Editing Appeasement (section)

==History==
===Failure of collective security===
{{Blockquote|quote  = Appeasement policy, the policy of appeasing Hitler and Mussolini, operating jointly at that time, during 1937 and 1938 by continuous concessions granted in the hope of reaching a point of saturation when the dictators would be willing to accede to international collaboration.... It came to an end when Hitler seized Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, in defiance of his promises given at Munich, and Prime Minister Chamberlain, who had championed appeasement before, decided on a policy of resistance to further German aggression. |source = Walter Theimer (ed.), ''The Penguin Political Dictionary'', 1939}}

Chamberlain's policy of appeasement emerged from the failure of the [[League of Nations]] and the failure of [[collective security]]. The League of Nations was set up in the [[aftermath of World War I]] in the hope that international co-operation and collective resistance to aggression might prevent another war. Members of the League were entitled to the assistance of other members if they came under attack. The policy of collective security ran in parallel with measures to achieve international disarmament and, if possible, was to be based on [[economic sanctions]] against an aggressor. The policy appeared to be ineffectual when confronted by the aggression of dictators, notably Germany's [[Remilitarisation of the Rhineland]] and [[Kingdom of Italy|Italy]]'s [[Benito Mussolini]]'s [[Second Italo-Ethiopian War|invasion]] of [[Ethiopian Empire|Abyssinia]].

====Invasion of Manchuria====
{{main|Japanese invasion of Manchuria}}
In September 1931, the [[Empire of Japan]], a member of the League of Nations, invaded [[Manchuria]], in [[northeast China]], by claiming that the regional population was not only [[Han Chinese|Chinese]] but was multi-ethnic. The [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] appealed to the League of Nations and to the United States for assistance. The [[League of Nations Council]] asked the parties to withdraw to their original positions to permit a peaceful settlement. The United States reminded them of their duty under the [[Kellogg–Briand Pact]] to settle matters peacefully. Japan was undeterred and went on to occupy the whole of Manchuria. The League set up a commission of inquiry that condemned Japan, and the League duly adopted the report in February 1933. In response, Japan resigned from the League and continued its advance into China, with neither the League nor the United States taking any action. However, the U.S. issued the [[Stimson Doctrine]] and refused to recognize Japan's conquest, which played a role in shifting U.S. policy to favour China over Japan during the late 1930s.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Clauss |first1=E. M. |title=The Roosevelt Administration and Manchukuo, 1933?1941 |doi=10.1111/j.1540-6563.1970.tb00380.x |journal=The Historian |volume=32 |issue=4 |pages=595–611 |year=1970}}</ref> Some historians, such as [[David Thomson (historian)|David Thomson]], assert that the League's "inactivity and ineffectualness in the Far East lent every encouragement to European aggressors who planned similar acts of defiance".<ref>[[David Thomson (historian)|Thomson, David]] (1957) ''Europe Since Napoleon'', London: Longans Green & Co. p. 691</ref>

==== Anglo-German Payments Agreement ====
The 1934 [[Anglo-German Payments Agreement]] stabilised economic relations between Britain and Germany, guaranteeing German interest repayments on bonds arising from [[World War I reparations]] and deepening British economic ties to Germany, particularly in the area of trade. [[Herbert von Dirksen]], the German ambassador to Britain, in 1938 characterised the agreement, alongside the 1935 naval agreement, as carrying "the swaying structure of foreign relations [between the UK and Germany] even in critical periods".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Wendt |first=Bernd-Jürgen |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003212997-17/economic-appeasement-crisis-strategy-bernd-j%C3%BCrgen-wendt |title=The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=1983 |isbn=9781003212997 |page=168 |chapter='Economic Appeasement' – A Crisis Strategy|doi=10.4324/9781003212997-17 }}</ref>

====Anglo-German Naval Agreement====
The 1935 [[Anglo-German Naval Agreement]] had Britain permit Germany to begin rebuilding the [[Kriegsmarine|German Navy]], including its [[U-boats]], despite Germany having repeatedly violated the [[Treaty of Versailles]].

