Editing Argument from free will (section)

==Omniscience and free will==
[[File:Chess-king.JPG|thumb|right|150px|If God made the game, its rules, and the players, then how can any player be free?]]
Some arguments against the [[existence of God]] focus on the supposed incoherence of humankind possessing [[free will]] and God's [[omniscience]]. These arguments are deeply concerned with the implications of [[predestination]].

Noted Jewish philosopher [[Moses Maimonides]] described the conflict between divine omnipotence and his creation's person's free will, in traditional terms of good and evil actions, as follows:

{{quote|… "Does God know or does He not know that a certain individual will be good or bad? If thou sayest 'He knows', then it necessarily follows that the man is compelled to act as God knew beforehand how he would act, otherwise, God's knowledge would be imperfect.…"<ref name=maimonides>''The Eight Chapters of Maimonides on Ethics (Semonah Perakhim)'', edited, annotated, and translated with an Introduction by Joseph I. Gorfinkle, pp. 99–100. (New York: AMS Press), 1966.</ref>}}

A "standard Anglican" theologian gave a similar description of Christian revelation:
{{quote|… Scripture hold before us two great counter-truths – first, God's absolute sovereignty (cp Rome. 9, 20ff.), and secondly, man's responsibility. Our intellects cannot reconcile them.<ref name="Watt-1946-124">{{cite journal |last1=Watt |first1=William M. |title=Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam |journal=The Muslim World |date=April 1946 |volume=36 |issue=2 |page=124 |doi=10.1111/j.1478-1913.1946.tb02093.x |hdl=1842/34371 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1478-1913.1946.tb02093.x |access-date=19 June 2022|hdl-access=free }}</ref>}}

A logical formulation of this argument might go as follows:<ref name=stanford />
# God knows choice "C" that a human would claim to "make freely".
# It is now necessary that C.
# If it is now necessary that C, then C cannot be otherwise (this is the definition of “necessary”). That is, there are no actual "possibilities" due to predestination.
# If you cannot do otherwise when you act, you do not act freely (Principle of Alternate Possibilities)
# Therefore, when you do an act, you will not do it freely.

[[Norman Swartz]], however, contends that the above arguments commit the [[modal fallacy]]. In particular, he asserts that these arguments assume that if C is true, it becomes necessary for C to be true, which is incorrect as C is contingent (see [[modal logic]]). Otherwise, one can argue that the future is set already regardless of his actions.<ref name=iep />

Other means of reconciling God's omniscience with human free will have been proposed. Some have attempted to redefine or reconceptualize free will:
* God can know in advance what I will do, because free will is to be understood only as freedom from [[coercion]], and anything further is an illusion. This is the move made by [[Compatibilism|compatibilistic]] philosophies.
* The sovereignty (autonomy) of God, existing within a free agent, provides strong inner compulsions toward a course of action (calling), and the power of choice (election). The actions of a human are thus determined by a human acting on relatively strong or weak urges (both from God and the environment around them) and their own relative power to choose.<ref>''The Philosopher's Handbook'', Stanley Rosen, ed., Random House Reference, New York, 2000.</ref>

A proposition first offered by [[Boethius]]<ref>''Consolatio Philosophiae'', Boethius, book 5:4</ref> and later by [[Thomas Aquinas]]<ref group=note>See also ''[[Divine Providence]]'' versus the concept of [[Destiny|Fate]]</ref> and [[C. S. Lewis]], suggests that God's perception of time is different, and that this is relevant to our understanding of our own free will. In his book ''[[Mere Christianity]]'', Lewis argues that God is actually outside time and therefore does not "foresee" events, but rather simply observes them all at once. He explains:
{{quote|But suppose God is outside and above the Time-line. In that case, what we call "tomorrow" is visible to Him in just the same way as what we call "today". All the days are "Now" for Him. He does not remember you doing things yesterday, He simply sees you doing them: because, though you have lost yesterday, He has not. He does not "foresee" you doing things tomorrow, He simply sees you doing them: because, though tomorrow is not yet there for you, it is for Him. You never supposed that your actions at this moment were any less free because God knows what you are doing. Well, He knows your tomorrow's actions in just the same way{{snd}}because He is already in tomorrow and can simply watch you. In a sense, He does not know your action till you have done it: but then the moment at which you have done it is already "Now" for Him.<ref>C. S. Lewis ''Mere Christianity'' Touchstone: New York, 1980 p. 149</ref>}}

A common objection is to argue that [[Molinism]], or the belief that God can know counterfactually the actions of his creations, is true. This has been used as an argument by [[Alvin Plantinga]] and [[William Lane Craig]], amongst others.