Editing Army Group A (section)

== First deployment, 1939–41 ==
{{Multiple image
| image1            = Bundesarchiv Bild 183-L08129, Gerd v. Rundstedt.jpg
| caption1          = [[Gerd von Rundstedt]], first commander of Army Group A
| image2            = Bundesarchiv Bild 183-H01757, Erich von Manstein.jpg
| caption2          = [[Erich von Manstein]], first chief of staff of Army Group A
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}}
Army Group A was formed, through the redesignation of [[Army Group South]], on 26 October 1939 in the central sector of Germany's western frontiers, along the [[France–Germany border]] and [[Belgium–Germany border]], in the broader area of the [[Eifel]] and [[Hunsrück]] mountain ranges. Under its previous name, the army group had fought in the [[Invasion of Poland]] in September and October 1939.<ref name="Tessin 1977">{{Cite book |last=Tessin |first=Georg |title=Die Landstreitkräfte: Namensverbände. Luftstreitkräfte (Fliegende Verbände). Flakeinsatz im Reich 1943-1945. |publisher=Biblio Verlag |year=1977 |isbn=3764810971 |series=Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 |volume=14 |location=Osnabrück |language=de}}</ref>{{Rp|page=7}} The initial commander and chief of staff of Army Group A were the same persons who held these portfolios during the time of Army Group South in Poland, [[Gerd von Rundstedt]] as commander and [[Erich von Manstein]] as chief of staff.<ref>{{Cite book |last=McNab |first=Chris |title=The Fall of Eben Emael: Belgium 1940 |publisher=Osprey Publishing |year=2013 |isbn=9781780962627 |location=Oxford}}</ref>{{Rp|page=13}}

=== Preparations for the Battle of France ===
Enthusiasm among the higher echelons of Army Group A for a repetition of the armored thrusts of the Poland Campaign was initially limited; Army Group A chief of staff [[Georg von Sodenstern]] predicted as late as 5&nbsp;March&nbsp;1940 that a repetition of the swift advances through what was estimated to be a well-developed French defensive line was less than likely.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=23}}

Nonetheless, the military preparations that the Wehrmacht ultimately settled for in regards to the upcoming Western Campaign was in accordance with the "[[Manstein Plan]]", developed by then-chief of staff of Army Group A [[Erich von Manstein]] on his post in the [[Electoral Palace, Koblenz|Koblenz Electoral Palace]], where the HQ of Army Group A was then located. Manstein had developed the first drafts of his conception in late October 1939 upon his first receival of the original deployment plan against France. Whereas this original plan envisaged to place the focus of operations with the northernmost army group, [[Army Group B]], Manstein instead demanded that the focus be shifted towards Army Group A and the German center. In total, Manstein issued seven memoranda (31 October, 6 & 21 & 30 November, 6 & 12 December, 12 January) arguing for his proposal in various ways. As Manstein's insistence annoyed the army's general chief of staff, [[Franz Halder]], he was removed from the position of Army Group A chief of staff and instead moved to the command of the upcoming [[XXXVIII Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|XXXVIII Army Corps]], thus eliminating him from a major command post in the upcoming campaign.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=|pages=78–81}} The [[Mechelen incident]] in January 1940, which provoked a response by the Allied armies and allowed the Germans to observe the Allied defensive movements, gave additional credibility to the Manstein Plan, as it made the encirclement of Allied forces in the Low Countries appear plausible.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=102|pages=}}

The Manstein Plan found its way to Hitler's desk through the interventions of [[Günther Blumentritt]], [[Henning von Tresckow]] and [[Rudolf Schmundt]], and Hitler received Manstein for a private meeting on 17 February 1940 in Berlin. Hitler, who found thought experiments that he had himself had in the previous weeks confirmed in Manstein's more elaborate presentation and ordered its implementation, resulting in a complete shift of plans by OKH, placing the German ''[[Schwerpunkt]]'' southwards in accordance with the Manstein Plan.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=|pages=78–81}} Nonetheless, even though Franz Halder was eventually swayed, many detractors remained. Especially the commander of Army Group B (the army group that stood to lose the most materiel from the change of plans), [[Fedor von Bock]], believed the change of military focus to be an irresponsible gamble. Additionally, the implementation of the plan was not helped by the fact that Halder's intrigue to replace Manstein had resulted in the appointment of [[Georg von Sodenstern]] as chief of staff of Army Group A. A conservative-minded planner, von Sodenstern had initially been selected by Halder precisely because he opposed the Manstein Plan, and was now left to oversee its realization. Indeed, there were now serious reservations in the upper echelons of Army Group A whether or not the motorized and armored formations should truly be in the vanguard during the advance, or whether it would not be preferable to attack with the infantry first. Such doubts were voiced by von Sodenstern, Blumentritt, and notably by army group commander Gerd von Rundstedt himself. This scepticism was not shared by the advocates of rapid armored assaults, such as [[Heinz Guderian]] of [[XIX Army Corps]].<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=|pages=112–119}}