====Abyssinia crisis====
{{Main|Abyssinia Crisis|Hoare–Laval Pact}}
[[File:Addis Ababa-8e00855u.jpg|thumb|right|upright=1.25|Emperor [[Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia|Haile Selassie]] of [[Ethiopian Empire|Ethiopia]], {{Circa|1942}}]]
Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini had [[Abyssinian Crisis|imperial ambitions]] in [[Abyssinia]]. Italy was already in possession of the neighbouring [[Italian Eritrea|Eritrea]] and [[Italian Somaliland|Somalia]]. In December 1934, there was a clash between [[Royal Italian Army]] and [[Imperial Ethiopian Army]] troops at [[Walwal]], near the border between [[British Somaliland|British]] and [[Italian Somaliland]], in which Italian troops took possession of the disputed territory, and about 150 Abyssinians and 50 Italians were killed. Italy demanded apologies and compensation from Abyssinia, which appealed to the League, with Emperor [[Haile Selassie]] famously appealing in person to the assembly in [[Geneva]]. The League persuaded both sides to seek a settlement under the [[Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928]], but Italy continued troop movements, and Abyssinia appealed to the League again. In October 1935 Mussolini launched an attack on Abyssinia. The League declared Italy to be the aggressor and imposed sanctions, but coal and oil were not included since blocking them, it was thought, would provoke war. [[Albanian Kingdom (1928–1939)|Albania]], [[Federal State of Austria|Austria]] and [[Kingdom of Hungary (1920–1946)|Hungary]] refused to apply sanctions, and Germany and the United States were not in the League. Nevertheless, the [[Economy of fascist Italy|Italian economy suffered]]. The League considered closing off the [[Suez Canal]], which would have stopped arms to Abyssinia, but thinking that would be too harsh a measure, failed to do so.<ref name=Taylor />

Earlier, in April 1935, Italy had joined Britain and France in protest against [[German rearmament]]. France was anxious to placate Mussolini to keep him away from an alliance with Germany. Britain was less hostile to Germany and set the pace in imposing sanctions and moved a naval fleet into the [[Mediterranean]], but in November 1935, British Foreign Secretary [[Samuel Hoare, 1st Viscount Templewood|Sir Samuel Hoare]] and French Prime Minister, [[Pierre Laval]] had secret discussions in which they [[Hoare–Laval Pact|agreed to concede two thirds of Abyssinia to Italy]]. However, the press leaked the content of the discussions, and a public outcry forced Hoare and Laval to resign. In May 1936, undeterred by sanctions, Italy captured [[Addis Ababa]], the Abyssinian capital, and proclaimed [[Victor Emmanuel III]] as Emperor of [[Italian East Africa|Ethiopia]]. In July the League abandoned sanctions. The episode, in which sanctions were incomplete and appeared to be easily given up, seriously discredited the League.

====Remilitarisation of the Rhineland====
{{Main|Remilitarisation of the Rhineland}}
[[File:Stanley Baldwin 02.jpg|thumb|right|UK Prime Minister [[Stanley Baldwin]]]]
Under the [[Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920)|Versailles Settlement]], the [[Rhineland]] was [[demilitarised]]. Germany accepted that arrangement under the [[Locarno Treaties]] of 1925. Hitler claimed that it threatened Germany and, on 7 March 1936, sent the [[Wehrmacht]] into the [[Rhineland]]. He gambled on Britain not getting involved but was unsure of how France would react. The action was opposed by many of his advisers. His officers had orders to withdraw if they met French resistance. [[French Third Republic|France]] consulted Britain and lodged protests with the League but took no action. Prime Minister [[Stanley Baldwin]] said that Britain lacked the forces to back its guarantees to France and that in any case, public opinion would not allow so. In Britain, it was thought that the Germans were merely walking into "their own backyard". [[Hugh Dalton]], a [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]] MP who usually advocated stiff resistance to Germany, said that neither the British people nor Labour would support military or economic sanctions.<ref name=Taylor>Taylor, A.J.P., ''English History, 1914–1945'', 1965</ref> In the Council of the League, only the [[Soviet Union]] proposed sanctions against Germany. Hitler, who was invited to negotiate, proposed a [[non-aggression pact]] with the Western powers. When asked for details, he did not reply. Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland had persuaded him that the international community would not resist him, and it put Germany in a powerful strategic position.{{Citation needed|date=December 2012}}

