya's]] influential foreign policy pamphlet "The Unique Principles Guiding Japanese Diplomacy", in which Takeo laid out a vision of a long-term orientation of Japanese diplomacy around a racially justified expansionist policy based on traditional Japanese spiritual values rather than western-style imperialism. Nimiya's pamphlet was especially popular with young bureaucrats and students who were about to enter Japanese state politics in the late 1930s and early 1940s.<ref name="Ohata-1976" />{{Rp|16}}{{Quote box
| quote = The Soviet Union's revolutionary pressure on Asia increases as it continues to strengthen its national defense and international position through a huge rearmament program. Its goal, a Red penetration of many areas, interferes with Japan's East Asia policy and poses a grave threat to our empire's defense. Thwarting the Soviet Union's aggressive intention therefore has become the most crucial element in our diplomacy. This goal must be achieved by diplomatic means and by completion of a defense buildup.

[...]

Germany has interests that closely parallels ours vis-a-vis the Soviet Union because of the special arrangement that exists between Russia and France. Hence, it is in Germany's interest to cooperate with us; and we in turn should promote close relations with Germany, leading to alliance between Japan and Germany. This relationship must be expanded to include Poland and other friendly European countries near the Soviet Union as well as other Asian and Islamic countries, as a further restraint on the Soviet Union.
| source = Ohata, Tokushiro (1976). "The Anti-Comintern Pact, 1935–1939". In Morley, James William (ed.). "Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935–1940". p. 31. {{ISBN|9780231089692}}.
| align = right
| title = "The Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan" (8 August 1936)
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}}The two countries shared a common ideological antagonist in the communism, which was extensively covered in the German and Japanese media and perceived as a real threat of subversion among German and Japanese political elites.<ref name="Bix-2007" />{{Rp|143}} As a result of Japanese reservations about an outright military alliance, the Anti-Comintern Pact was conceptualized as an anti-communist agreement rather than an outright military alliance.<ref name="Boyd-1977" />{{Rp|53}} However, the Japanese military establishment was concerned about the growth of Soviet military strength, and Japanese military attachés in Europe had held conferences about the potential threat coming specifically from the USSR as early as 1929 to discuss potential countermeasures.<ref name="Boyd-1981" />{{Rp|314–315}} The Japanese government on 8 August 1936 issued an internal document that specifically justified the German–Japanese alliance as a response to the growing threat that the Soviet Union posed in Asia and the close parallels between Japanese and German interests regarding the USSR. This document also revealed intentions to include other European, Islamic and Asian countries in the anti-Soviet pact and specifically named [[Second Polish Republic|Poland]] as a potential candidate for pact membership.<ref name="Ohata-1976" />{{Rp|31}}

Both the Japanese and German movements shared an aversion towards the League of Nations, and both countries left the League during the year 1933.<ref name="Martin-1970" />{{Rp|609}} The two countries shared a similar list of diplomatic adversaries: The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union.<ref name="Stratman-1970" />{{Rp|1}}

While the German and Japanese racial ideologies of the supposed superiority of the [[Aryan race]] and the [[Yamato race]], respectively, showed parallels, these parallels should logically have made the alliance less likely, as the two countries' fascisms viewed each other as racially inferior. In fact, Hitler's ''[[Mein Kampf]]'' specifically names the Japanese as an example of a racial grouping on the second out of three cultural tiers, a step down from the Aryan race on the top.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hitler |first=Adolf |title=Mein Kampf |date=1943 |publisher=August Pries GmbH |location=Leipzig |language=de |orig-year=1925}}</ref>{{Rp|317–323}} To prevent diplomatic complications as a result of German racial thought, German racist propaganda in the state-controlled press was directed away from the topic of the Japanese people so as to not irritate Japan.<ref name="Stratman-1970" />{{Rp|4}}

=== Seventh World Congress of the Comintern ===
{{Main|Seventh World Congress of the Comintern}}{{Quote box
| quote = In the face of the war provocations of the German fascists and Japanese militarists, and the speeding up of armaments by the war parties in the capitalist countries [...] the central slogan of the Communist Parties must be: struggle for peace. All those interested in the preservation of peace should be drawn into this vital front. The concentration of forces against the chief instigators of war at any given moment (at the present time against fascist Germany and against Poland and Japan which are in league with it) constitutes a most important task of the Communist Parties.
| source = Stratman, George John (1970). Germany's diplomatic relations with Japan 1933–1941. Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 2450. University of Montana. p. 18.
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| title = Seventh World Congress declaration regarding the threat of Germany and Japan
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}}At the [[Seventh World Congress of the Comintern]] in July 1935, following the advice of [[Georgi Dimitrov]] to the Soviet government that had resulted from Dimitrov's experiences in France and Austria during 1934,<ref name="Haslam-1984">{{Cite book |last=Haslam |first=Jonathan |title=The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–39 |publisher=The MacMillan Press Ltd |year=1984 |isbn=0198731868 |editor-last=Davies |editor-first=R.W. |series=Studies in Soviet History and Society}}</ref>{{Rp|35}} the Communist International drastically changed the course that communist parties were advised to take in democratic systems. Instead of viewing the democratic and fascist parties as politically allied (''[[social fascism]]''), the communist movements were encouraged to ally with leftist and centrist forces (the policy of the ''[[popular front]]'') in order to prevent the rightists from gaining ground.

