Editing Approval voting (section)

== Effect on elections ==
Research by [[Social choice theory|social choice theorists]] [[Steven Brams]] and [[Dudley R. Herschbach]] found that approval voting would increase voter participation, prevent minor-party candidates from being [[spoiler effect|spoilers]], and reduce negative campaigning.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Brams |first1=Steven J. |last2=Herschbach |first2=Dudley R. |year=2001 |title=The Science of Elections |journal=Science |volume=292 |issue=5521 |pages=1449 |doi=10.1126/science.292.5521.1449 |jstor=3083781 |pmid=11379606 |s2cid=28262658}}</ref> Brams' research concluded that approval can be expected to elect [[Majority preferred candidate|majority-preferred candidates]] in practical election scenarios, avoiding the [[center squeeze]] common to [[Instant-runoff voting|ranked-choice voting]] and [[Two-round system|primary election]]s.<ref>{{cite book |last=Brams |first=Steven J. |url=https://archive.org/details/mathematicsdemoc00bram |title=Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures |date=2008 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=9780691133218 |page=[https://archive.org/details/mathematicsdemoc00bram/page/n31 16] |url-access=limited}}</ref><ref name="theory to practice" />

One study showed that approval would not have chosen the same two winners as plurality voting ([[Jacques Chirac]] and [[Jean-Marie Le Pen]]) in the first round of the [[2002 French presidential election]]; it instead would have chosen Chirac and [[Lionel Jospin]] as the top two candidates to proceed to the runoff.

In the actual election, Le Pen lost by an overwhelming margin in the runoff, 82.2% to 17.8%, a sign that the true top two candidates had not been found. In the approval voting survey primary, Chirac took first place with 36.7%, compared to Jospin at 32.9%. Le Pen, in that study, received 25.1% and so would not have made the cut to the second round. In the real primary election, the top three were Chirac, 19.9%, Le Pen, 16.9%, and Jospin, 16.2%.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Laslier |first1=Jean-François |last2=Vander Straeten |first2=Karine |date=April 2003 |title=Approval Voting: An Experiment during the French 2002 Presidential Election |url=http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/VPP/VPPpdf_Wshop2/jflkvdscaen.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050507223548/http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/VPP/VPPpdf_Wshop2/jflkvdscaen.pdf |archive-date=May 7, 2005 |access-date=July 8, 2014 |page=6}}</ref> A study of various [[Evaluative voting|evaluative voting methods]] (approval and score voting) during the [[2012 French presidential election]] showed that "unifying" candidates tended to do better, and polarizing candidates did worse, as compared to under plurality voting.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Baujard |first1=Antoinette |last2=Igersheim |first2=Herrade |last3=Lebon |first3=Isabelle |last4=Gavrel |first4=Frédéric |last5=Laslier |first5=Jean-François |date=June 1, 2014 |title=Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election |url=https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00803024/file/cahier_2013-05.pdf |url-status=live |journal=Electoral Studies |volume=34 |pages=131–145 |doi=10.1016/j.electstud.2013.11.003 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00803024/file/cahier_2013-05.pdf |archive-date=October 9, 2022}}</ref>

=== Operational impacts ===
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* '''Simple to tally—'''Approval ballots can be counted by some existing machines designed for plurality elections, as ballots are cast, so that final tallies are immediately available after the election, with relatively few if any upgrades to equipment.
* '''Just one round—'''Approval can remove the need for multiple rounds of voting, such as a [[Two-round system|primary]] or a [[Two-round system|run-off]], simplifying the election process.
* '''Avoids overvotes—'''Approval voting does not have the notion of overvotes, where voting for one more than allowed will cancel the entire opportunity to vote. In plurality elections, overvotes have to be reviewed and resolved if possible while in approval voting, no time is wasted on this activity.