====Spanish Civil War====
{{Main|Non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War}}
Many historians argue that the British policy of non-intervention was a product of the Establishment's anti-communist stance. Scott Ramsay (2019) instead argues that Britain demonstrated "[[benevolent neutrality]]" and was simply hedging its bets by avoiding the favouring of one side or the other. The goal was that in a European war Britain would enjoy the "benevolent neutrality" of whichever side won in Spain.<ref>Scott Ramsay. "Ensuring Benevolent Neutrality: The British Government's Appeasement of General Franco during the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939".  ''International History Review'' 41:3 (2019): 604–623.  DOI:  https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2018.1428211.</ref>

===Conduct of appeasement, 1937–1939===
{{Main|European foreign policy of the Chamberlain ministry}} 
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 119-5243, Wien, Arthur Seyß-Inquart, Adolf Hitler.jpg|thumb|[[Arthur Seyss-Inquart|Seyss-Inquart]] and [[Hitler]] in Vienna, March 1938]]
In 1937, [[Stanley Baldwin]] resigned as Prime Minister. He was replaced by [[Neville Chamberlain]], who pursued a policy of appeasement and rearmament.<ref>Mujtaba Haider Zaidi "Chamberlain and Hitler vs. Pakistan and Taliban" The Frontier Post Newspaper, 3 July 2013 URL: [https://archive.today/20130704120057/http://www.thefrontierpost.com/article/24108/]</ref> Chamberlain's reputation for appeasement rests in large measure on his negotiations with Hitler over [[German occupation of Czechoslovakia|Czechoslovakia in 1938]].

====''Anschluss''====
{{Main|Anschluss}}
When the [[German Empire]] and [[Austria-Hungary]] were broken up in 1918, [[Austria]] was left as a [[rump state]] with the temporary adopted name ''Deutschösterreich'' ("[[German-Austria]]"), with the vast majority of [[Austrians]] wanting to join Germany. However, the victors' agreements of [[World War I]] (the [[Treaty of Versailles]] and the [[Treaty of Saint-Germain]]) strictly forbade union between Austria and Germany without League consent, as well as the name "German-Austria", which reverted to "Austria" after the emergence of the [[First Republic of Austria]] in September 1919. The constitutions of both the [[Weimar Republic]] and the First Republic of Austria, included the aim of unification, which was supported by democratic parties. However, the rise of Hitler dampened the enthusiasm of the Austrian government for such a plan. Hitler, an Austrian by birth, had been a [[pan-German]] from a very young age and had promoted a Pan-German vision of a [[Greater Germanic Reich]] from the beginning of his career in politics. He wrote in ''[[Mein Kampf]]'' (1924) that he would attempt a union of his birth country Austria with Germany by any means possible and by force if necessary. By early 1938, Hitler had consolidated his power in Germany and was ready to implement his long-held plan.