Diplomatically, the Seventh World Congress also brought on the '[[collective security]]' policy in the Soviet Union, wherein the USSR would attempt to align with the western democracies to counteract the fascist regimes.<ref name="Haslam-1984" />{{Rp|52–59}} The Seventh World Congress specifically declared fascist Germany and Japan, next to Poland, to be among the world's chief instigators of war.

This declaration accelerated Ribbentrop's efforts to secure a German–Japanese alliance against the USSR, or at least a promise of non-support for the Soviet Union in case of a war between one of the countries against it.<ref name="Stratman-1970" />{{Rp|18}} This change in Comintern policy also made it urgent for the European fascists to prevent the strengthening of leftist popular fronts against them.<ref name="Borejsza-1981">{{Cite journal |last=Borejsza |first=Jerzy W. |date=1981 |title=Die Rivalität zwischen Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus in Ostmitteleuropa |url=https://www.ifz-muenchen.de/heftarchiv/1981_4_3_borejsza.pdf |journal=Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte |language=de |volume=29/4 |pages=579–614 |via=IFZ München}}</ref>{{Rp|595}}

=== Role of China in German–Japanese relations ===
The [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] was an important partner to the Germans, but a bitter enemy of the Japanese Empire, as Japan had [[Mukden Incident|invaded Manchuria in 1931]]. Although Ribbentrop hoped to involve both China and Japan in his anti-communist bloc,<ref name="Weinberg-1970">{{Cite book |last=Weinberg |first=Gerhard |title=The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933–36 |publisher=University of Chicago Press |year=1970 |isbn=0226885097 |location=Chicago |author-link=Gerhard Weinberg}}</ref>{{Rp|342–346}} the continued hostilities and eventual [[Second Sino-Japanese War|outbreak of war]] made the ambivalent German position, including the [[China–Germany relations (1912–1949)|Sino–German military cooperation]] and the status of [[Alexander von Falkenhausen]] and other military advisors to [[Chiang Kai-shek]], a serious concern to both of the Asian states. Furthermore, China was the biggest trade partner for German businesses in Asia.<ref name="Boyd-1977" />{{Rp|51}} China was also favored by the German military establishment and the armament industry, as the Chinese military was an important customer for German arms manufacturers and heavy industry. Chinese exports to Germany, including deliveries of [[tin]] and [[tungsten]], were also seen as vital.<ref name="Stratman-1970" />{{Rp|32}}

During his time as Japanese ambassador to Germany, Mushanokōji made it one of his goals to undermine Sino–German economic and diplomatic relations.<ref name="Boyd-1977" />{{Rp|51}} Within Germany's foreign service, Ribbentrop favored cooperation with Japan, whereas Neurath preferred alignment with China.<ref name="Steiner-2011" />{{Rp|262–263}}

One of the major questions in the German foreign service in regards to Germany's diplomatic ambivalence between China and Japan was the recognition of the Japanese puppet state in Manchukuo, installed after the 1931 Japanese invasion of North East China. A recognition of Manchukuo, as suggested by German ambassador in Tokyo [[Herbert von Dirksen]] beginning in early 1934, would have clearly presented a German statement in favor of Japanese expansionism and would have disturbed Germany's Chinese partners. As a result of the possible irritation of the Chinese government and the potential misgivings of the Soviet government about the potential perception of an attempted encirclement by a German–Japanese entente, such a recognition of Manchukuo was initially opposed by Neurath and the foreign ministry.<ref name="Stratman-1970" />{{Rp|16}} In response to his initial request to recognize Manchukuo, Dirksen was instructed to avoid "any close relations with Japan which might lay [Germany] open to being suspected of wishing to render assistance against Russia". This German caution towards any offense cast against the Soviet Union resulted from the impression in Berlin that Japan during the year 1934 was under serious threat of diplomatic and military encirclement. Specifically, Dirksen was also instructed to pay close attention to any signs of a potential war between Japan and the USSR, which the Germans assumed the Soviet Union would probably receive the aid of the western democracies if it were to break out, although this potential war was not perceived as immediately imminent. Regardless, the German foreign service sought at all costs to avoid entanglement in such a conflict.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://digi20.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb00045948_00001.html |title=14. Juni bis 31. Oktober 1934 |publisher=Vandenhoeck + Ruprecht |year=1973 |editor-last=Lambert |editor-first=Margaret |series=Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945 |volume=C-3 |editor-last2=Sweet |editor-first2=Paul R. |editor-last3=Baumont |editor-first3=Maurice |display-editors=1}}</ref>{{Rp|466–467}}

