Editing Axis powers (section)

== Origins and creation ==
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{{Main|Anti-Comintern Pact|Tripartite Pact|Pact of Steel}}
The term "axis" was first applied to the Italo-German relationship by the Italian prime minister [[Benito Mussolini]] in September 1923, when he wrote in the preface to Roberto Suster's ''La'' ''Germania Repubblicana'' that "there is no doubt that in this moment the axis of European history passes through Berlin" (''non v'ha dubbio che in questo momento l'asse della storia europea passa per Berlino'').<ref>Martin-Dietrich Glessgen and Günter Holtus, eds., ''Genesi e dimensioni di un vocabolario etimologico'', Lessico Etimologico Italiano: Etymologie und Wortgeschichte des Italienischen (Ludwig Reichert, 1992), p. 63.</ref> At the time, he was seeking an alliance with the [[Weimar Republic]] against [[Kingdom of Yugoslavia|Yugoslavia]] and [[French Third Republic|France]] in the dispute over the [[Free State of Fiume]].<ref name=Watt>D. C. Watt, "The Rome–Berlin Axis, 1936–1940: Myth and Reality", ''The Review of Politics'', 22: 4 (1960), pp. 530–531.</ref>

The term was used by [[Kingdom of Hungary (1920–1946)|Hungary]]'s prime minister [[Gyula Gömbös]] when advocating an alliance of Hungary with Germany and Italy in the early 1930s.{{sfn|Sinor|1959|p=291}} Gömbös' efforts did affect the Italo-Hungarian [[Rome Protocols]], but his sudden death in 1936 while negotiating with Germany in [[Munich]] and the arrival of [[Kálmán Darányi]], his successor, ended Hungary's involvement in pursuing a trilateral axis.{{sfn|Sinor|1959|p=291}} Contentious negotiations between the Italian foreign minister, [[Galeazzo Ciano]], and the German ambassador, [[Ulrich von Hassell]], resulted in a [[Italo-German protocol of 23 October 1936|Nine-Point Protocol]], signed by Ciano and his German counterpart, [[Konstantin von Neurath]], in 1936. When Mussolini publicly announced the signing on 1 November, he proclaimed the creation of a Rome–Berlin axis.<ref name=Watt/>

===Initial proposals of a German–Italian alliance===
Italy under ''[[Duce]]'' [[Benito Mussolini]] had pursued a strategic alliance of Italy with Germany against France since the early 1920s.{{sfn|Knox|2000|p=124}} Prior to becoming head of government in Italy as leader of the [[Italian Fascism|Italian Fascist]] movement, Mussolini had advocated alliance with defeated Germany after the [[Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920)]] settled [[World War I]].{{sfn|Knox|2000|p=124}} He believed that Italy could expand its influence in Europe by allying with Germany against France.{{sfn|Knox|2000|p=124}} In early 1923, as a goodwill gesture to Germany, Italy secretly delivered weapons for the ''[[Reichswehr]]'', which had faced major disarmament under the provisions of the [[Treaty of Versailles]].{{sfn|Knox|2000|p=124}}

Since the 1920s Italy had identified the year 1935 as a crucial date for preparing for a war against France, as 1935 was the year when Germany's obligations under the Treaty of Versailles were scheduled to expire.{{sfn|Knox|2000|p=125}} Meetings took place in Berlin in 1924 between Italian General [[Luigi Capello]] and prominent figures in the German military, such as von Seeckt and [[Erich Ludendorff]], over military collaboration between Germany and Italy. The discussions concluded that Germans still wanted a war of revenge against France but were short on weapons and hoped that Italy could assist Germany.<ref>John Gooch. ''Mussolini and His Generals: The Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922–1940''. Cambridge University Press, 2007. p. 11.</ref>

However at this time Mussolini stressed one important condition that Italy must pursue in an alliance with Germany: that Italy "must&nbsp;... tow them, not be towed by them".{{sfn|Knox|2000|p=124}} Italian foreign minister [[Dino Grandi]] in the early 1930s stressed the importance of "decisive weight", involving Italy's relations between France and Germany, in which he recognized that Italy was not yet a major power, but perceived that Italy did have strong enough influence to alter the political situation in Europe by placing the weight of its support onto one side or another, and sought to balance relations between the three.<ref name=":0">Gerhard Schreiber, Bern Stegemann, Detlef Vogel. ''Germany and the Second World War''. Oxford University Press, 1995. p. 113.</ref>{{sfn|Burgwyn|1997|p=68}}