Austrian Chancellor [[Kurt Schuschnigg]] wished to pursue ties with Italy but turned to [[Czechoslovakia]], [[Kingdom of Yugoslavia|Yugoslavia]] and [[Kingdom of Romania|Romania]] (the [[Little Entente]]). To that end, Hitler took violent exception. In January 1938, the [[Austrian Nazis]] attempted a ''[[coup d'état|putsch]]'' following which some were imprisoned. Hitler summoned Schuschnigg to [[Berchtesgaden]] in February and demanded, with the threat of military action, for him to release imprisoned Austrian Nazis and to allow them to participate in the government. Schuschnigg complied and appointed [[Arthur Seyss-Inquart]], a pro-Nazi lawyer, as [[interior minister]]. To forestall Hitler and to preserve Austria's independence, Schuschnigg scheduled a [[plebiscite]] on the issue for 13 March. Hitler demanded for the plebiscite to be cancelled. The [[Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda|German Propaganda Ministry]] issued press reports that riots had broken out in Austria and that large parts of the Austrian population were calling for German troops to restore order. On 11 March, Hitler sent an ultimatum to Schuschnigg that demanded him to hand over all power to the Austrian Nazis or face an invasion. The British Ambassador in Berlin, [[Nevile Henderson]], registered a protest with the German government against the use of coercion against Austria. Schuschnigg, realising that neither France nor the United Kingdom would actively support him, resigned in favour of Seyss-Inquart, who then appealed to German troops to restore order. On 12 March, the German [[Wehrmacht]] crossed the Austrian border. They met no resistance and were greeted by cheering Austrians. The invasion was the first major test of the Wehrmacht's machinery. Austria became the German province of [[Ostmark (Austria)|Ostmark]], with Seyss-Inquart as governor. A [[1938 Austrian Anschluss referendum|plebiscite was held on 10 April]] and officially recorded the support of 99.73% of the voters for the ''Anschluss''.<ref>Richard J. Evans, ''The Third Reich in Power'' (2006) pp. 646–58</ref>

Although the [[Allies of World War I|Allies]] had prohibited the union of Austria and Germany, their reaction to the ''Anschluss'' was mild.<ref>Alfred D. Low, ''The Anschluss Movement 1931–1938 and the Great Powers'' (1985)</ref> Even the strongest voices against annexation, particularly those of [[Kingdom of Italy#Fascist regime (1922–1943)|Fascist Italy]], [[Third French Republic|France]] and Britain (the "[[Stresa Front]]"), were not backed by force. In the [[British House of Commons]], Chamberlain said, "The hard fact is that nothing could have arrested what has actually happened [in Austria] unless this country and other countries had been prepared to use force".<ref>{{cite book |title=Twentieth Century Journey, Volume 2, The Nightmare Years: 1930–1940 |publisher=Little Brown and Company |location=Boston |isbn=0-316-78703-5 |year=1984 |first=William L. |last=Shirer |pages=[https://archive.org/details/nightmareyears1900shir/page/308 308] |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/nightmareyears1900shir}}</ref> The American reaction was similar. The international reaction to the events of 12 March 1938 led Hitler to conclude that he could use even more aggressive tactics in his plan to expand the Third Reich.{{citation needed|date=April 2014}} The ''Anschluss'' paved the way for Munich in September 1938 because it indicated the likely non-response of Britain and France to future German aggression.

====Munich Agreement====
{{Main|Munich Agreement}}
{{blockquote|How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.|
[[Neville Chamberlain]], 27 September 1938, 8 p.m. radio broadcast, on Czechoslovak refusal to accept Nazi demands to cede border areas to Germany.}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-R69173, Münchener Abkommen, Staatschefs.jpg|thumb|upright=1.6|
From left to right: [[Neville Chamberlain|Chamberlain]], [[Daladier]], [[Hitler]], [[Mussolini]] and [[Galeazzo Ciano|Ciano]] pictured before they sign the Munich Agreement, which gave the Czechoslovak border areas to Germany]]
Under the Versailles Settlement, [[Czechoslovakia]] was created with the territory of the Czech part more or less corresponding to the [[Czech Crown lands]] as they had existed within Austria-Hungary and earlier. The new country included [[Bohemia]], [[Moravia]], and [[Slovakia]] and had border areas with a majority-German population that was known as the [[Sudetenland]] and areas with significant numbers of other ethnic minorities (notably [[Hungarians]], [[Polish people|Poles]] and [[Ruthenians]]). In April 1938, the [[Sudeten German Party]], led by [[Konrad Henlein]], agitated for autonomy and then threatened, in Henlein's words, "direct action to bring the [[Sudeten Germans]] within the frontiers of the Reich".{{sfn|Grant Duff|1938|p=}} An international crisis ensued.