Army Group A would be equipped with [[4th Army (Wehrmacht)|4th Army]], [[12th Army (Wehrmacht)|12th Army]], [[16th Army (Wehrmacht)|16th Army]] and [[Panzer Group Kleist]], commanded by generals [[Günther von Kluge|Kluge]], [[Wilhelm List|List]], [[Ernst Busch (field marshal)|Busch]] and [[Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist|Kleist]], respectively.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=118}} This assignment left the army group with four out of the eight field-army level commands assigned to the three army groups along the western frontier.<ref name="Pöhlmann 2016">{{Cite book |last=Pöhlmann |first=Markus |title=Der Panzer und die Mechanisierung des Krieges: Eine deutsche Geschichte, 1890 bis 1945 |publisher=Ferdinand Schöningh |year=2016 |isbn=9783506783554 |language=de}}</ref>{{Rp|page=312}} Each of these armies as well as the panzer group were equipped with three army corps each, placing the army group at a total of twelve army corps.<ref name="Douglas 2014">{{Cite book |last=Dildy |first=Douglas C. |title=Fall Gelb 1940 (1): Panzer Breakthrough in the West |publisher=Osprey Publishing |year=2014 |isbn=9781782006459 |location=Oxford}}</ref>{{Rp|page=26f.}} Additionally, Army Group A also received the concentration of German armored and motorized formations, as [[5th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|5th]] and [[7th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|7th]] Panzer Divisions ([[XV Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|XV Corps]], [[Hermann Hoth|Hoth]]) were assigned to 4th Army and [[1st Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|1st]], [[2nd Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|2nd]], [[6th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|6th]], [[8th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|8th]] and [[10th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|10th]] Panzer Division (divided among [[XXXXI Panzer Corps|XXXXI Corps]] ([[Georg-Hans Reinhardt|Reinhardt]]) and XIX Corps (Guderian)) assigned to Panzer Group Kleist. Additionally, Panzer Group Kleist also received the [[2nd Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|2nd]], [[13th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|13th]] and [[29th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|29th]] Motorized Infantry Divisions (divided among XXXXI Corps and [[XIV Panzer Corps|XIV Corps]] ([[Gustav Anton von Wietersheim|von Wietersheim]]).<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=118|pages=}} In total, this left Army Group A with seven panzer divisions and three motorized infantry divisions, compared to just three each for Army Group B further north and none of either type for Army Group C in the south.<ref name="Pöhlmann 2016" />{{Rp|page=312}} Whereas Army Groups B and C had 29⅓ and 17 divisions, respectively, Army Group A was equipped with 44⅓ divisions, leaving it as the clear ''Schwerpunkt'' of the German thrust.<ref name="Umbreit 1979">{{Cite book |last=Umbreit, Hans |title=Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem Europäischen Kontinent |publisher=Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt |year=1979 |isbn=3421019355 |editor-last=Maier, Klaus A. |series=Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg |volume=2 |location=Stuttgart |pages=235–328 |chapter=Der Kampf um die Vormachtstellung in Westeuropa |display-editors=et al.}}</ref>{{Rp|page=254}} Additionally, most of the 42 available reserve divisions were earmarked to support Army Group A rather than either of the other two army groups.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=105}} The overall task of Army Group A was to breach the [[Meuse river]] line between the cities of [[Sedan, Ardennes|Sedan]] and [[Dinant]] using a rapid breakthrough of motorized formations and to then advance towards the [[Somme (river)|Somme river estuary]]. In this, 4th Army was to cross the Meuse at Dinant, the 12th Army at Sedan. The 16th Army was to protect the southern flank from Allied counterattack, whereas the [[2nd Army (Wehrmacht)|2nd Army]], initially posted in reserves, would be used to follow the advancing 4th and 12th Armies. Once the latter turned towards the Somme estuary, 2nd Army could then be used to cover the spaces vacated by the two other armies.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=82}} Panzer Group Kleist was to carry the momentum and speed of the assault, receiving a total of 41,140 motorized vehicles including 1,222 tanks (around half of the entire German tank arm's stock) spread across two armored corps and one motorized infantry corps, with a total personnel strength of 134,370. This left Panzer Group Kleist as by far the strongest single motorized formation ever used in warfare up to this point. However, Panzer Group Kleist fell victim to a strange compromise that was caused in no small part by its novelty factor: Rundstedt allowed the panzer group to initially operate autonomously, but placed the condition that it would be placed subservient to either of the infantry armies if it managed to catch up to the panzer group. As a result, the leadership of Panzer Group Kleist had a strong incentive during the campaign for single-minded and daring operations to preserve their organizational autonomy.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=|pages=119–122}}