===Danube alliance, dispute over Austria===
[[File:Adolf Hitler cropped restored.jpg|thumb|upright|left|[[Adolf Hitler]], ''Führer and Reich Chancellor of the German People'', 1933–1945]]
In 1933, [[Adolf Hitler]] and the Nazi Party [[Machtergreifung|came to power]] in Germany. Hitler had advocated an alliance between Germany and Italy since the 1920s.<ref>Christian Leitz. Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933–1941: The Road to Global War. p. 10.</ref> Shortly after being appointed [[Chancellor of Germany]], Hitler sent a personal message to Mussolini, declaring "admiration and homage" and declaring his anticipation of the prospects of German–Italian friendship and even alliance.{{sfn|Burgwyn|1997|p=75}} Hitler was aware that Italy held concerns over potential German land claims on South Tyrol, and assured Mussolini that Germany was not interested in South Tyrol. Hitler in ''[[Mein Kampf]]'' had declared that South Tyrol was a non-issue considering the advantages that would be gained from a German–Italian alliance. After Hitler's rise to power, the Four Power Directorate proposal by Italy had been looked at with interest by Britain, but Hitler was not committed to it, resulting in Mussolini urging Hitler to consider the diplomatic advantages Germany would gain by breaking out of isolation by entering the Directorate and avoiding an immediate armed conflict.{{sfn|Burgwyn|1997|p=81}} The Four Power Directorate proposal stipulated that Germany would no longer be required to have limited arms and would be granted the right to re-armament under foreign supervision in stages.{{sfn|Burgwyn|1997|p=82}} Hitler completely rejected the idea of controlled rearmament under foreign supervision.{{sfn|Burgwyn|1997|p=82}}

Mussolini did not trust Hitler's intentions regarding [[Anschluss]] nor Hitler's promise of no territorial claims on South Tyrol.{{sfn|Burgwyn|1997|p=76}} Mussolini informed Hitler that he was satisfied with the presence of the anti-Marxist government of [[Engelbert Dollfuss]] in the [[First Austrian Republic]], and warned Hitler that he was adamantly opposed to Anschluss.{{sfn|Burgwyn|1997|p=76}} Hitler responded in contempt to Mussolini that he intended "to throw Dollfuss into the sea".{{sfn|Burgwyn|1997|p=76}} With this disagreement over Austria, relations between Hitler and Mussolini steadily became more distant.{{sfn|Burgwyn|1997|p=76}}

Hitler attempted to break the impasse with Italy over Austria by sending [[Hermann Göring]] to negotiate with Mussolini in 1933 to convince Mussolini to press Austria to appoint [[Austrian Nazism|Austrian Nazis]] to the government.{{sfn|Burgwyn|1997|p=78}} Göring claimed that Nazi domination of Austria was inevitable and that Italy should accept this, as well as repeating to Mussolini of Hitler's promise to "regard the question of the South Tyrol frontier as finally liquidated by the peace treaties".{{sfn|Burgwyn|1997|p=78}} In response to Göring's visit with Mussolini, Dollfuss immediately went to Italy to counter any German diplomatic headway.{{sfn|Burgwyn|1997|p=78}} Dollfuss claimed that his government was actively challenging Marxists in Austria and claimed that once the Marxists were defeated in Austria, that support for Austria's Nazis would decline.{{sfn|Burgwyn|1997|p=78}}

In June 1934, Hitler and Mussolini met for the first time, in [[Venice]]. The meeting did not proceed amicably. Hitler demanded that Mussolini compromise on Austria by pressuring Dollfuss to appoint Austrian Nazis to his cabinet, to which Mussolini flatly refused the demand. In response, Hitler promised that he would accept Austria's independence for the time being, saying that due to the internal tensions in Germany (referring to sections of the Nazi [[Sturmabteilung]] that Hitler would soon kill in the [[Night of the Long Knives]]) that Germany could not afford to provoke Italy.{{sfn|Neville|2004|p=123}} [[Galeazzo Ciano]] told the press that the two leaders had made a "gentleman's agreement" to avoid interfering in Austria.<ref name="knickerbocker1941">{{cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RwGwpIBHhgcC&pg=PA7 | title=Is Tomorrow Hitler's? 200 Questions On the Battle of Mankind | publisher=Reynal & Hitchcock | author=Knickerbocker, H.R. | year=1941 | pages=7–8}}</ref>

[[File:DollfussEnGinebra1933.jpeg|thumb|upright|[[Engelbert Dollfuss]], Chancellor of Austria, 1932–1934]]
Several weeks after the Venice meeting, on 25 July 1934, Austrian Nazis assassinated Dollfuss.{{sfn|Neville|2004|p=123}} Mussolini was outraged as he held Hitler directly responsible for the assassination that violated Hitler's promise made only weeks ago to respect Austrian independence.{{sfn|Neville|2004|pp=123–125}}{{r|knickerbocker1941}} Mussolini rapidly deployed several army divisions and air squadrons to the [[Brenner Pass]], and warned that a German move against Austria would result in war between Germany and Italy.<ref>Gordon Martel. ''Origins of Second World War Reconsidered: A. J. P. Taylor and Historians''. Digital Printing edition. Routledge, 2003. p. 179.</ref> Hitler responded by both denying Nazi responsibility for the assassination and issuing orders to dissolve all ties between the German Nazi Party and its Austrian branch, which Germany claimed was responsible for the political crisis.<ref>Gordon Martel. ''Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context''. New Brunswick, New Jersey, US: Transaction Publishers, 2006. p. 179.</ref>

Italy effectively abandoned diplomatic relations with Germany while turning to France in order to challenge Germany's intransigence by signing a Franco–Italian accord to protect Austrian independence.{{sfn|Neville|2004|p=125}} French and Italian military staff discussed possible military cooperation involving a war with Germany should Hitler dare to attack Austria.