France and Britain advised Czechoslovak acceptance of Sudeten autonomy. The Czechoslovak government refused and ordered a partial mobilisation in expectation of German aggression. [[Lord Runciman]] was sent by Chamberlain to [[Runciman Mission|mediate]] in [[Prague]] and persuaded the Czechoslovak government to grant autonomy. Germany escalated the dispute, with the country's press carrying stories of alleged atrocities against Sudeten Germans, and Hitler ordering 750,000 troops to the [[Czech Republic–Germany border|Czechoslovak border]]. In August, Henlein broke off negotiations with the Czechoslovak authorities. At a [[Nuremberg Rally|Nazi party rally]] in [[Nuremberg]] on 12 September, Hitler made a speech attacking Czechoslovakia<ref>Donald Cameron Watt, ''How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War'' (1989) ch. 2</ref> and there was an increase of violence by Sudeten Nazis against Czechoslovak and Jewish targets.

Chamberlain, faced with the prospect of a German invasion, flew to [[Berchtesgaden]] on 15 September to negotiate directly with Hitler, who now demanded that Chamberlain accept not Sudeten self-government within Czechoslovakia but the absorption of the Sudeten lands into Germany. Chamberlain became convinced that refusal would lead to war. The [[geography of Europe]] was such that Britain and France could forcibly prevent the German occupation of the Sudetenland only by the invasion of Germany.<ref>A. J. P. Taylor, ''English History, 1914–1945'', p. 415</ref> Chamberlain, therefore, returned to Britain and agreed to Hitler's demands. Britain and France told the Czechoslovak President [[Edvard Beneš]] to hand over to Germany all territory with a German majority. Hitler increased his aggression against Czechoslovakia and ordered the establishment of a [[Sudetendeutsches Freikorps|Sudeten German paramilitary organisation]], which proceeded to carry out terrorist attacks on Czechoslovak targets.

====German annexation of Sudetenland====
On 22 September, Chamberlain flew to [[Bad Godesberg]] for his second meeting with Hitler and said that he was willing to accept the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. He was startled by the response of Hitler that the cession of the Sudetenland was not enough and that Czechoslovakia, which Hitler had described as a "fraudulent state", must be broken up completely. Later in the day, Hitler resiled by saying that he was willing to accept the cession of the Sudetenland by 1 October. On 24 September, Germany issued the [[Godesberg Memorandum]], which demanded cession by 28 September or war. The Czechoslovak government rejected those demands, France ordered mobilisation and Britain mobilised the [[Royal Navy]].

[[File:MunichAgreement.jpg|right|thumb|upright=1.35|British Prime Minister [[Neville Chamberlain]], landing at [[Heston Aerodrome]] on 30 September 1938 after his meeting with Hitler at [[Munich]]. In his hand, he holds the peace agreement between Britain and Germany.]]
On 26 September, Hitler made a speech at the [[Sportpalast]] in Berlin in which he claimed that the Sudetenland was "the last territorial demand I have to make in Europe",<ref name=sudetenland1>{{cite book|author1=Domarus, Max|author2=Hitler, Adolf|title=Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932–1945: The Chronicle of a Dictatorship|year=1990|page=1393}}</ref> and he gave Czechoslovakia an [[ultimatum]] of 28 September at 2:00pm to cede the territory to Germany or to face war.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73">Corvaja, Santi and Miller, Robert L. (2008) ''Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings''. New York: Enigma Books. {{ISBN|978-1-929631-42-1}}. p.73</ref>