=== Battle of France ===
{{See also|Battle of France|Case Red}}{{command structure|name=Army&nbsp;Group&nbsp;A|date=10 May 1940<ref name="Douglas 2014"/>{{Rp|26f.}}|parent=[[Oberkommando des Heeres]]|subordinate={{tree list}}
* [[Panzer Group Kleist]]
** [[XIX Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|XIX Corps]]
** [[XLI Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|XLI Corps]]
** [[XIV Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|XIV Corps]]
* [[4th Army (Wehrmacht)|4th Army]]
** [[II Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|II Corps]]
** [[V Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|V Corps]]
** [[VIII Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|VIII Corps]]
* [[12th Army (Wehrmacht)|12th Army]]
** [[III Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|III Corps]]
** [[VI Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|VI Corps]]
** [[XVIII Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|XVIII Corps]]
* [[16th Army (Wehrmacht)|16th Army]]
** [[VII Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|VII Corps]]
** [[XIII Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|XIII Corps]]
** [[XXIII Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|XXIII Corps]]
{{tree list/end}}}}During the [[Battle of France]], Army Group A was pivotal in the implementation of the German breakthrough in the central sector of the front (in accordance with the "Manstein Plan"), with Army Group A forces crossing the [[Ardennes|Ardennes mountain range]],<ref>{{cite book |last=Jackson |first=J. T. |url=https://archive.org/details/falloffrancenazi00jack |title=The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2003 |isbn=978-0-19-280300-9 |location=Oxford |author-link=Julian T. Jackson |url-access=registration}}</ref> and then swiftly turning northwestwards to rush towards the [[English Channel]] and trap the Allied armies in the [[Low Countries]].<ref name="Tessin 1977" />{{Rp|page=7}} In this, Army Group A (von Rundstedt) would cooperate with [[Army Group B]] (von Bock) and [[Army Group C]] ([[Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb|von Leeb]]), all under the joint supervision of [[Oberkommando des Heeres|OKH]].<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Frieser |first=Karl-Heinz |title=Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug 1940 |publisher=De Gruyter Oldenbourg |year=2021 |isbn=9783110745078 |language=de}}</ref>{{Rp|page=16}}

4th Army advanced on the army group's right flank (with [[6th Army (Wehrmacht)|6th Army]] of Army Group B as its right-hand neighbor) from the [[Monschau]] sector along the [[Liège]]—[[Namur]] axis as well as towards [[Dinant]]. To its left, 12th Army stood in the army group's center, with its initial thrust directed from the [[Prüm]] sector via northern [[Luxembourg]] towards [[Neufchâteau, Luxembourg Province|Neufchâteau]] (Belgium) and then towards the Meuse river. Furthest in the south, the 16th Army held the army group's left flank and aimed to advance from the [[Trier]]—[[Merzig]] sector over [[Luxembourg City]] towards [[Longuyon]].<ref name="Umbreit 1979" />{{Rp|page=253}} In its entire sector, Army Group A developed a large numerical advantage, advancing its own 45 divisions through territories held by only 18 enemy divisions.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=106}}

Within days of the beginning of the campaign, the troops of Army Group A achieved what one of the army group's staff officers, Günther Blumentritt, would later refer to as a "three-fold miracle": The Allied air forces failed to attack the lengthy tank columns that were stuck for hours on end in traffic jams trying to cross the Ardennes, the Germans succeeded with high speed and low casualties to cross the Meuse river with the breakthrough in the [[Battle of Sedan (1940)|Battle of Sedan]], and the German tank divisions finally won a stunning victory in what was at times a more than reckless advance towards the channel coast, dangerously abandoning the cover of the German thrust's flank against a potential Allied counterattack that never materialized.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=2f.}}

There was a repeated tendency during the early days of the campaign where the Army Group A high command and the political leadership would advocate caution, but their instructions overruled and ignored by the divisional and corps commanders on the ground. [[Georg-Hans Reinhardt]] of XXXXI Corps ignored a direct oder by the army group and instead advanced with his troops out of their bridgehead at [[Monthermé]]. A similar action was undertaken by [[Heinz Guderian]] of XIX Corps, who on 14 May was dissatisfied with the prospect of Army Group A leadership using his tanks to safeguard the bridgehead rather than to exploit the momentary disarray in the French army's rear. The leader of the panzer group, Ewald von Kleist, found himself in the difficult situation of mediating between his superior army group and his subordinate corps commanders; Kleist had initially covered Reinhardt's autonomous actions but was forced on 17 May to give a definitive holding order to Guderian, as Hitler personally had decreed a deceleration of the armored advance. This order remained in place until 19 May.<ref name="Pöhlmann 2016" />{{Rp|page=316f.}}