Relations between Germany and Italy recovered due to Hitler's support of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, while other countries condemned the invasion and advocated sanctions against Italy.

===Development of German–Italian–Japanese alliance===

[[File:Hideo Kodama 01.jpg|thumb|left|upright|[[Hideo Kodama]], a wartime cabinet minister in the Empire of Japan]]

Interest in Germany and Japan in forming an alliance began when Japanese diplomat [[Hiroshi Ōshima]] visited [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] in Berlin in 1935.{{sfn|Boscaro|Gatti|Raveri|1990|pp=32–39}} Although at the time Japan was unwilling to make an alliance against the United Kingdom and France, Oshima informed von Ribbentrop of Japan's interest in forming a German–Japanese alliance against the Soviet Union.<ref name=":1">{{Harvp|Weinberg|2005|p=30–31}}</ref>{{sfn|Boscaro|Gatti|Raveri|1990|pp=32–39}} Von Ribbentrop expanded on Oshima's proposal by advocating that the alliance be based in a political context of a pact to oppose the [[Comintern]].{{sfn|Boscaro|Gatti|Raveri|1990|pp=32–39}} The proposed pact was met with mixed reviews in Japan, with a faction of ultra-nationalists within the government supporting the pact while the [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] and the [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)|Japanese Foreign Ministry]] were staunchly opposed to the pact.{{sfn|Boscaro|Gatti|Raveri|1990|p=33}} There was great concern in the Japanese government that such a pact with Germany could disrupt Japan's relations with Britain, endangering years of a beneficial [[Anglo-Japanese Alliance|Anglo-Japanese accord]], that had allowed Japan to ascend in the international community in the first place.{{sfn|Boscaro|Gatti|Raveri|1990|p=38}} The response to the pact was met with similar division in Germany; while the proposed pact was popular amongst the upper echelons of the Nazi Party, it was opposed by many in the Foreign Ministry, the Army, and the business community who held financial interests in the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] to which Japan was hostile.

[[File:OKAWA Shumei.jpg|thumb|upright|Japanese writer [[Shūmei Ōkawa]], a key exponent of Japanese nationalism]]

On learning of German–Japanese negotiations, Italy also began to take an interest in forming an alliance with Japan.{{sfn|Boscaro|Gatti|Raveri|1990|pp=32–39}} Italy had hoped that due to Japan's long-term close relations with Britain, that an Italo-Japanese alliance could pressure Britain into adopting a more accommodating stance towards Italy in the Mediterranean.{{sfn|Boscaro|Gatti|Raveri|1990|pp=32–39}} In the summer of 1936, Italian Foreign Minister [[Galeazzo Ciano]] informed Japanese Ambassador to Italy, Sugimura Yotaro, "I have heard that a Japanese–German agreement concerning the Soviet Union has been reached, and I think it would be natural for a similar agreement to be made between Italy and Japan."{{sfn|Boscaro|Gatti|Raveri|1990|pp=32–39}} Initially Japan's attitude towards Italy's proposal was generally dismissive, viewing a German–Japanese alliance against the Soviet Union as imperative while regarding an Italo-Japanese alliance as secondary, as Japan anticipated that an Italo-Japanese alliance would antagonize Britain that had condemned Italy's invasion of Ethiopia.{{sfn|Boscaro|Gatti|Raveri|1990|pp=32–39}} This attitude by Japan towards Italy altered in 1937 after the League of Nations condemned Japan for aggression in China and faced international isolation, while Italy remained favourable to Japan.{{sfn|Boscaro|Gatti|Raveri|1990|pp=32–39}} As a result of Italy's support for Japan against international condemnation, Japan took a more positive attitude towards Italy and offered proposals for a non-aggression or neutrality pact with Italy.{{sfn|Boscaro|Gatti|Raveri|1990|pp=39–40}}

[[File:Lt.Gen Hiroshi Ōshima IJA.jpg|left|upright|thumb|Lt.Gen [[Hiroshi Ōshima]], Japanese ambassador to Germany before and during World War II]]

The Tripartite Pact was signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan on 27 September 1940, in Berlin. The pact was subsequently joined by Hungary (20 November 1940), Romania (23 November 1940), Slovakia (24 November 1940), and Bulgaria (1 March 1941).{{sfn|Hill|2003|p=91}}