In the atmosphere of growing conflict, Mussolini persuaded Hitler to put the dispute to a four-power conference. On 29 September 1938, Hitler, Chamberlain, French Prime Minister [[Édouard Daladier]] and Mussolini met in Munich. Czechoslovakia was not to be a party to these talks, nor was the Soviet Union. The four powers agreed that Germany would complete its occupation of the Sudetenland but that an international commission would consider other disputed areas. Czechoslovakia was told that if it did not submit, it would stand alone. At Chamberlain's request, Hitler readily signed an agreement for between the United Kingdom and Germany. Chamberlain returned to Britain and promised "[[peace for our time]]". Before Munich, U.S. President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] had sent a telegram to Chamberlain that said, "Good man" and he later told the American ambassador in Rome, [[William Phillips (diplomat)|William Phillips]], "I am not a bit upset over the final result".<ref>The Versailles Treaty and its Legacy: The Failure of the Wilsonian Vision, by Norman A. Graebner, Edward M. Bennett</ref>

====First Vienna Award and German annexation of Bohemia and Moravia====
{{Main|First Vienna Award|Occupation of Czechoslovakia (1938–1945)}}
As a result of the annexation of the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia lost 800,000 citizens, much of its industry and its mountain defences in the west. The rest of Czechoslovakia was left weak and powerless to resist subsequent occupation. In the following months, Czechoslovakia was broken up and ceased to exist, as Germany occupied the Sudetenland; Hungary took part of Slovakia, including [[Carpathian Ruthenia]]; and Poland annexed [[Trans-Olza]]. On 15 March 1939, the German ''[[Wehrmacht]]'' moved into the remainder of Czechoslovakia, and from [[Prague Castle]], Hitler proclaimed [[Bohemia]] and [[Moravia]] to be the [[Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia]], completing the [[German occupation of Czechoslovakia]]. Slovakia separated and became  a [[Slovak Republic (1939–1945)|German satellite state]].

In March 1939, Chamberlain foresaw a possible disarmament conference between himself, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini and [[Stalin]]. [[Home Secretary]], [[Samuel Hoare, 1st Viscount Templewood|Samuel Hoare]], said, "These five men, working together in Europe and blessed in their efforts by the [[President of the United States of America]], might make themselves eternal benefactors of the human race".<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20081214212333/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,789498,00.html International: Peace Week], ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine, 20 March 1939</ref>

In effect, the British and French had by the Munich negotiations pressured their ally Czechoslovakia to cede part of its territory to a hostile neighbour in order to preserve peace. Churchill likened the negotiations at [[Berchtesgarten]], [[Bad Godesberg]] and [[Munich]] to a man demanding £1, then, when it is offered, demanding £2, then when it is refused settling for £1.17s.6d.<ref name=Churchill>Winston Churchill, ''The Gathering Storm'', 1948</ref> British leaders committed to the Munich Agreement in spite of their awareness of Hitler's vulnerability at the time. In August 1938, General [[Ludwig Beck]] relayed a message to Lord Halifax to explain that most of the [[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht|German General Staff]] had prepared a [[Oster conspiracy|coup against the Fuhrer]] for if there was "proof that England will fight if Czechoslovakia is attacked". When Chamberlain received the news, he dismissed it out of hand. In September, the British received assurance that the General Staff's offer to launch the coup still stood with key private sector police and army support, even though Beck had resigned his post.<ref name="Nigel Jones Pp. 60-65">{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Wgj8EWapQYgC&q=chamberlain%2C+beck|title=Countdown to Valkyrie: The July Plot to Assassinate Hitler|first=Nigel|last=Jones|date=1 January 2008|publisher=Casemate Publishers|isbn=978-1-84832-508-1 |via=Google Books}}</ref> Chamberlain ultimately ceded to all of Hitler's demands at Munich because he believed Britain and Nazi Germany were "the two pillars of European peace and buttresses against communism".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-hour/finest-hour-162/munich-timeline/|title=Munich Timeline|date=14 February 2015|website=International Churchill Society}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ILnFyBpfOOwC&dq=pillars+of+peace%2C+buttresses+against+communism&pg=PA18|title=The British Political Elite and the Soviet Union|first=Louise Grace|last=Shaw|date=17 June 2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-135-76127-1 |via=Google Books}}</ref>