When the operational delay of 17 May was revoked on 19 May, the tanks' thrust into the Allied rear continued. There was temporary panic among Army Group A higher-ups when on 21 May, a British attack hit the exposed German flank at [[Arras]], resulting in the [[Battle of Arras (1940)|Battle of Arras]]. This attack was however repelled within hours. The first German forces had already reached the channel coast at 02:00 in the morning on 20 May, when 2nd Rifle Regiment of [[2nd Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|2nd Panzer Division]] reached [[Noyelles-sur-Mer]]. This left the northern sector of the French Army, the [[Belgian Land Component|Belgian Army]] and the [[British Expeditionary Force (World War II)|British Expeditionary Force]] cut off in the Low Countries.<ref name="Pöhlmann 2016" />{{Rp|page=317f.}}
{{See also|Battle of Dunkirk|Dunkirk evacuation}}
[[File:21May-4June1940-Fall Gelb.svg|thumb|Western front, 21 May – 4 June]]
By 24 May, the Germans had encircled the critical channel ports of [[Boulogne-sur-Mer]] and [[Calais]] and were just 15&nbsp;km off the last partially unobstructed port that the encircled Allied forces could use, [[Dunkirk]], where the Allies began to rapidly implement [[Dunkirk evacuation|an evacuation of their forces]]. Particular historical interest has been given to a sequence of events on 24 May 1940 known as the "halting order" ({{Langx|de|Haltebefehl|links=no}}), where the armored formations were ordered to halt outside of Dunkirk and to instead prioritize infantry formations in the [[Battle of Dunkirk]]. Popular imagination of both German and Western Allied postwar observers was captured by the idea that the German tanks might have inflicted horrific casualties on the encircled and tightly-packed Allied infantry, if they had not been stopped by undue meddling by higher military command. Hitler had personally insisted on the preservation of the remaining tank forces on 24 May, overruling even [[Walther von Brauchitsch]], the commander-in-chief of the German army, after a worrying 23 May report by Ewald von Kleist had placed the casualties of his panzer group at "over 50%". Hitler in this concurred with the leadership of Army Group A and went against the intuition of von Brauchitsch, who even attempted to transfer the 4th Army away from Army Group A to insist on his own vision. Due to a coincidence, Hitler happened to be present at Army Group A headquarters on 24 May, and overruled Brauchitsch's instructions, implementing instead the "halting order". The halting order was revoked on 26 May and Dunkirk captured on 4 June. While the British army had been forced to leave behind much of its heavy equipment (including 475 tanks), some 340,000 British and Allied soldiers were successfully evacuated out of Dunkirk.<ref name="Pöhlmann 2016" />{{Rp|page=318}}

After the Allied evacuation at Dunkirk, Army Group A tuned southeast and advanced in the general direction of the [[Vosges|Vosges mountains]] and the [[France–Switzerland border]], thus encircling the static French forces positioned along the [[Maginot Line]].<ref name="Tessin 1977" />{{Rp|page=7}}

=== Occupation of France ===
On 10 October 1940, Army Group A became the first army group upon whose commander the designation of [[OB West|''Supreme Commander in the West'']] was bestowed, thus placing them in charge of the military dimension of the [[German military administration in occupied France during World War II|German occupation of France]].<ref name="Tessin 1977" />{{Rp|page=7}} On 15 April 1941, this responsibility was passed to [[Army Group D]].<ref name="Tessin 1977" />{{Rp|page=49}} Army Group A had in the meantime been repurposed on 1 April 1941 and earmarked for deployment to [[Occupation of Poland (1939–1945)|German-occupied Poland]].<ref name="Tessin 1977" />{{Rp|page=7}}

=== Preparations for Barbarossa ===
Starting on 1 April 1941, Army Group A was assigned the cover name Section Staff Winter ({{Langx|de|Abschnittsstab Winter|label=none}}), later changed to Section Staff Silesia ({{Langx|de|Abschnittsstab Schlesien|label=none}}), to prepare for [[Operation Barbarossa]], the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|German invasion of the Soviet Union]]. On the day that this offensive began, 22 June 1941, Army Group A was formally renamed "[[Army Group South]]", thus ending the first deployment of Army Group A.<ref name="Tessin 1977" />{{Rp|page=7}}