For their part, the Japanese political and military establishments were by 1934 also less than certain about the usefulness of the new Hitler government in Germany, which Tokyo assumed would attempt to maintain a peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union and avoid any open alignment with Moscow's enemies. The distrust that Japan felt was partially caused by the close relationship between Germany and China, which in turn was perceived as an ally of the Soviet Union against Japan.<ref name="Stratman-1970" />{{Rp|17}}

After the Anti-Comintern Pact's signing, Falkenhausen was recalled to Germany against his will after Japanese pressure in 1938.<ref name="Time-1938">{{Cite magazine |date=1938-07-18 |title=Foreign News: Recalled |url=http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,760004,00.html |magazine=Time |language=en-US |issn=0040-781X |access-date=2020-10-11}} {{subscription required}}</ref> China eventually declared war on Germany and Italy, along with Japan, on 9 December 1941, in the aftermath of the [[Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor]] and the American entry into World War II, citing German and Italian support for Japanese aggression as the reason.<ref>{{Cite web |title=World War II: China's Declaration of War Against Japan, Germany and Italy (December 9, 1941) |url=https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/china-s-declaration-of-war-against-japan-germany-and-italy-december-1941 |access-date=27 Sep 2019 |website=Jewish Virtual Library}}</ref>

=== Instability in France ===
The domestic situation in the [[French Third Republic]] was unstable. This provided the opportunity for France's rivals, especially Germany, to expand their influence, while at the same time weakening France's European partners, such as [[Poland]] and [[Czechoslovakia]].

The cabinet of [[Léon Blum]], supported by France's [[Popular Front (France)|popular front]], had taken the reins in June 1936. The social instability and political violence within France made the French government careful and ineffective in applying France's otherwise extensive diplomatic and military power.<ref name="Presseisen-1958">{{Cite book |last=Presseisen |first=Ernst L. |title=Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933–1941 |publisher=Springer-Science + Business Media |year=1958 |isbn=9789401765909 |location=Den Haag |doi=10.1007/978-94-017-6590-9}}</ref>{{Rp|88}} Hitler, who expected France's popular front to result in a situation similar to the Spanish Civil War, openly announced to the French ambassador on 6 October 1936 that a communist takeover in France would not be treated by Germany as a domestic affair.<ref name="Macmillan-1989">{{Cite book |title=Paths to War: New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War |publisher=Macmillan |year=1989 |isbn=9781349203338 |editor-last=Boyce |editor-first=Robert |location=Houndmills |editor-last2=Robertson |editor-first2=Esmonde M.}}</ref>{{Rp|150}}

In French foreign policy, the 1934 [[German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact]] had caused concerns about the stability of the French alliance system in eastern Europe, leading to a French realignment towards the Soviet Union that resulted in the 1936 [[Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance]].<ref name="Stratman-1970" />{{Rp|10}}

=== German, Italian and Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War ===
{{See also|German involvement in the Spanish Civil War|Condor Legion|Corpo Truppe Volontarie|International Brigades|Non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War}}The [[Spanish Civil War]], in which Germany supported the [[Nationalist faction (Spanish Civil War)|Nationalists]] and the Soviet Union the [[Republican faction (Spanish Civil War)|Republicans]], reinforced the urgency in the mind of the German leadership to create some sort of anti-Soviet military arrangement to counteract a potential aggression by the Soviet Union.<ref name="Macmillan-1989" />{{Rp|210}} The Spanish nationalists also received aid from Mussolini's Italy ([[Corpo Truppe Volontarie]]), but the Italian attitude to a potential anti-communist or anti-Soviet agreement was initially the opposite of the German position: the Italians viewed the signing of an anti-communist treaty as superfluous, as Italy's anti-communist commitment was in the Italian viewpoint sufficiently proven in their support for the Spanish nationalists.<ref name="Mallett-2003">{{Cite book |last=Mallett |first=Robert |title=Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933–1940 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2003 |isbn=0333748158 |location=New York City}}</ref>{{Rp|115}}

The Spanish Civil War was viewed by the Germans as concrete proof that the teachings of the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern, which had been specifically aimed against Germany (and Japan), were indeed affecting geopolitics.<ref name="Stratman-1970" />{{Rp|20}}