Czechoslovakia had a modern well-prepared military, and Hitler, on entering [[Prague]], conceded that a war would have cost Germany much blood{{sfn|Grant Duff|1938|p=137}}<ref name=Churchill/> but the decision by France and Britain not to defend Czechoslovakia in the event of war and the exclusion from the equation of the Soviet Union, which Chamberlain distrusted, meant that the outcome would have been uncertain.<ref name=Churchill/> The event forms the main part of what became known as [[Western betrayal|Munich betrayal]] ({{langx|cs|Mnichovská zrada}}) in Czechoslovakia and the rest of Eastern Europe,<ref name="rozhoupaly">[[František Halas]], {{lang|cs|Torzo naděje}} (1938), poem "{{lang|cs|Zpěv úzkosti}}", "{{lang|cs|Zvoní zvoní zrady zvon zrady zvon, Čí ruce ho rozhoupaly, Francie sladká hrdý Albion, a my jsme je milovali}}"</ref> as the Czechoslovak view was that Britain and France had pressured it to cede territory to prevent a major war, which would involve Western Europe. The Western view is that the pressure was done to save Czechoslovakia from total annihilation.

====German annexation of Lithuania's Klaipėda Region====
{{main| 1939 German ultimatum to Lithuania}}
Rumours had reached the [[Lithuania]]n government to the effect that Germany had specific plans to take over [[Klaipėda]]. On 12 March 1939, Foreign Minister [[Juozas Urbšys]] represented Lithuania at the coronation of [[Pope Pius XII]] in Rome. On Urbšys's return to Lithuania, he stopped in Berlin with the hope of clarifying the growing rumours.<ref name=eidintas>{{cite book | last=Eidintas | first=Alfonsas |author2=Vytautas Žalys|author3=Alfred Erich Senn | editor=Ed. Edvardas Tuskenis | title=Lithuania in European Politics: The Years of the First Republic, 1918–1940 | edition=Paperback |date=September 1999 | publisher=[[St. Martin's Press]] | location=New York | isbn=0-312-22458-3 | pages=161–166}}</ref> On 20 March, just five days after the [[Occupation of Czechoslovakia (1938–1945)|German occupation of Prague]], German Foreign Minister [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] agreed to meet Urbšys but not the Lithuanian Ambassador to Berlin, [[Kazys Škirpa]], who was asked to wait in another room. The conversation lasted for about 40 minutes.<ref name=cd117>{{cite book | last=Skirius | first=Juozas | title=Gimtoji istorija. Nuo 7 iki 12 klasės | url=http://mkp.emokykla.lt/gimtoji/ | access-date=14 March 2008 | year=2002 | publisher=Elektroninės leidybos namai | location=Vilnius | isbn=9986-9216-9-4 | chapter=Klaipėdos krašto aneksija 1939–1940 m. | chapter-url=http://mkp.emokykla.lt/gimtoji/?id=10117 | language=lt | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080226131025/http://mkp.emokykla.lt/gimtoji/ | archive-date=26 February 2008 }}</ref> Ribbentrop demanded the return of Klaipėda to Germany and threatened military action. Urbšys relayed the verbal ultimatum to the Lithuanian government. Because the ultimatum was never set down in writing and did not include a formal deadline, some historians downplay its importance and describe it as a "set of demands", rather than as an ultimatum.<ref name=gerutis>{{cite book | last=Gerutis | first=Albertas | editor=Ed. Albertas Gerutis | translator=Algirdas Budreckis | title=Lithuania: 700 Years | year=1984 | edition=6th | publisher=Manyland Books | location=New York |isbn=0-87141-028-1 | pages=247–249 | chapter=Independent Lithuania| lccn=75-80057 }}</ref> However, it was made clear that force would be used should Lithuania resist, and Lithuania was warned not to seek help from other nations. A clear deadline was not given, but Lithuania was told to make a speedy decision and that any clashes or German casualties would inevitably provoke a response from the [[German military]].<ref name=cd117/>

Lithuania secretly informed the signatories of the [[Klaipėda Convention]] about those demands since technically, Lithuania could not transfer Klaipėda without the signatories' approvals.<ref>{{cite journal |journal=New York Times |title=Lithuania Agrees to Yield Memel to Reich After Berlin Asks Speed to Avoid "Clashes" |date=22 March 1939 |page=2}}</ref> Italy and Japan supported Germany in the matter, and the United Kingdom and France expressed sympathy for Lithuania but chose not to offer any material assistance and followed a well-publicized policy of appeasement. The British treated the issue in the same way as the earlier Sudeten Crisis and made no plans to assist Lithuania or the other [[Baltic States]] if they were attacked by Germany.<ref>{{cite book |title=The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War |first=John |last=Hiden |author2=Thomas Lane |pages=31–32 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HzrpExvg2XgC&pg=PA26 |year=1992 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] | isbn=0-521-53120-9| access-date= 28 June 2010 }}</ref> The Soviets supported Lithuania in principle but did not wish to disrupt their relations with Germany since they were contemplating the [[German-Soviet Pact]].<ref name=cd117/> Without any material international support, Lithuania had no choice but to accept the ultimatum. Lithuanian diplomacy characterized the concession as a "necessary evil" to enable Lithuania to preserve its independence, and it maintained the hope that it was merely a temporary retreat.<ref name=eidintas/>

====Outbreak of World War II and Phoney War====
{{Main|Beginning of World War II|Invasion of Poland|Phoney War}}
By August 1939, Hitler was convinced that the democratic nations would never put up any effective opposition to him. He expressed his contempt for them in a speech that he delivered to his Commanders in Chief: "Our enemies have leaders who are below the average. No personalities. No masters, no men of action.... Our enemies are small fry. I saw them in Munich".<ref>[http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2287&language=english ''Hitler's Speech to the Commanders in Chief (22 August 1939)''], German History in Documents and Images (GHDI), ''germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org''</ref>

On 1 September 1939, German forces started their [[invasion of Poland]]. Britain and France joined the war against Germany but initially averted serious military involvement during the period known as the [[Phoney War]]. After the [[German invasion of Norway]], opinion turned against Chamberlain's conduct of the war. He resigned after the [[Norway Debate]] in the British House of Commons, and on 10 May 1940 [[Winston Churchill]] became Prime Minister. In July, after the [[Fall of France]], when Britain stood almost alone against Germany, Hitler offered peace. Some politicians both inside and outside the government were willing to consider the offer, but Churchill refused to do so.<ref>Richard Overy, ''"Civilians on the front-line"'', ''The Second World War – Day 2: The Blitz'', The Guardian/The Observer, September 2009</ref> Chamberlain died on 9 November the same year. Churchill delivered a tribute to him in which he said, "Whatever else history may or may not say about these terrible, tremendous years, we can be sure that Neville Chamberlain acted with perfect sincerity according to his lights and strove to the utmost of his capacity and authority, which were powerful, to save the world from the awful, devastating struggle in which we are now engaged".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/neville-chamberlain/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100702233910/http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/104-neville-chamberlain |title=Neville Chamberlain|date=12 November 1940|archive-date=2 July 2010|website=International Churchill Society}}</ref>